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ABSTRACT
This paper reviews ﬁ  nancial stability challenges 
in the EU candidate countries: Croatia, the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 
Turkey. It follows a macro-prudential approach, 
emphasising systemic risks and the stability of 
ﬁ  nancial systems as a whole. 
The paper recalls that the economies of all three 
countries experienced a recession in 2008-09 
and shows how this slowed the rapid process 
of  ﬁ   nancial deepening that had been taking 
place since the beginning of the last decade. 
The deteriorating economic and ﬁ  nancial 
conditions manifested themselves, ﬁ  rst  and 
foremost, through a marked deterioration in 
asset quality. These direct credit risks were 
compounded by the transformation of exchange 
and interest rate risks through a widespread use 
of foreign exchange-denominated or indexed 
loans and variable or adjustable interest rate 
loans. Moreover, funding and liquidity risks 
also materialised to some extent, although fully 
ﬂ  edged bank runs were avoided, and none of 
the countries experienced a sharp reversal in 
external ﬁ  nancing. 
Overall, the deterioration in asset quality 
has so far been managed well by the 
banking systems of the candidate countries, 
facilitated by large capital buffers, pro-active 
macro-prudential policies pursued by the 
authorities both before and during the crisis and 
the relative stability of exchange rates. Looking 
ahead, although uncertainties remain high 
regarding credit quality, the shock-absorbing 
capacities of the banking systems are fairly 
robust, as also evidenced by their relative 
resilience so far. Nevertheless, as the economic 
recovery sets in, the central banks should return 
to and possibly reinforce the implementation of 
measures to avoid a pro-cyclical build-up of credit 
(asset) boom-bust cycles. Furthermore, given 
the relevance of foreign-owned banks in two of 
the three countries, a continued strengthening of 
home-host cooperation in the supervisory area 
will be crucial to avoid any kind of regulatory 
arbitrage, to enhance the efﬁ  ciency  of 
macro-prudential measures and to provide 
authorities with comprehensive information for 
planning their actions. 
Key words: Europe, banking sector, vulnerability 
indicators, macro-prudential approach, emerging 
markets
JEL Classiﬁ  cation: F32, F41, G21, G287
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This paper provides an assessment of ﬁ  nancial 
stability issues in the EU candidate countries: 
Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and Turkey. It examines potential 
sources of vulnerability from a macroeconomic 
perspective as well as ﬁ  nancial sector challenges, 
highlighting risks pertaining to each country 
individually or to the group as a whole.
Over the past two years, the largely 
bank-based  ﬁ   nancial systems of Croatia, the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 
Turkey have been operating in an increasingly 
challenging ﬁ  nancial and economic environment. 
The candidate countries were barely affected 
by the initial global ﬁ   nancial turmoil given 
their limited exposure to ﬁ   nancial assets that 
turned “toxic”, but they were severely hit as the 
global crisis intensiﬁ  ed through a combination 
of real, ﬁ   nancial and conﬁ  dence  channels. 
The abrupt deterioration in the external 
environment, coupled with an unwinding of 
some domestic overheating pressures, tipped all 
three economies into recession in 2008-09. This 
crisis also slowed the rapid process of ﬁ  nancial 
deepening that had been taking place since the 
beginning of the last decade – notwithstanding 
considerable differences in the level of economic 
development across the countries.
Turning to speciﬁ  c risks in the ﬁ  nancial sector, 
the deteriorating economic and ﬁ  nancial 
conditions manifested themselves, ﬁ  rst  and 
foremost, through a marked deterioration in 
asset quality. These direct credit risks were 
compounded by the transformation of exchange 
and interest rate risks through a widespread use 
of foreign exchange-denominated or indexed 
loans and variable or adjustable interest rate 
loans. In particular, while credit institutions 
have managed to limit currency mismatches, 
partly through the successful use of prudential 
policies, currency mismatches on the balance 
sheets of borrowers represent a risk from a 
systemic stability perspective. Nevertheless, 
the deterioration in asset quality has so far 
been managed well, facilitated by large capital 
buffers, pro-active macro-prudential policies 
pursued by the authorities both before and after 
the crisis and the relative stability of exchange 
rates. Moreover, loan loss provisions are high, 
particularly in the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia and in Turkey. Looking ahead, 
further developments in asset quality will require 
close monitoring. Given that asset quality tends 
to lag behind the business cycle and that debt 
servicing problems may become aggravated as 
new loan portfolios start maturing, some further 
gradual deterioration in asset quality cannot be 
excluded (even though the trend in terms of 
non-performing loans in Turkey had started to 
revert back to moderate declines already towards 
the end of 2009). 
A second main risk to ﬁ  nancial stability relates 
to funding or liquidity risks. Domestic funding 
dominates the banking systems of candidate 
countries, the bulk of it stemming from deposits 
and capital.1 This limits vulnerability to external 
liquidity shocks, even though the widespread 
deposit-based funding does leave banking 
systems exposed to the classical risks of deposit 
withdrawals. Such risks partially materialised in 
the last quarter of 2008, when deposits declined 
in Croatia and in the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia. Conﬁ  dence-building  measures 
by the national authorities, including an increase 
in deposit insurance limits in Croatia, and 
intensiﬁ  ed communication by all central banks, 
helped to stem deposit withdrawals and avoid 
fully ﬂ  edged bank runs, although deposit growth 
remains subdued in all three countries to date.
Despite the candidate countries’ heavy reliance 
on domestic funding, risks on the external side 
are also non-negligible as the external liabilities 
of the countries’ banking sectors range between 
13% and 20% of total liabilities. These external 
funding risks only partially materialised during 
the crisis, as none of the countries experienced 
a sharp reversal in external ﬁ  nancing. In Croatia 
Other sources of domestic funding, such as domestic debt  1 
securities, are negligible, reﬂ   ecting the limited scope for 
institutional investors owing to a low level of development 
of corporate debt markets, as well as the absence of legal 
frameworks for the issuance of covered bonds.8
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and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, external funding is mainly 
channelled through foreign-owned banks – 
generally headquartered in the European 
Union – that hold over 90% of the total assets. 
The presence of EU banks was generally 
considered to be a stabilising factor for the 
banking systems of the western Balkan 
economies given that their lending is less 
constrained by local shocks, but the crisis 
highlighted the potential for bi-directional 
spillovers, namely when shocks originating in 
the home countries of parent banks might 
also adversely affect subsidiaries. However, 
the experience so far has conﬁ  rmed the strategic 
and long-term interest of parent banks in the 
region.2 In particular, the share of external 
liabilities in total liabilities increased steadily 
in Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia during the crisis, suggesting that 
subsidiaries did not experience severe 
funding strains.
Overall, banking systems in the three countries 
have weathered the strains in domestic and 
international funding sources well. Relatively 
high levels of capital contributed to this 
resilience. Liquidity risks were also contained 
through abundant liquidity provision by central 
banks, but a further deterioration in international 
liquidity conditions and possible further 
balance sheet restructuring in some western 
European parent banks could lead to a sudden 
deterioration in liquidity conditions for banking 
systems in candidate countries. Looking ahead, 
if the reduced availability or higher cost of 
external ﬁ  nancing prevail and domestic savings 
remain subdued, increased competition for retail 
deposits may raise funding costs and erode 
net interest margins in the future, which could 
aggravate pressures caused by still fairly robust 
but recently deteriorating proﬁ  tability.
Prior to the crisis, the central banks in 
the candidate countries used pro-active 
macro-prudential policies to stem systemic risks 
in the ﬁ  nancial systems, particularly risks from 
high credit growth resulting from the economic 
convergence process and the concomitant 
large capital inﬂ   ows. Central banks in the 
candidate countries had limited possibilities 
to address these risks by means of traditional 
monetary policy instruments. Accordingly, 
the three countries resorted to several less 
conventional measures to stem credit growth and 
to inﬂ  uence the structure of loans towards those 
denominated in domestic currency. All in all, 
the various measures helped limit credit growth 
and avert a pro-cyclical emergence of banking 
crises in the candidate countries. At the same 
time, the measures to some extent displaced 
problems out of the banking system into other 
segments of the economy (e.g. increased 
external indebtedness as companies were 
induced to borrow directly from abroad). 
As the crisis unfolded, central banks were 
able to unwind some of their earlier measures, 
thereby contributing to an easing of liquidity 
constraints and avoiding signiﬁ  cant  spillovers 
from deteriorating economic conditions into the 
ﬁ  nancial sector.
Candidate countries beneﬁ   ted not only directly from the  2 
presence of foreign banks, but also indirectly as a result of 
positive spillovers from parent bank commitments made to other 
countries in the region within the framework of the European 
Bank Coordination Initiative.9
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This paper reviews ﬁ  nancial stability challenges 
in Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and Turkey. All three countries enjoy 
EU candidate country status, albeit with varying 
degrees of progress towards EU membership. 
Croatia, an EU candidate country since 
June 2004, opened accession negotiations on 
3 October 2005. These are now well-advanced. 
Accession by 2012 seems to be within reach but 
remains crucially dependent on further reforms 
to the judicial system and progress in the area 
of competition policy, particularly with regard 
to the privatisation of the country’s loss-making 
shipyards. The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia became a candidate country in 
December 2005. In October 2009 the European 
Commission recommended starting accession 
negotiations with the country, but no start date 
has been set thus far. Turkey started EU accession 
negotiations on 3 October 2005, having been 
recognised as a candidate for EU membership 
since 1999. The European Commission started 
negotiations on the individual chapters of the 
acquis communautaire in June 2006, and one 
chapter was provisionally closed in the same 
month. In December 2006 the European Council, 
owing to the lack of progress in the extension of 
the customs union to the EU Member States, 
decided to suspend talks on eight out of the 
35 chapters as well as against provisionally 
closing any other chapters for the time being. 
This paper provides an update of ECB (2008) 
and complements this earlier paper with a clear 
macro-prudential focus, insofar as the emphasis 
is on the analysis of ﬁ   nancial systems as a 
whole. It provides an overview of the structure 
of the ﬁ  nancial systems in each of the countries 
and examines potential sources of vulnerability 
from a macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial  system 
perspective, highlighting common and country-
speciﬁ  c risks.3
Given the increasingly challenging ﬁ  nancial and 
economic environment in which the banking 
systems of the candidate countries had to operate 
in 2008 and 2009, the rapid process of ﬁ  nancial 
deepening that had been taking place since 
the beginning of the last decade has slowed 
considerably in all countries. The paper starts by 
examining speciﬁ  c risks in the ﬁ  nancial sector. 
In particular, the deteriorating economic and 
ﬁ  nancial conditions manifested themselves ﬁ  rst 
and foremost through a marked deterioration 
in asset quality. These direct credit risks were 
compounded by the transformation of exchange 
and interest rate risks through a widespread use of 
foreign exchange-denominated or indexed loans 
and variable or adjustable interest rate loans. A 
second main risk investigated relates to funding 
or liquidity risks. The paper looks into funding 
structures and the resulting vulnerabilities thereof. 
It also touches on the question of whether the 
presence of EU banks via their subsidiaries has 
proved to be beneﬁ  cial in practice for the banking 
systems of the candidate countries. It tries to 
assess how the banking systems coped with these 
risks as well as the main vulnerabilities to be 
monitored in this regard in the future. In addition, 
the paper takes a look at macro-prudential policies 
used in the candidate countries to stem systemic 
risks in ﬁ  nancial systems prior to the crisis, as 
well as policies and measures taken to alleviate 
the impact of the crisis.  
The paper has two main parts. The ﬁ  rst focuses 
on developments in the three individual countries, 
where each country section discusses the 
macroeconomic environment, reviews structural 
developments in the ﬁ  nancial system, assesses the 
risks and shock-absorbing capacity of the banking 
system and provides a concluding assessment. 
These country sections are complemented 
with special features that cover a number of 
overarching themes: (i) the distribution of major 
banking stability indicators across individual 
banks; (ii) the results of macro stress tests for the 
candidate countries; (iii) the quality of assets at 
the sectoral level at the turn of the credit cycle; 
(iv) the funding structures of banking systems; 
(v) the role of parent banks in the candidate 
countries; (vi) the trends in terms of foreign 
exchange-denominated loans and deposits; and 
(vii) measures taken to tackle the crisis.
The cut-off date for this paper is mid-May 2010. 3 10
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1 CROATIA
1.1  THE MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
After the boom years between 2002 and 2007, 
which were characterised by buoyant growth in 
domestic demand, the Croatian economy saw a 
gradual slowdown in economic growth during 
2008 on the back of the unfolding global ﬁ  nancial 
turmoil. The downward trend reached its peak in 
the ﬁ  rst half of 2009, when the spillovers from 
the global crisis fully hit the Croatian economy 
and led to the deepest recession since early 
transition. The severe economic downturn also 
entailed notable changes in the growth pattern: 
while domestic demand plummeted as a result of 
waning consumer conﬁ  dence, tightening credit 
conditions, ﬁ  scal adjustments and deteriorating 
labour market conditions, the contribution of 
net exports to GDP growth became markedly 
positive, despite the collapse in world trade, 
with imports contracting even more strongly 
than exports.
Against this backdrop, Croatia’s external 
imbalances narrowed considerably in 2009, 
with the current account deﬁ  cit falling to 5.3% 
of GDP, down from 9.3% in 2008 (the highest 
level since the mid-1990s). Nevertheless, 
ﬁ   nancing needs were high, especially in the 
ﬁ  rst quarter of 2009, when the limited access 
to foreign funds, portfolio investment outﬂ  ows 
and more moderate foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inﬂ  ows translated into declining foreign 
exchange reserves. However, given the gradually 
softening global liquidity conditions, ﬁ  nancing 
pressures started to ease from the second 
quarter of 2009. As a result of falling GDP and 
continued (though more moderate) increases 
in debt ﬁ  nancing, Croatia’s gross foreign debt 
increased further and stood at 98.2% of GDP 
at the end of 2009 (see Table 1). The increase 
reﬂ  ected a revival of foreign borrowing by the 
corporate sector in the latter part of the year 
(which had largely come to a halt at the turn of 
2008-09) and two government bond issues on 
international ﬁ  nancial markets in 2009. At the 
same time, reserve accumulation resumed and 
by the end of 2009 foreign exchange reserves 
had returned to the levels recorded before 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers at around 
€10 billion (or some 22% of GDP). 
The conduct of monetary policy remained 
challenging in 2008 and 2009. In the ﬁ  rst half 
of 2008 the Croatian National Bank’s (CNB) 
focus was on containing inﬂ  ationary  pressures 
related to adverse global food and energy price 
developments (which drove average inﬂ  ation to a 
near 15-year high in 2008), as well as on reining in 
credit growth driven by banks’ foreign liabilities. 
However, the CNB’s priorities quickly changed to 
safeguarding exchange rate and ﬁ  nancial stability 
when the global ﬁ  nancial market turmoil gained 
Table 1 Croatia: Main macroeconomic indicators
Description 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 1) 2011 1)
Real GDP growth Percentage period average 5.0 4.2 4.2 4.7 5.5 2.4 -5.8 -0.5 2.0
Inﬂ  ation Percentage, period average, 
harmonised deﬁ  nition 2.4 2.1 3.0 3.3 2.7 5.8 2.2 1.5 3.0
Repo rate Percentage, end of period … … 3.5 3.5 4.1 6.0 … … …
Money market overnight rate Percentage, period average 3.1 5.0 3.0 2.4 5.0 5.9 7.2 … …
Nominal effective exchange rate  Index (2001 = 100), period average 102.8 105.0 106.2 107.4 108.1 110.3 108.5 … …
Current account balance Percentage of GDP -6.4 -4.5 -5.6 -7.0 -7.6 -9.3 -5.3 -5.5 -5.9
FDI Percentage of GDP 5.6 1.8 3.5 6.5 8.0 6.8 2.1 3.8 4.1
Gross external debt Percentage of GDP 66.3 70.0 72.1 74.9 76.9 85.1 98.2 … …
General government balance  Percentage of GDP -5.1 -3.8 -3.2 -2.2 -1.7 -1.4 -3.5 -3.0 -3.2
General government gross debt  2) Percentage of GDP 35.8 37.8 38.3 35.7 33.1 29.1 33.5 35.9 37.3
Central government balance Percentage of GDP -4.0 -3.2 -2.8 -1.9 -1.3 -1.0 -2.3 -3.0 -3.2
Unemployment rate Percentage, period average 14.2 13.7 12.7 11.2 9.6 8.4 9.1 11.5 11.0 
Sources: Eurostat (AMECO), Haver Analytics, IMF, national sources and ECB calculations.
1) Forecasts.
2) Excluding public guarantees and HBOR debt.11
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I   CROATIA
considerably in depth and intensity following 
the demise of Lehman Brothers, and inﬂ  ationary 
pressures subsided in tandem with the deepening 
economic downturn and sharp corrections in 
global commodity prices.
In fact, given falling investor and depositor 
conﬁ   dence in particular (resulting in heavy 
stock market losses, increasing risk premia 
and temporary deposit withdrawals) and, to a 
lesser extent, increased demand for foreign 
exchange by the government and corporations 
(to repay foreign liabilities), the kuna came 
under downward pressure in the last quarter of 
2008 and the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2009.4 During this 
turbulent period, the CNB allowed a moderate 
depreciation of the kuna. However, in order to 
prevent a more marked weakening, it not only 
changed reserve requirement allocation rules, 
but also undertook outright market interventions 
in favour of the currency.5 Furthermore, to boost 
banking sector (foreign currency) liquidity 
the CNB also reduced mandatory reserve 
requirements, eased foreign currency liquidity 
regulations and raised banks’ maximum 
permitted open foreign exchange positions 
(see Table 2). With a view to moderating 
interest rate ﬂ   uctuations in interbank markets 
and stabilising liquidity supply, at the end 
of 2008 the CNB started to hold its regular repo 
auctions at a ﬁ  xed interest rate of 6% and kept 
doing so until mid-October 2009. Driven by 
improving global investor sentiment, increased 
foreign currency inﬂ   ows following Eurobond 
issues by the public sector and seasonal factors 
(tourism), the kuna began to strengthen again 
from the second quarter of 2009 onwards. In the 
ﬁ  nal quarter of 2009, the CNB even intervened 
in foreign exchange markets to prevent a more 
marked appreciation of the kuna. With a view 
to supporting economic recovery (and in the 
absence of inﬂ   ationary pressures), the CNB 
reduced mandatory reserve requirements further 
from 14% to 13% in early 2010.
Headline ﬁ  scal balances continued to improve 
overall in 2008, but public ﬁ  nances increasingly 
came under pressure towards the end of 2008 as 
economic activity slowed. In order to cope with 
the spillovers from the global crisis, in 
early 2009 the government adopted a set of ten 
anti-recession measures  6 and, in order to 
maintain public conﬁ   dence in banks, also 
quadrupled the level of guaranteed bank deposits 
(of natural persons) to HRK 400,000 
(approximately €55,000).7 The severity of the 
economic downturn and the related revenue 
shortfalls also induced a series of budget 
revisions in 2009, including expenditure cuts 
and revenue-boosting measures, such as the 
introduction of a temporary “crisis tax” and an 
increase in the main VAT rate. Given the 
severity of the economic downturn the general 
government budget deﬁ  cit still climbed to 3.5% 
of GDP in 2009 instead of the originally targeted 
0.9% of GDP. Nevertheless, cyclically adjusted 
primary budget ﬁ   gures from Croatia’s 2009 
Pre-accession Economic Programme suggest a 
fairly neutral ﬁ  scal stance in 2009. To ﬁ  nance 
the budget deﬁ  cit and reﬁ  nance maturing public 
debt, the government took out a €1 billion loan 
from domestic banks in early 2009 and tapped 
international  ﬁ   nancial markets with two 
Eurobond issues in May and November 2009, 
worth €750 million and USD 1.5 billion 
(€1 billion) respectively. Consequently, public 
debt levels picked up substantially in 2009, but 
still remained relatively low at around 35% of 
GDP. During 2008 and 2009 all major rating 
agencies revised downward their sovereign 
rating outlook for Croatia, but conﬁ  rmed  the 
country’s long-term foreign currency ratings at 
pre-crisis levels.8
For an empirical analysis of the determinants of downward  4 
exchange pressures, see Box 2 in issue 4 of CNB (2009b).
The  ﬁ   rst intervention in favour of the kuna took place on  5 
27 October 2008 (worth €270.6 million), followed by two 
other interventions on 23 January 2009 (€328.3 million) and 
18 February 2009 (€184.7 million).
The measures include, inter alia, the revision of the state  6 
budget, the ﬁ   nancial strengthening of the Croatian Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (HBOR) and support for the 
tourism and real estate sectors.
Starting from 1 January 2010 the deposits of legal persons are also  7 
guaranteed up to HRK 400,000 (approximately €55,000).
Standard & Poor’s and Fitch revised Croatia’s rating outlook  8 
down from stable to negative in October 2008 and May 2009, 
respectively, while Moody’s reduced its outlook from positive 
to stable in November 2008. All rating agencies have, however, 
maintained their sovereign ratings for Croatia at investment 
grade levels of BBB, BBB- and Baa3 respectively.12
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Table 2 CNB measures in the context of the global financial crisis (2008-10) 1)
Monetary policy instrument Date Measure
Interest rates January 2008 Increasing the discount rate by 450 bp to 9.0%.
December 2008






October 2008 Starting from the reserve requirement calculation date of 9 October 2008, 
banks’ vault cash will no longer be included in the liquid kuna claims that may 
be used to maintain the kuna component of the reserve requirement. With this 
move the CNB withdrew some €365 millions from the market.
November 2008 The CNB reduced the banks’ reserve requirement rate from 17% to 14% to 
provide additional liquidity to the banking system totalling HRK 8.4 billions 
(5.9 billions in kuna and 2.5 billions in foreign exchange). The decision 
was applicable as of the reserve requirement calculation period starting on 
10 December 2008.
January 2009 To maintain exchange rate stability, i.e. to ease depreciation pressures on the 
kuna against the euro, the CNB increased the foreign exchange component 
of the reserve requirement to be allocated in kuna from 50% to 75%. 
The decision was applicable as of the reserve requirement period starting on 
14 January 2009.
February  2010 Reduction of the reserve requirement from 14% to 13% with the aim of 
speeding up economic recovery. This move released HRK 2.9 billions of 
additional liquidity (2.4 billions in kuna and 0.5 billions in foreign exchange).
Marginal reserve 
requirement
October 2008 The CNB suspended the 55% marginal reserve requirement on all commercial 
bank borrowing from abroad as of 10 October 2008. Removal of the MRR was 
designed to release HRK 3.2 billions in liquidity.
Special reserve 
requirement
February  2009 Abolishment of the 55% special reserve requirement on banks’ liabilities 




January 2008 While retaining the annual 12% credit growth ceiling, the rate of purchase of 
compulsory CNB bills was increased from 50% to 75% of the loans granted 
in excess of the credit ceiling. At the same time, the remuneration rate was 
lowered from 0.75% p.a. to 0.25% p.a.
November 2009 Removal of the obligation on banks to subscribe CNB bills at 0.25% interest 
rate where credit growth exceeded 12% annually, thereby releasing liquidity 
of around HRK 137 millions.




January 2008 Introduction of higher capital requirements on banks whose growth rate for 
placements exceeded the maximum permissible growth rate for placements 
and the introduction of increased risk weights (100%) to placements with 
a currency clause extended to clients with no own foreign currency income.
March 2008 A 100% risk weight (instead of 75%) has to be applied on foreign currency 
loans and loans with a currency clause fully and completely secured 
by mortgages on residential property occupied or let by the borrower now 
or in the future (with an unhedged currency position). At the same time, 
a 150% risk weight (instead of 125%) was applied to foreign currency claims 
and claims with a currency clause not covered by bank deposits or adequate 
pledged property (referring to clients with an unhedged currency position).
Bank liquidity March 2008 In the period from 10 March 2008 to 31 May 2008, the banks included in 
their foreign currency claims the amount they contributed to the short-term 
foreign currency loan granted in March 2008 to the Ministry of Finance of the 
Republic of Croatia, totalling €200 millions.
May 2008 Cut in the ratio of banks’ liquid foreign currency claims to foreign currency 
liabilities from 32% to 28.5%.
February 2009 On 4 February 2009 the CNB cut the ratio of banks’ liquid foreign currency 
claims to foreign currency liabilities from 28.5% to 25% to boost liquidity 
and make it easier for the state to borrow at home. This freed up around 
€840 millions.
February 2009 On 18 February 2009 the CNB released €1.25 billions to banks by cutting the 
ratio of banks’ liquid foreign currency claims to foreign currency liabilities 
from 25% to 20%.13
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1.2  THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: STRUCTURE 
AND DEVELOPMENTS
THE STRUCTURE OF THE BANKING SYSTEM
No major structural changes took place in the 
Croatian banking sector in 2008 or 2009. Over 
the two-year period, the total number of banks 
increased by one, to 34, following the market 
entry of two savings banks  9 and the merger 
between Slavonska banka and Hypo 
Alpe-Adria-Bank in February 2009 (see Table 3). 
The Croatian banking industry continues to be 
dominated by foreign ownership. The asset 
share of foreign banks remained fairly stable at 
around 91% in 2008 and 2009, but the number 
of foreign banks decreased by one due to the 
aforementioned merger. Austria is the largest 
foreign investor, accounting for slightly over 
60% of total banking sector assets, followed by 
Italy (19.1%), France (7.4%) and Hungary (3.4%).
Despite the large number of banks, the banking 
sector is fairly concentrated. The market 
share of the four largest banks even increased 
slightly further in 2008 and 2009, amounting 
to some 65% of total assets by the end of 2009. 
Similarly, the Herﬁ  ndahl-Hirschman  index 
reached 1,367 points in 2009, up from 1,279 
in 2007. The large number of small banks 
(25 in total), each with a strong regional focus 
and a tiny market share, suggests potential for 
further market consolidation.
Market penetration of banking services 
continued to increase in 2008-09. The number 
of operating units rose from 1,191 in 2007 
To comply with the  9  acquis communautaire, savings and loan 
co-operatives were obliged to convert either into savings banks in 
accordance with the Banking Act or into credit unions pursuant 
to the new Credit Unions Act adopted in December 2006.
Table 2 CNB measures in the context of the global financial crisis (2008-10) 1) (cont’d)




February 2009 On 20 February 2009 the CNB increased the maximum permitted open foreign 
exchange position for banks from 20% to 30% of own funds, a move designed 
to make it easier for banks to dispose of the foreign exchange funds freed up 
by reducing the rate of minimum required foreign currency claims for banks 
from 25% to 20%.
Source: CNB.
1) For an overview of CNB measures in 2000-07 (mainly with a view to reining in lending growth), see ECB (2008).
Table 3 Croatia: structure of the banking sector
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
EBRD index of banking sector reform 1) 3.7 3.7 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Number of banks (foreign-owned) 46 (23) 41 (19) 37 (15) 34 (14) 33 (15) 33 (16) 34 (16) 34 (15)
Number of banks per 100,000 inhabitants 1.04 0.92 0.83 0.77 0.74 0.74 0.77 0.77
Assets of private banks Percentage of total assets 96.0 96.6 96.9 96.6 95.8 95.3 95.5 95.8
Assets of foreign banks Percentage of total assets 90.2 91.0 91.3 91.3 90.8 90.4 90.7 90.9
Assets of the four largest banks Percentage of total assets 58.6 61.6 64.9 64.9 64.0 63.9 64.87 65.15
Herﬁ  ndahl-Hirschmann index 2) 1,237 1,270 1,363 1,359 1,299 1,279 1,311 1,367
Sources: CNB and EBRD.
1) Reform progress ranges from 1 (little progress beyond the establishment of a two-tier system) to 4+ (standards and performance norms 
of advanced industrial economies). 
2) Sum of the squared asset shares of individual banks. The index ranges between 0 and 10,000. Below 1,000 it suggests a non-concentrated 
sector; above 1,800 it is highly concentrated.14
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to 1,299 by the end of 2009, and the number of 
ATMs grew by some 600 to 3,601 over the same 
period. Network expansion went hand in hand 
with a continued rise in staff levels until the end 
of 2008, when employment in the sector reached 
22,027. However, a less conducive economic 
environment and the unfolding lower demand 
for banking services seem to have initiated staff 
reductions in the second half of 2009, with the 
number of employees falling to 21,673 by the 
end of 2009.
According to the EBRD’s banking reform index, 
the Croatian banking sector exhibits 
well-developed institutional standards and 
performance norms. In contrast to some other 
transition economies, Croatia was able to 
maintain its EBRD ranking during the crisis 
years 2008 and 2009, at a level above even those 
of many central, eastern and south-eastern 
European EU Member States. In 2009 only 
Hungary and Estonia had a similarly high 
ranking among the EU10.10
THE ASSET AND LIABILITY STRUCTURE 
OF THE BANKING SYSTEM
Financial deepening slowed considerably 
between 2008 and 2009. Initially, this was 
attributable to measures taken by the CNB to 
rein in credit growth, while later on deteriorating 
economic conditions, the process of global 
deleveraging, increasing risk aversion on the 
part of banks and lower credit demand from 
bank clients played a more prominent role. 
Expansion of banking sector assets decelerated 
sharply from 13% in 2007 to 2.5% in 2009. 
Consequently, increasing ﬁ  nancial penetration, 
from 109.8% of GDP in 2007 to 114.2% of 
GDP by the end of 2009 (see Table 4), should 
be seen mainly in the context of sharply falling 
GDP levels. Croatia’s ﬁ  nancial intermediation 
levels continue to rank among the highest in 
central, eastern and south-eastern Europe but are 
The Czech Republic, which had the same ranking at the end of  10 
2007, is no longer given a ranking since the country has ceased 
to be an EBRD country of operation.
Table 4 Croatia: asset structure of the banking sector
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Commercial bank assets Percentage of GDP 83.6 89.9 93.4 98.5 106.4 109.8 108.1 114.2
Total domestic claims Percentage of total assets 80.6 79.1 77.2 82.7 84.5 84.2 84.3 84.4
Claims on domestic MFIs Percentage of total assets 18.2 18.8 17.6 18.7 18.4 17.9 13.8 14.9
Claims on domestic non-banks Percentage of total assets 62.4 60.4 59.6 64.0 66.1 66.3 70.4 69.6
of which:
claims on general government Percentage of total assets 13.2 11.2 9.9 11.6 9.7 9.0 10.6 12.2
claims on domestic households 
and enterprises Percentage of total assets 49.2 49.2 49.8 52.4 56.4 57.3 59.9 57.4
of which:
claims on domestic enterprises Percentage of total assets 25.4 23.2 22.3 23.1 25.8 25.4 26.6 26.1
claims on domestic households Percentage of total assets 23.8 25.9 27.5 29.3 30.6 31.9 33.3 31.3
Money market fund shares Percentage of total assets 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
External assets Percentage of total assets 14.1 16.5 18.3 13.2 12.6 13.1 12.9 12.6
Claims on domestic households Percentage of total claims 
on household and enterprises 48.3 52.7 55.2 55.9 54.3 55.7 55.6 54.5
Loans-to-claims ratio for domestic 
nonbanks 82.5 86.5 89.0 88.6 90.8 90.8 91.6 92.9
of which:
Loans-to-claims ratio for general 
government 29.0 37.4 40.0 42.3 49.0 46.1 55.0 68.2
Loans-to-claims ratio for domestic 
households and enterprises 97.1 97.8 98.6 98.9 98.3 98.3 98.7 98.6
Source: CNB.15
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still well below the euro area average of almost 
340% of GDP (based on the aggregated balance 
sheet of other MFIs).
With a share of 57.4% of total assets in 2009, 
banking sector assets continued to be dominated 
by claims on domestic households and 
enterprises. This ﬁ  gure was as high as in 2007, 
despite the strong slowdown in lending to 
both corporations and households in 2008 and 
2009. In contrast to most other central, eastern 
and south-eastern European economies, the 
slowdown in lending was more pronounced in 
the retail segment, seemingly the result, inter 
alia, of a slump in general-purpose cash loans 
and car loans.
The banking sector’s claims on general 
government increased during the crisis years 
of 2008 and 2009 owing to greater government 
borrowing from banks. In particular, given 
budgetary  ﬁ   nancing needs, in early 2009 the 
government took out a €1 billion syndicated 
loan from a group of six domestic banks, 
for which the CNB relaxed liquidity 
provisions so that the banks were able to 
extend the loan without recourse to additional 
external funding. Emerging crowding-out 
concerns were, however, alleviated by the 
decreasing risk aversion in global ﬁ  nancial 
markets starting in March 2009 and the two 
subsequent Eurobond issues by the government 
in 2009, a €200 million World Bank loan in 
January 2010, as well as two bond issues on 
domestic markets (totalling some €830 million) 
in spring 2010.
Banks’ claims on domestic monetary ﬁ  nancial 
institutions, which mostly consist of deposits 
with the CNB, decreased in 2008 and 2009, 
largely reﬂ  ecting CNB measures to ease reserve 
requirements during the most critical periods 
of the global ﬁ   nancial crisis. These measures 
included abolishing the marginal reserve 
requirement in October 2008, reducing the 
mandatory reserve requirement rate from 17% to 
14% in December 2008, suspending the special 
reserve requirement in February 2009 and 
removing, in November 2009, the obligation for 
banks to subscribe to CNB bills in the event of 
credit growth exceeding 12% annually, thereby 
releasing a total liquidity of some HRK 12 billion 
(approximately €1.6 billion).
The share of foreign assets in total bank assets 
remained fairly stable over the review period. 
Thus, despite high global and local liquidity 
pressures, banks did not need to run down 
foreign assets on a large scale in an annual 
comparison.11 This was underpinned by the fact 
that foreign parent banks were on hand to 
support their subsidiaries during times of 
heightened liquidity pressures. In fact, banks’ 
external liabilities, which continued to fall in the 
context of CNB credit restrictions over the ﬁ  rst 
three quarters of 2008, increased substantially in 
the  ﬁ   nal quarter of 2008 and helped to 
compensate for the decrease in domestic funding 
sources related to temporary deposit withdrawals. 
Thus, the banks’ net foreign asset position, 
which had improved strongly in 2007 on the 
back of CNB measures to contain bank lending 
based on foreign borrowing,12 again deteriorated 
from -4.8% of total assets in 2007 to -7.9% 
in 2009.
Banks’ liabilities continue to be dominated 
by the deposits of domestic non-banks 
(51% of liabilities at the end of 2009), especially 
private sector deposits (i.e. households and 
enterprises). The solid growth in private sector 
deposits before the crisis came to a halt in the 
ﬁ   nal quarter of 2008, when the population’s 
waning conﬁ  dence in the banking sector caused 
temporary deposit withdrawals. The situation 
started to stabilise however in the ﬁ  rst quarter 
of 2009, and household deposits (mainly in 
foreign currency) rose again in particular in the 
second half of 2009. In fact, household deposits 
It is important to note, however, that the relaxation of the CNB’s  11 
foreign currency liquidity regulations in February 2009 (with the 
aim of facilitating the government’s ﬁ  nancing needs) led to a 
temporary recourse to foreign assets in the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2009, 
which were then gradually built up again during the remainder 
of 2009.
IMF estimates of VAR impulse responses suggest that  12 
CNB measures (especially the marginal and special reserve 
requirements) achieved some success in temporarily reducing 
the overall volume of capital inﬂ  ows to Croatia. See IMF (2010), 
pp.146-148.16
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in 2009 were up by some 4% on their 2008 
levels, as households sharply cut spending in 
the light of the negative economic environment, 
deteriorating labour market conditions and the 
related deterioration in their income position 
towards the end of 2009. By contrast, corporate 
deposits fell by some 6% on the back of declining 
corporate proﬁ  tability in 2009, so that, by and 
large, total private sector deposits stagnated 
during 2009 while their share in total liabilities 
fell to slightly below 50% (see Table 5).
The term structure of deposits also changed 
during the crisis years, with the share of time 
deposits climbing to around 73% of total deposits 
by the end of 2009, up from 65% in 2007. 
While this development might be partially 
explained by the run-down of demand deposits 
(mainly for conﬁ   dence reasons), it may also 
reﬂ   ect the above mentioned changes in the 
structure of deposits and customers’ attempts 
to shift deposits over to longer maturities to 
secure higher interest rates, particularly before 
the onset of the global cycle of low interest rates 
(including the ﬂ  attening of the yield curve). 
Foreign currency-denominated positions, while 
increasing in 2008 and 2009, continued to 
dominate the liability side of the banking sector, 
accounting for about three-quarters of total 
deposits at the end of 2009. This might be 
explained by the fact that workers’ remittances 
and tourism revenues are largely earned in 
foreign currency, but it is also due to conﬁ  dence 
issues which may have triggered the conversion 
of kuna deposits into foreign currency-
denominated deposits, leading to a higher 
propensity within the population to save in 
foreign currency.13 As bank claims continued to 
grow faster than deposits, claim-to-deposit ratios 
increased in 2008 and 2009 and remained well 
in excess of 100%. The implication of this was a 
continued need for ﬁ  nancing from abroad.
The Croatian banking sector’s liability structure 
also exhibited a strong role for capital and 
reserves as a ﬁ  nancing item. This role increased 
further in 2008 and 2009. In particular, the 
share of capital and reserves in total liabilities 
was more than twice as high as in the euro area, 
for example. The seemingly multiple reasons 
for this ranged from higher capital adequacy 
requirements in Croatia via presumably higher 
risks faced by banks operating in a high growth 
environment to widespread foreign ownership, 
with foreign banks providing their subsidiaries 
For further details see Dvorsky, Scheiber and Stix (2009). 13 
Table 5 Croatia: liability structure of the banking sector
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Deposits of MFIs Percentage of total liabilities 3.2 2.6 2.1 2.9 3.6 5.6 4.3 4.6
Deposits of domestic non-banks Percentage of total liabilities 60.2 56.6 54.9 52.9 52.5 53.3 52.6 51.1
of which:
deposits of general government Precentage of total liabilities 2.5 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.1
deposits of households 
and enterprises
Precentage of total liabilities
57.7 54.8 53.0 51.1 51.0 51.7 50.9 49.9
Money market fund shares  Precentage of total liabilities 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Debt securities issued  Precentage of total liabilities 1.7 1.6 2.7 2.0 1.7 1.4 1.9 1.0
Capital and reserves Precentage of total liabilities 9.5 8.9 8.6 9.0 10.3 12.5 13.5 13.9
External liabilities Precentage of total liabilities 18.5 23.0 24.1 23.9 23.5 17.8 18.9 20.5
Remaining liabilities Precentage of total liabilities 7.0 7.4 7.6 9.3 8.5 9.5 8.8 8.9
Memorandum items:
Domestic non-banks’ claim-to-deposit 
ratio 103.7 106.7 108.6 121.1 125.8 124.5 133.9 136.2
General government’s claim-to-deposit 
ratio 529.5 620.4 599.7 745.6 703.9 590.6 649.7 1,096.9
Households’ and enterprises’ 
claim-to-deposit ratio  85.2 89.7 93.8 102.5 110.6 110.9 117.6 114.9
Source: CNB.17
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with a portion of ﬁ   nancing in the form 
of equity.14 The latter element has been especially 
important in the case of Croatia, where the high 
marginal and special reserve requirements on 
banks’ foreign liabilities and issued securities 
induced parent banks to ﬁ  nance strong credit 
growth by boosting the capital positions of 
subsidiaries.
BANKING SECTOR PROFITABILITY
Deteriorating economic conditions started to 
take a toll on banking proﬁ  tability in the ﬁ  nal 
quarter of 2008, but the full impact materialised 
only in 2009. While banks remained proﬁ  table 
throughout the review period, proﬁ  tability 
levels declined on the back of less favourable 
business conditions and higher provisioning 
needs. Consequently, return on average assets 
(pre-tax) dropped from 1.6% in 2007 and 2008 
(see Table 6) to 1.2% by the end of 2009, while 
the decline in return on average equity (after-tax) 
to 6.7% was additionally underpinned by the 
banks’ attempt to strengthen their capitalisation 
(in particular via retained earnings).
Net interest income continued to constitute the 
main source of revenue in the banking sector. 
Despite increasing interest rate spreads in the 
last two years, which were driven by a pick-up 
in lending rates, interest income grew only 
moderately in 2009 given tighter supply-side 
credit conditions based on the increased risk 
aversion of banks and more subdued credit 
demand. Interest expenses grew more strongly, 
however, most likely owing to the more 
widespread use of longer-term, ﬁ  xed interest rate 
deposit contracts. Therefore, in 2009 net interest 
income decreased not only in absolute terms, 
but also as a share of total operating income.
At the same time, net non-interest income 
increased considerably in both absolute and 
relative terms. In this context, net income from 
fees and commissions remained fairly stable, 
but strong increases in other less stable sources 
of income, such as proﬁ  t from securities and 
foreign exchange trading activities (including 
related valuation effects), had pushed the share 
of total net non-interest income to some 37.5% 
of total operating income by the end of 2009. 
In this context, it is important to note that 
movements in net interest and non-interest 
income seem closely correlated given certain 
swap transactions by Croatian banks with parent 
institutions.15 
For more details on the reﬁ  nancing structure of banks in central,  14 
eastern and south-eastern Europe, see Walko (2008).
See issue 4 of CNB (2009b), p. 44 onwards. 15 
Table 6 Croatia: profitability of the banking sector
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Total operating income Percentage of total income 100.00 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
of which:
Net interest income Percentage of operating income 70.80 75.3 69.2 70.2 70.5 67.5 69.3 62.5
Net non-interest income Percentage of operating income 29.20 24.7 30.8 29.8 29.5 32.5 30.7 37.5
General administrative expenses Percentage of operating income 59.30 57.4 54.3 54.4 54.9 52.1 52.4 49.4
Operating expenses 
(excluding loan loss provisions) Percentage of operating income
Loan loss provision expenses Percentage of operating income 6.60 7.7 6.6 5.3 6.2 7.6 7.6 22.4
Income tax Percentage of operating income 6.30 6.0 6.4 7.8 7.7 8.2 7.8 5.7
After-tax proﬁ  t/loss Percentage of operating income 27.80 28.9 32.6 32.5 31.1 32.1 32.2 22.6
Net interest income Percentage of average assets 3.30 3.4 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.8 2.5
Net non-interest income Percentage of average assets 1.30 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.5
Interest rate spread 
(total loans – total deposits) Percentage points 7.70 8.0 7.6 7.0 6.5 6.0 6.3 7.0
Return on average assets – before tax Percentage 1.58 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.2
Return on average equity – after tax Percentage 13.73 14.1 16.1 15.0 12.4 10.9 9.9 6.7
Net interest margin Percentage of average 
interest-bearing assets 4.90 4.9 4.5 4.2 3.8 3.7 3.8 3.4
Source: CNB.18
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Despite continued network expansion and 
ongoing infrastructure deepening (e.g. ATMs), 
bank efﬁ  ciency increased and operating expenses 
fell below 50% of total operating income by 
the end of 2009, partly on the basis of lower 
personnel expenses owing to crisis-induced 
cutbacks in staff. Finally, in order to provide 
for increased risks related to the deteriorating 
economic conditions and the pick-up in 
non-performing loans, banks sharply stepped up 
their provisioning efforts in 2009.
NON-BANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Following several years of rapid expansion, 
Croatia’s non-bank ﬁ  nancial sector took a turn 
for the worse in the crisis years of 2008 and 
2009 given the less favourable global ﬁ  nancial 
market developments. Thus, the non-bank 
ﬁ  nancial sector lost market share to the banking 
sector in 2008 and 2009 in terms of total 
ﬁ  nancial sector assets (see Table 7). Adverse 
movements in global and local stock markets 
in 2008 and during the ﬁ   rst quarter of 2009 
entailed substantial asset losses, particularly 
for open-end investment funds, which had a 
fairly strong bias towards equity investments 
before the crisis. In fact, in 2007 around 50% of 
open-end investment funds’ total assets 
consisted of equity funds and an additional 30% 
of balanced funds (which contain a more or less 
signiﬁ  cant proportion of equity). Consequently, 
driven by the global stock market slump 
following the demise of Lehman Brothers, their 
share in total ﬁ  nancial sector assets has contracted 
by more than two-thirds since 2007. In contrast, 
growth in (compulsory) pension funds’ assets 
remained buoyant as these funds invest large 
proportions of their assets (some 75%) in less 
risky domestic and foreign government bonds. 
Similarly, insurance company assets increased 
further, with the life segment outperforming the 
non-life segment, where in line with the 
economic downturn, demand in particular for the 
insurance of land motor vehicles and of goods 
in transit, as well as for credit insurance, fell 
considerably. Leasing companies also gained 
some ground in 2008 and 2009, driven mainly 
by strong growth in ﬁ  nancial leasing (machines 
and equipment, real estate).
Given the relatively limited size of the sector 
(some 30% of GDP at the end of 2009) in 
comparison with the banking system, the risks 
related to the non-bank ﬁ   nancial sector seem 
rather limited at present and are unlikely to erode 
ﬁ  nancial system stability. However, the strong 
dependence of some segments on stock market 
developments (suggesting higher risks in the 
case of further adverse shocks) and the potential 
for regulatory arbitrage (parent banks very often 
Table 7 Croatia: financial sector structure
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Banks, non-consolidated assets (net) 1) 85.8 84.0 81.7 79.0 76.6 73.8 77.7 76.6
Open-end investment funds, net assets 1.3 1.2 1.6 2.7 4.0 6.4 2.1 2.4
Closed-end investment funds, net assets 0.6 0.4 0.4 1.1 1.4 1.6 0.4 0.4
War veterans’ fund 2) ... ... ... ... ... ... 0.5 0.4
Insurance companies 5.7 5.2 5.1 5.0 4.9 5.2 5.6 5.8
Housing savings banks, non-consolidated assets (net) 1) 1.1 1.4 1.9 1.9 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.4
Compulsory pension funds, net assets 1.1 1.9 2.8 3.6 4.0 4.5 4.7 5.9
Voluntary pension funds, net assets 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3
Savings and loan co-operatives 3) 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 ... ...
Savings banks ... ... ... ... ... ... 0.0 0.0
Leasing companies 3.8 5.2 5.9 6.2 6.8 6.5 7.3 6.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: CNB, HANFA and Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Croatia.
1) Supervisory data (ﬁ  gures may differ from monetary statistics because of consolidation). 
2) War veterans’ fund members can withdraw their shares from the fund freely since 14 April 2008. This fund is therefore excluded from 
closed-end funds.
3) These intermediaries are in the process of liquidation and were required to convert into banks or credit unions. Latest available data 
refer to June 2007.19
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also own non-bank ﬁ  nancial intermediaries) call 
for a cautious policy stance and close cooperation 
between the CNB, which is in charge of bank 
supervision, and the Croatian Financial Services 
Supervisory Agency (HANFA), which oversees 
non-bank ﬁ  nancial institutions.
1.3  RISKS AND SHOCK-ABSORBING CAPACITIES
CREDIT RISK
Credit risk continues to represent the main 
source of risk to ﬁ  nancial stability in Croatia. 
In fact, after years of strong credit growth, in the 
second half of the last decade the ratio of private 
sector credit to GDP had reached fairly elevated 
levels relative to underlying fundamentals in 
Croatia.16 Strong credit growth, albeit 
decelerating on account of various CNB 
measures aimed at reining in lending growth 
based on banks’ foreign liabilities, continued 
during 2007 and in the ﬁ  rst three quarters of 
2008 (see Table 8). However, credit growth 
moderated considerably thereafter, as the 
downturn fully hit the Croatian economy in the 
ﬁ  rst half of 2009. Both demand and supply-side 
factors contributed to this development, with the 
slowdown in household lending being more 
pronounced than in corporate lending.
Croatia’s banking sector is highly prone to 
indirect credit risk arising from the use of foreign 
currency in domestic operations. The large share 
of foreign currency-denominated and indexed 
loans in total loans exposes households and 
enterprises to exchange rate and foreign interest 
rate ﬂ  uctuations, thereby implying credit risk for 
banks. Given that households account for over 
45% of total foreign currency-denominated (and 
indexed) loans in Croatia, unhedged domestic 
borrowers seem to bear the bulk of the currency 
risk. According to CNB (2009c), about 96% of 
total net placements and contingent liabilities 
to households are considered as unhedged, 
implying substantial currency-induced credit risk 
in this sector. However, this risk is somewhat 
mitigated by the fact that household deposits are 
also largely denominated in foreign currencies, 
as workers’ remittances and tourism revenues 
represent a major source of household income.
Against the background of stricter capital 
adequacy and liquidity requirements imposed by 
the CNB, in particular the introduction of higher 
risk weights on foreign currency-denominated 
and indexed loans (mainly claims on unhedged 
borrowers), the degree of currency substitution 
in bank liabilities declined considerably during 
2006 and 2007 and in the ﬁ  rst three quarters 
of 2008. This trend reversed, however, after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, which undermined 
trust in the stability of global ﬁ  nancial markets. 
In fact, the temporary waning of conﬁ  dence 
among the Croatian population and corporations 
in the local banking sector and in the 
domestic currency led to an increased share of 
foreign exchange-denominated bank liabilities 
(especially as a result of currency conversions of 
deposits, but also due to local currency deposit 
withdrawals). This, in conjunction with the 
release of foreign currency reserves by the CNB, 
entailed stepped-up foreign currency lending by 
banks to avoid currency mismatches. Driven 
mainly by the strong growth in foreign currency 
lending to the corporate sector, the share in 
total loans of foreign currency-denominated 
(including indexed) loans thus increased 
strongly from 61% of total loans in 2007 to over 
70% in 2009. Exchange rate valuation effects 
(the depreciation of the kuna vis-à-vis the Swiss 
franc) also played a part in this development.
Before the crisis, the Swiss franc played an 
important role in domestic borrowing alongside 
the euro. In fact, given low interest rates, Swiss 
franc loans had quickly become popular in 
Croatia during the boom years, with their share 
of total foreign currency loans (total loans) 
quintupling (quadrupling) from 5% (3.9%) at 
the start of 2005 to 27% (16%) by the end of 
2007. However, the global ﬁ  nancial  crisis 
brought about major changes regarding the 
currency composition of foreign currency loans, 
with the CHF share falling to 19% (13%) by the 
end of 2009. The declining popularity of CHF 
loans on account of the higher volatility of the 
kuna vis-à-vis the Swiss franc (relative to that 
against the euro), a more limited supply of CHF 
For further details, see Zumer, Égert and Backé (2009). 16 20
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loans by banks given difﬁ  culties in obtaining 
CHF liquidity and conversions of CHF loans 
into euro loans presumably contributed to this 
development.
Credit risk started to materialise through 
deteriorating credit quality in the ﬁ  nal quarter 
of 2008 and continued at an accelerated pace 
in 2009 owing to borrowers’ difﬁ  culties servicing 
Table 8 Croatia: selected banking sector stability indicators
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Risks
Credit risk
Credit growth Percentage, year on year 35.1 17.4 12.8 20.1 22.6 14.8 13.6 3.3
Credit growth to the private sector Percentage, year on year 32.9 16.2 13.3 18.7 23.7 14.2 12.1 -0.7
Real credit growth to the private sector Percentage, year on year 30.4 14.5 10.8 14.6 21.3 8.3 8.971 -2.6
Credit growth to households Percentage, year on year 45.4 27.4 18.0 20.5 21.9 18.1 12.0 -3.0
Mortgage credit (housing loans) growth Percentage, year on year 28.6 37.4 28.9 28.9 34.0 22.5 15.7 1.2
Non-performing loans Percentage of total loans 10.2 8.9 7.5 6.2 5.2 4.8 4.9 7.8
of which:
Non-performing loans of households
Percentage of total 
household loans 5.8 6.4 4.7 4.5 4.1 3.7 3.9 5.8
Non-performing loans of corporates
Percentage of total 
corporate loans 15.5 12.9 11.9 9.7 7.6 7.3 7.2 12.8
Non-performing loans in domestic 
currency
Percentage of total 
domestic currency loans … … … … … … … …
Non-performing loans in foreign 
currency
Percentage of total foreign 
currency loans … … … … … … … …
Foreign currency credit Percentage of total credit 79.8 74.2 75.7 77.4 71.5 61.4 65.4 72.7
Foreign currency deposits 1) Percentage of total deposits 88.4 87.5 87.3 86.4 76.3 66.8 68.5 76.1
Market risk
Forex risk
Open foreign exchange position Percentage of total assets 1.0 1.2 1.0 0.6 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.9
Stock market risk
Ratio of shares and participations 
to total assets (equity holdings) 1.8 1.4 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.1
Liquidity risk
Ratio of liquid assets 2) to total assets 29.4 32.8 31.2 28.0 27.5 27.6 23.9 23.7
Ratio of total loans to total deposits 74.2 76.7 80.7 88.5 92.5 92.8 99.5 98.3
Ratio of liquid assets 2) to short-term 




non-performing loans 67.9 60.9 62.5 60.0 57.0 54.7 49.5 42.5
of which:




to the household sector 61.4 53.0 69.9 66.2 62.6 67.0 63.8 60.6




to the corporate sector 68.4 62.0 57.4 56.4 52.2 45.3 38.1 33.0
Non-performing loans net of provisions Percentage of capital 19.6 22.6 19.0 16.7 14.0 11.3 12.8 22.2
Capital adequacy ratio  16.6 15.7 14.1 13.5 13.2 15.4 14.2 15.8
Memo
Number of banks (foreign-owned) 46 (23) 41 (19) 37 (15) 34 (14) 33(15) 33(16) 34 (16) 34 (15)
Asset share of foreign-owned banks Percentage of total assets 90.2 91.0 91.3 91.3 90.8 90.4 90.7 90.9
Source: CNB.
1) Time deposits. 
2) Liquid assets = cash in vaults + deposits with the CNB + deposits with other banks + treasury bills.21
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their loans in a less favourable economic 
environment. Having decreased for years, largely 
on the back of strong credit growth, the share of 
non-performing loans  17 (NPLs) in total loans 
picked up from 4.8% in 2007 to 7.8% by the end 
of 2009. NPL ratios in the retail segment are half 
as high as in the corporate sector, which is 
associated with the relatively large share of 
housing loans (some 43% at the end of 2009) in 
total household loans, where delinquency rates 
have been fairly low thus far (at around 2.7%). 
Another possible explanation underpinning this 
development could be the recourse of large 
corporations with a solid ﬁ  nancial standing to 
cross-border borrowing (IMF, 2008), which 
could imply an adverse selection problem. 
However, in their recent empirical analysis 
Cerovac and Ivičic (2009) ﬁ  nd no evidence of a 
negative impact of corporations’ direct 
cross-border borrowing on the risk proﬁ  le  of 
domestic banks’ balance sheets. Quite the 
reverse, in fact, since default rates seem 
somewhat higher for corporations with direct 
foreign  ﬁ   nancing (often being related to the 
construction sector). There are no data available 
on non-performing loans by currency 
composition, which makes it impossible to infer 
whether banks applied stricter risk management 
practices to foreign currency-denominated and 
foreign currency-indexed loans than to domestic 
loans so as to offset the higher risks associated 
with those loans. Being a lagging indicator, NPLs 
appear to be increasing further in 2010 owing, 
inter alia, to declining corporate proﬁ  tability and 
adverse labour market conditions.
Pursuant to the CNB Decision on the classiﬁ  cation of placements  17 
and off-balance sheet liabilities of credit institutions, placements 
have to be classiﬁ   ed as placements without impairment 
(risk category “A”), partly recoverable placements (risk categories 
“B-1”, “B-2” and “B-3”) and fully irrecoverable placements 
(risk category “C”). In more detail, in order to be included in 
NPLs, placements have to be classiﬁ  ed as: 1) B-1, if liabilities 
are overdue by more than 90 but less than 180 days; 2) B-2, 
if liabilities are overdue by more than 180 but less than 270 days; 
3) B-3, if liabilities are overdue by more than 270 but less than 
365 days; or 4) C, if liabilities are overdue by more than 365 days.
Table 9 Croatia: selected macroprudential indicators – total debt 1)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Households
Debt Percentage of GDP 21.6 25.4 28.0 32.4 36.6 39.5 40.4 40.6
Debt Percentage of gross disposable income 43.3 52.1 58.3 69.5 78.0 85.1 88.6 84.4
Debt Percentage, year on year 42.6 28.2 19.4 24.4 22.4 18.5 11.4 -2.7
Implicit interest payments Percentage of gross disposable income 3.7 4.5 4.8 5.1 5.3 5.7 6.1 6.3
Non-ﬁ  nancial enterprises
Debt Percentage of GDP 42.2 43.7 45.8 50.8 58.9 66.3 72.0 78.5
Debt Percentage of corporate bank deposits 331.4 320.2 339.4 398.6 395.9 387.1 498.9 580.0
Debt Percentage, year on year 16.5 12.9 13.2 19.6 25.5 23.5 18.3 6.1
Implicit interest payments Percentage of GDP 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.1 3.5 4.2 4.4 …
Total non-ﬁ  nancial private sector
Debt Percentage of GDP 63.8 69.1 73.8 83.2 95.5 105.8 112.5 119.1
Debt Percentage, year on year 24.2 18.0 15.5 21.4 24.3 21.6 15.7 2.9
General government 2), 3)
Debt Percentage of GDP 34.9 35.7 37.9 38.5 36.0 33.4 29.3 35.4
Debt Percentage, year on year 7.3 11.7 14.8 9.2 1.3 2.0 9.1 17.3
Interest paid Percentage of GDP 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.7
Total non-ﬁ  nancial sector
Debt Percentage of GDP 98.7 104.9 111.7 121.7 131.5 139.3 141.8 154.4
Debt Percentage, year on year 24.2 18.0 15.5 21.4 24.3 21.6 10.9 6.0
Memorandum items:
Total external debt 5) Percentage of GDP 53.9 66.3 70.0 72.1 74.9 76.9 82.6 95.0
Total private external debt 4), 5) Percentage of GDP 34.5 45.1 50.0 54.9 60.4 64.3 73.7 83.5
Source: CNB.
1) All items refer to total (foreign and domestic) debt. 
2) Effective from 2008, data exclude Croatian Highways. 
3) Growth rate for 2008 adjusted for exclusion of Croatian Highways. 
4) All domestic sectors except general government are considered to be private.
5) Round-tripping transactions excluded (for further details, see issue 154, CNB (2009e), p.38).22
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Household debt, predominantly consisting of 
bank loans, fell in 2009 (see Table 9) after years 
of double-digit growth rates. For this reason, as 
well as on account of increases in disposable 
income (averaging 2.8% in 2009),18 household 
debt also fell relative to gross disposable income 
(to 84.4%) in 2009. However, household debt 
levels remained stable at about 40% of GDP 
during the crisis years given last year’s fall in 
nominal GDP. Implicit interest payments 
relative to gross disposable income continued to 
increase in 2008 and 2009, largely driven by a 
pick-up in interest rates. Mortgage lending, the 
most dynamic line of business in the household 
segment during the boom years, lost considerable 
momentum during the second half of 2009 on 
the back of lower demand for property and 
falling real estate prices (by around 4% on 
average in 2009). In contrast to other segments 
of household lending, growth in housing loans 
remained in positive territory in 2008 and 2009, 
so that their share in total household loans 
increased slightly to 43% in those two years.
Despite a crisis-driven slump in investment 
activity, robust growth in corporate sector debt 
levels continued in 2008 and 2009. However, 
to some extent this may also have been driven 
by exchange rate valuation effects (e.g. the 
depreciation of the kuna vis-à-vis the Swiss 
franc by some 13% since the start of 2008), 
even though – given the lack of data on the 
currency breakdown of loans – the bulk of CHF 
loans appears to relate more to the household 
segment (mainly housing loans). In this context, 
the domestic debt growth of the corporate sector 
(mainly bank loans) decelerated signiﬁ  cantly in 
2009 but remained positive, so that corporations’ 
domestic debt climbed to over 78% of GDP, 
with interest payable also rising considerably in 
conjunction with increased reﬁ  nancing costs.
MARKET AND LIQUIDITY RISKS
The banking sector’s exposure to interest rate 
risk is limited. Most of the interest rate risk 
(both domestic and foreign) has been shifted to 
bank clients and appears to materialise through 
the credit risk channel in the event of adverse 
developments. This is because loan contracts 
(including ﬁ  xed interest rate loans) often allow 
for pertinent interest rate adjustments by carrying 
safeguard clauses. In fact, some two-thirds
of total loans provide for interest rate adjustments 
within three months (and 95% for within 
one year). At the same time, on the liability side 
deposits are predominantly short-term, with 
about 85% (55%) of total deposits maturing 
within less than one year (three months), 
allowing a fairly broad degree of ﬂ  exibility 
during times of high interest rate volatility.
In contrast to global interest rate developments, 
average lending rates increased substantially in 
Croatia more or less across the board in 2008 
and 2009 (see Chart 1), especially in the case of 
short-term local currency corporate loans and 
long-term household loans indexed to foreign 
currency, thereby increasing indirect domestic 
and foreign interest rate risks. Average deposit 
rates remained fairly stable throughout 2008 
and 2009, albeit with major ﬂ  uctuations observed 
in the case of local-currency time deposits. 
To some extent, this can be attributed to the 
banks’ attempts to stop deposit withdrawals at 
the height of the crisis and to prevent large-scale 
deposit conversions into foreign currencies, 
but also – given the coincidence with the 
concurrent spikes in money market rates – 
to the fairly high bargaining power of corporate 
treasurers, who demand short-term deposit interest 
rates comparable with money market rates or 
otherwise place their funds in the money market.
The share of equity participations in total assets 
declined by more than two-thirds in 2008 and 
2009 in the context of adverse global stock 
market developments. These positions do 
not represent a major risk to banking system 
stability in Croatia, as the banking sector’s 
exposure to stock market risk is negligible in the 
light of equity positions of only 0.1% of total 
assets in 2009.
It is important to note, however, that full-year 2009 data mask  18 
strongly decelerating intra-year dynamics in disposable income 
growth, from +8.9% in the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2009 to -3.8% in the 
ﬁ  nal quarter of 2009, on the back of the introduction of a special 
“crisis tax” in July, and the lagged impact of slowing wage 
growth and worsening labour market conditions.23
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Direct foreign exchange risk also appears to be 
manageable. Open foreign exchange positions 
did not see major increases over the review 
period. However, in contrast to previous years 
short open foreign exchange positions exceeded 
the long positions throughout 2008 as a whole and 
in the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2009, implying that banks 
during this period were more exposed to foreign 
exchange risks associated with a depreciation 
of the kuna. This changed, however, as of the 
second quarter of 2009, given the stronger 
increase in foreign currency-denominated and 
indexed assets than in corresponding liabilities, 
so that the ratio of average long foreign exchange 
positions to regulatory capital exceeded average 
short positions in the remainder of 2009. 
There were substantial changes in legislation 
related to open foreign exchange positions 
during the crisis years. In May 2008 the CNB 
cut the minimum required rate of foreign 
currency claims from 32% to 28.5%, a 
move aimed at facilitating the government’s 
budgetary ﬁ  nancing needs through the take-up 
of a €760 million syndicated loan provided by 
domestic banks. In order to ease the mounting 
foreign currency liquidity pressures that emerged 
at the turn of 2008-09, the ratio of liquid foreign 
currency claims to foreign currency liabilities 
was cut further in two steps from 28.5% to 25% 
in early February 2009 (again with a view to 
facilitating government ﬁ  nancing) and then to 
20% in late February 2009, thereby releasing 
foreign exchange liquidity to banks worth 
around €2.1 billion. At the same time, as a way 
of easing the management of the released funds, 
in February 2009 the CNB increased banks’ 
maximum permitted open foreign currency 
positions to 30% of their regulatory capital 
(up from the previous 20%).
As reﬂ   ected by liquidity indicators 
(see Table 8), liquidity risks increased somewhat 
in 2008 and 2009. In 2008 the ratio of liquid 
assets to total assets declined fairly sharply to 
24% mainly on the back of the reduction in 
mandatory reserve requirements from 17% to 
14%, starting from the reserve requirement 
calculation period on 10 December 2008. This 
move by the CNB released liquid assets worth a 
Chart 1 Croatia: average lending and deposit rates
(percentages)
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total of HRK 8.4 billion (5.9 billion in kuna and 
2.5 billion in foreign exchange), corresponding 
to some €1.2 billion (see Chart 2). In 2009 the 
ratio of liquid to total assets stabilised. At the 
same time, the loan-to-deposit ratio increased 
further in 2008, reaching some 100%. However, 
given strongly decelerating credit growth in the 
context of the ﬁ  nancial crisis the loan-to-deposit 
ratio stabilised in 2009 at 2008 levels. Despite 
the above, liquidity levels can still be considered 
high, inter alia given the large amounts of free 
reserves held with the CNB. At the same time, 
the liquidity risks associated with the high 
share of liabilities towards non-residents in 
total liabilities did not materialise during the 
crisis given parent banks’ strong commitments 
to Croatia.
SHOCK-ABSORBING FACTORS
Croatia’s banking sector is well-capitalised in 
terms of standard capital ratios. Notwithstanding 
substantial capital increases by banks, capital 
adequacy fell slightly in 2008 on account of 
the further tightening of capital adequacy 
regulations, which required banks to apply 
higher risk weights on foreign currency 
(and indexed) claims vis-à-vis unhedged 
borrowers. The capital adequacy ratio stood at 
15.2% in late 2008 (see Table 8), well above 
the 10% required by Croatian law. Bank 
capitalisation improved again in 2009 owing 
to stepped-up capital increases (mainly via 
retained earnings) in the context of the global 
crisis (see also Table 5) and slower growth in 
risk-weighted assets as a result of the slowdown 
in credit growth and stepped-up lending to the 
public sector (which carries lower risk weights). 
In order to strengthen bank capitalisation 
further, in line with the section of the new 
Credit Institutions Act that came into force on 
1 January 2009 and additional CNB decisions 
on the capital adequacy of credit institutions, the 
CNB increased the banks’ minimum required 
capital adequacy ratio from 10% to 12% as of 
31 March 2010, when Basel II standards also 
became operational in Croatia. 
Substantial capital buffers allow the banking 
sector to withstand shocks stemming from 
operational and market risks and underpin its 
shock-absorbing capacities. In fact, CNB stress 
tests have concluded that even under a shock 
Chart 2 Effects of CNB measures taken in response to spillovers from the global crisis
(euro millions)
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scenario, which assumes a GDP decline of 6% 
and exchange rate depreciation of 10%,19 the 
banking sector as a whole would remain 
adequately capitalised. Moreover, stress tests 
for individual banking groups suggest that under 
the shock scenario corporate banks would be the 
most exposed given their lower initial capital 
adequacy ratio.
Moreover, despite the severity of the economic 
downturn and rising non-performing loans, the 
banking sector retained its proﬁ  tability in 2009, 
even if at somewhat lower levels than during the 
boom years. This should provide banks with an 
additional buffer to weather the global economic 
and  ﬁ   nancial crisis, with retained earnings 
helping to beef up banks’ capital positions.
Finally, as experience during the global crisis 
has shown, widespread foreign ownership also 
bolstered banking system stability. In fact, 
foreign banks’ strategic, long-term goals in the 
region and the related commitment of parent 
banks to support their Croatian subsidiaries 
during turbulent times in late 2008 and early 
2009 helped to mitigate the impact of the crisis 
on the Croatian banking sector, both directly 
and indirectly. Speciﬁ  cally, parent banks were 
instrumental in further strengthening their 
subsidiaries’ capital base (predominantly via 
retained earnings) and in providing sufﬁ  cient 
funding and liquidity. Moreover, Croatian 
subsidiaries indirectly beneﬁ   ted from the 
positive spillovers from foreign banks’ 
commitments to and action in other central, 
eastern and south-eastern European countries. 
Last, but not least, they also beneﬁ  ted  from 
private-public coordination under the aegis 
of international ﬁ   nancial institutions (e.g. the 
European Bank Coordination Initiative), which 
helped to restore public trust and to alleviate 
conﬁ  dence concerns.
1.4 CONCLUDING  ASSESSMENT 
AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The previous issue of the ﬁ  nancial  stability 
assessment of the candidate countries 
(ECB, 2008) identiﬁ   ed 1) the rapid pace of 
ﬁ   nancial deepening based on strong credit 
growth to the private sector, 2) the widespread 
use of foreign currency-denominated or indexed 
loans and the related indirect credit risk, 3) high 
and rising external imbalances, and 4) upward 
inﬂ  ationary pressures, as the main risk factors to 
ﬁ  nancial stability in Croatia.
The international ﬁ   nancial and economic 
environment has changed considerably since 
then, as the deepest crisis for decades affected 
the global economy in 2008 and 2009. Against 
this background, the global crisis severely tested 
Croatia, a test which the country has withstood 
for the time being and which, to some extent, 
also altered the country’s risk proﬁ  le. In fact, 
the crisis itself and the adjustment measures 
implemented by the authorities to cope with the 
spillovers from the global crisis reduced some 
of the existing risks, whereas other risks were 
ampliﬁ  ed by the crisis or materialised during it.
In particular, Croatia was hit hard by the global 
crisis especially in 2009, when the economy slid 
into its deepest recession since early transition. 
The current account improved considerably 
in 2009 but the country’s external position 
remains an important source of vulnerability, 
given high (and in 2008 and 2009 further 
increasing) external debt levels and substantial 
rollover needs, with the spillovers from the 
global ﬁ  nancial crisis also revealing temporary 
ﬁ  nancing strains in early 2009. Yet, in contrast 
to other countries in central, eastern and 
south-eastern Europe, Croatia managed to 
weather the global ﬁ  nancial turbulence without 
recourse to international support. Still, 
the country may have beneﬁ  ted indirectly from 
the positive impact of international support 
measures in other central, eastern and 
south-eastern European countries and from the 
stabilisation and recovery of global ﬁ  nancial 
markets as of March 2009. Nevertheless, 
Croatia’s major macro-ﬁ  nancial  challenges 
relate,  ﬁ   rst and foremost, to alleviating the 
country’s external vulnerabilities, in particular 
For further details, see CNB (2009b). For a macro stress-testing  19 
exercise, refer to section 4.2.26
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on the ﬁ  nancing side. In this context, it is crucial 
to prevent a further deterioration in Croatia’s 
external debt position. This is a challenging task 
given corporations’ increasing reliance on direct 
foreign borrowing and Croatia’s obligation to 
liberalise capital ﬂ  ows fully in accordance with 
the acquis communautaire.20
As in other central, eastern and south-eastern 
European countries, inﬂ  ationary  concerns 
quickly became a non-issue in Croatia in the 
context of the global crisis, which gave the 
CNB the leeway to focus on other emerging 
priorities, some of them unprecedented. In fact, 
the CNB successfully managed to preserve 
ﬁ  nancial and exchange rate stability during the 
period of turbulence by employing a wide set 
of measures, ranging from verbal interventions 
and standard monetary policy measures (mainly 
related to regulations on reserve and liquidity 
requirements) to outright foreign exchange 
market operations. However, the CNB’s limited 
room for manoeuvre – against the background 
of the tightly managed ﬂ  oat and the still high 
external imbalances – highlights the continued 
need for ﬁ  scal prudence with a view to lasting 
macro-ﬁ   nancial stabilisation. Deteriorating 
public  ﬁ   nances actually make ﬁ  scal  reform 
and consolidation imperative, all the more 
so as public ﬁ   nances are still burdened with 
subsidies for various industries (e.g. shipping), 
high health and pension commitments, as 
well as substantial quasi-ﬁ  scal  expenditures. 
Therefore, ensuring lasting ﬁ  scal consolidation, 
mainly through spending restraints, remains an 
important challenge.
Croatia’s predominantly bank-based ﬁ  nancial 
system remained stable and proﬁ  table in 2008 
and 2009, despite less favourable ﬁ  nancial and 
economic conditions and temporary conﬁ  dence 
problems (as was also the case in some other 
central, eastern and south-eastern European 
countries). Although ﬁ   nancial deepening has 
largely come to a halt on account of the ﬁ  nancial 
crisis, the Croatian banking system is relatively 
advanced in a central, eastern and south-eastern 
European context, both as regards the degree 
of ﬁ  nancial intermediation and the institutional 
setting. In the wake of the global ﬁ  nancial 
crisis, credit growth decelerated sharply, driven 
both by supply-side and demand-side factors. 
Consequently, the CNB’s ﬁ  ght against overly 
high credit growth based on banks’ foreign 
borrowing paled in comparison with previous 
years’ priorities. Still, the management of credit 
risk remains the most important ﬁ  nancial stability 
challenge for Croatia’s banking sector. Indeed, 
as in other central, eastern and south-eastern 
European countries and advanced economies, in 
an adverse economic environment households 
and corporations increasingly face problems with 
servicing their debt burden, which ranks among 
the highest in the region. Credit risk is further 
compounded by the dominant role of foreign 
currency positions, which – in a worst-case 
scenario of a substantial depreciation of the 
domestic currency – would imply substantial 
foreign exchange risks for unhedged borrowers. 
Banks’ exposure to market risks seems to be 
subdued as, by shifting foreign exchange and 
interest rate risk over to clients, they have 
transformed much of the market risk into credit 
risk. Again, this reinforces the need for a careful 
monitoring of credit risk.
At the same time, it is also important to stress the 
banking system’s shock-absorbing capacities. 
Thus far the sector’s still-high proﬁ  tability, 
its strong capitalisation and the strategically-
oriented presence of foreign banks have helped 
to absorb losses stemming from credit risk. 
Moreover, banks’ solid liquidity position before 
the crisis, which gave the central bank enough 
room for manoeuvre to carry out liquidity-easing 
operations during turbulent times, also allowed 
According to Croatia’s Stabilisation and Association Agreement  20 
(SAA) with the European Union, from the fourth year of its 
entry into force (i.e. by 1 February 2009) Croatia has to ensure 
free movement of capital relating to portfolio investment and 
ﬁ   nancial loans and credits with maturity of less than a year. 
However, in line with the SAA provisions and owing to 
exceptional circumstances (i.e. in order to cope with spillovers 
from the global economic and ﬁ   nancial crisis), Croatia and 
the European Commission have agreed on an extension to the 
deadline. Accordingly, the liberalisation of short-term loans 
to non-residents with maturities from three months to one year 
was postponed until 1 January 2010, while short-term loans 
with maturities of up to three months are to be liberalised as of 
1 July 2010. Deposit transactions of residents abroad will be 
liberalised as of 1 January 2011.27
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banks to weather global liquidity pressures. 
Banks’ sizeable net foreign liabilities continue 
to represent a potential vulnerability factor, 
however, and require cautious monitoring, 
even though parent banks are the main external 
ﬁ   nancing source of the Croatian banking 
sector. These same banks have shown a strong 
commitment towards the region and proved 
their readiness to support their subsidiaries in 
times of crisis.
The main challenge for the CNB continues to 
be safeguarding both ﬁ   nancial and monetary 
stability in a still uncertain global economic and 
ﬁ  nancial environment, while also contributing to 
economic recovery. How successful this will be 
hinges not only on external factors, such as the 
short to medium-term global economic prospects 
and the ﬁ   nancial position of parent banks, 
but also on local determinants like the magnitude 
and speed of debt restructuring by different 
economic sectors, the pace at which banks can 
digest the non-performing loan problem and 
their willingness to reignite lending activity, 
as well as the degree of support from other 
policy spheres.28
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2  THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC 
OF MACEDONIA
2.1  THE MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
The deepening of the global ﬁ  nancial and economic 
crisis after the collapse of Lehman Brothers led to 
a deterioration in the macroeconomic conditions 
in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
Real GDP growth decelerated in the fourth quarter 
of 2008 and turned negative in 2009 (-0.7%, 
see Table 10). This was the result of a steep 
fall in metal prices, a contraction of economic 
activity in leading economic partners and 
a decline in remittances and capital ﬂ  ows, which 
was only partly offset by the increase in public 
consumption. Regarding the outlook for 2010, the 
recovery that started in the fourth quarter of 2009 
is expected to gain pace, but real GDP growth 
will probably remain below the long-term trend. 
Structural unemployment remains signiﬁ  cant, 
with the ofﬁ  cial unemployment rate at 32.2% in 
December 2009. It should be noted, however, 
that unemployment has been persistently 
high for the whole decade and increased only 
marginally in 2009.21
Since the mid-1990s, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia has anchored its 
exchange rate, initially to the Deutsche Mark 
and then to the euro, in the form of a soft peg.22 
This policy has been largely motivated by the 
signiﬁ  cant degree of openness, close trade links 
with the European Union and the widespread 
private use of the euro. This exchange rate 
regime inﬂ   uences the conduct of monetary 
policy and its maintenance is pivotal in 
safeguarding macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial 
stability. At the onset of the global ﬁ  nancial 
crisis, the main vulnerability of the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was its large 
current account deﬁ   cit in the context of the 
exchange rate peg to the euro. Against this 
backdrop, the National Bank of the Republic of 
Macedonia (NBRM) in November 2007 
embarked on a cycle of tightening monetary 
policy to contain mounting inﬂ  ationary pressures 
(on the back of rising energy and food prices) 
and alleviate the pressures on the exchange rate. 
Speciﬁ   cally, the NBRM made consecutive 
increases in the central bank bill rate (i.e. the 
main monetary policy instrument) from 4.7% in 
November 2007 to 7% in June 2008. 
The high unemployment rate can be partly attributed to  21 
administrative factors (e.g. if not employed, an individual needs 
to be registered as unemployed to enjoy health insurance) as well 
as to hidden employment in the unofﬁ  cial sector (i.e. the black 
economy).
The de jure exchange rate regime is managed ﬂ  oating; the de  22 
facto regime involves a stabilised arrangement with the euro.
Table 10 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Main macroeconomic indicators
Description 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 1) 2011 1)
Real GDP growth Percentage, period average 2.8 4.1 4.1 4.0 5.9 4.8 -0.7 1.3 2.0
Inﬂ  ation Percentage, period average, 
harmonised deﬁ  nition 1.2 -0.4 0.5 3.2 2.3 8.3 -0.8 1.3 2.0
Central Bank Bill Rate 2) Percentage, end of period 6.2 10.0 8.5 5.7 4.8 7.0 8.5 … …
Nominal effective exchange rate  Index (2001 = 100), period average 106.8 109.6 110.9 111.1 112.6 114.4 116.7 … …
Current account balance Percentage of GDP -4.1 -8.4 -2.6 -0.9 -7.2 -13.1 -7.3 -7.8 -9.5
FDI Percentage of GDP 2.4 6.0 1.6 6.8 8.8 6.3 2.6 5.1 5.1
Gross external debt Percentage of GDP 50.0 51.9 51.5 51.8 52.2 47.0 59.3 57.8 58.4
General government balance Percentage of GDP -0.1 0.4 0.2 -0.5 0.6 -1.0 -2.8 -2.5 -2.0
General government gross debt Percentage of GDP 39.0 36.6 39.5 31.5 23.4 21.5 24.5 26.2 26.3
Unemployment rate Percentage 36.7 37.1 37.3 36.0 34.9 33.8 32.2 31.7 31.0
Sources: Eurostat (AMECO), Haver Analytics, IMF, national sources and ECB calculations.
1) Forecasts. 
2) Monetary policy rate; weighted average 28-day interest rate.29
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The escalation in the global ﬁ  nancial crisis in 
September 2008 and growing risk aversion 
among investors resulted in a collapse of export 
demand and a loss of external ﬁ  nancing at the 
end of 2008. These factors caused a sharp 
slowdown in the economy and a decline in tax 
revenues. They also forced a rapid sell-off of 
central bank foreign exchange reserves and 
raised uncertainties about the sustainability of 
the exchange rate peg. Currency substitution 
and cash outﬂ   ows by residents added to 
pressures on reserves, while elections in 
spring 2009 created additional uncertainties. 
By May 2009 central bank reserves had fallen 
below €1.2 billion (75% of short-term debt), 
30% down from the October 2008 peak. The 
NBRM responded to reserve outﬂ  ows by raising 
its policy rate from 7% to 9% and tightening 
bank reserve and liquidity requirements.23 These 
actions helped to slow credit growth and contain 
the loss of reserves. In response to the improved 
trends in the external sector and the more 
favourable outlook, the NBRM started a 
loosening cycle in November 2009 and had 
reduced its policy rate in six steps by 400 basis 
points to 5% by the middle of June 2010. 
Inﬂ  ation, which had been contained successfully 
at low levels until 2007, spiked in 2008, reaching 
8.3% (annual average) mainly on account of 
the increase in global food and energy prices. 
In 2009 the downward adjustment of import prices 
was the key driver behind a remarkable reversal, 
and negative inﬂ  ation was recorded (-0.8%).
The  ﬁ   scal position of the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, underpinned by 
prudent ﬁ  scal policy, had been improving for 
the whole of this decade until the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers. In the fourth quarter of 2008 
the government adopted an expansionary ﬁ  scal 
policy. Speciﬁ  cally, taxes on personal income 
and proﬁ  ts were reduced (10% ﬂ  at rate, down 
from 12%) while wages in public administration 
were increased (4.1%), as was public expenditure 
on goods and services (32.8%). These measures 
were aimed at stimulating domestic economic 
activity through an increase in household 
disposable income and public consumption. 
As a result, the government registered a small 
ﬁ  scal  deﬁ   cit (-1% of GDP) in 2008, which 
widened somewhat in 2009 (-2.8% of GDP). In 
July 2009 the government issued a €175 million 
Eurobond (at 9.875%), which bolstered foreign 
reserves and ensured sufﬁ  cient budget ﬁ  nancing. 
Central government debt also increased 
moderately in 2009 to reach 24.5% of GDP, but 
still remained signiﬁ  cantly lower than the levels 
recorded in the early part of the decade. Gross 
external debt also increased in 2009, reaching 
about 59% of GDP. 
The current account balance deteriorated in 2008 
to reach a multi-year high of 13.1% of GDP, 
but improved considerably in 2009 (-7.3%). 
The underlying trade deﬁ  cit remains structurally 
signiﬁ  cant, peaking at 26.7% in 2008. In the 
course of 2009 the trade deﬁ  cit improved, mainly 
on account of a signiﬁ  cant reduction in imports, 
while the current account also beneﬁ  ted from 
increasing private transfers. FDI ﬂ  ows hovered 
around 6-9% of GDP in 2006-08, but declined 
to about 2.6% in 2009.
2.2  THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: STRUCTURE 
AND DEVELOPMENTS
THE STRUCTURE OF THE BANKING SYSTEM
The banking sector of the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia is dominated by 
foreign-owned private banks, which have gained 
market share in the last couple of years. In 2009 
foreign-owned banks represented 93% of total 
banking sector assets, up from 86% in 2007, while 
their number has also increased (see Table 11). 
Concentration in the sector remains high with 
the three largest banks controlling two-thirds 
of total assets in 2009, a feature common in 
many small open economies. The total number 
of banks has remained stable since 2008.
In the last couple of years several institutional 
reforms in the banking system have been 
implemented, including the adoption of a new 
In particular, it increased the reserve requirement for foreign  23 
currency-denominated liabilities from 10% to 13% and for 
foreign currency-indexed liabilities from 10% to 20%.30
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banking law in June 2007. The EBRD index 
of banking sector reform rose to 3.0 in 2009 
(from 2.7 in 2007).24 In 2008 the following 
laws strengthening the institutional framework 
were enacted:
The Credit Bureau Law, enabling the    •
establishment of private credit bureaus 
covering liabilities based on loans, 
payment cards, ﬁ  nancial leasing, insurance, 
taxes, social insurance contributions, 
telecommunication, energy and other 
utilities fees, etc. Private credit bureaus are 
intended to complement the information 
provided by the NBRM’s Credit Registry, 
which only covers liabilities to banks and 
savings houses;
The Law on Financial Collateral, which    •
consolidates the regulations of the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia with EC 
Directive 2020/47 on ﬁ  nancial  collateral 
agreements;
The Law on Voluntary Fully Funded Pension    •
Insurances, which regulates the sector 
establishing the so-called third pension pillar 
for the ﬁ  rst time. 
THE ASSET AND LIABILITY STRUCTURE 
OF THE BANKING SYSTEM
Financial intermediation in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia showed an upward trend 
in the period 2002-07, but has remained almost 
ﬂ  at since. Measured by the share of total banking 
system assets in GDP, ﬁ  nancial intermediation 
stood at about 66% in 2009, only slightly higher 
compared with 2007 (63.1%), while in 2002 it 
had stood at 38% (see Table 12).25 Compared 
with the EU countries, only Romania has a 
lower level of ﬁ  nancial intermediation. 
Banks in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia focus on traditional banking 
activities, with credit to the private sector 
playing a predominant role. The share in total 
assets of claims on the non-bank corporate 
sector and households increased steadily until 
2008, reaching 66.7%, but declined in 2009 
(to 59.3%). Claims on households increased at 
a faster pace, representing 40% of total claims 
to the private sector at the end of 2009. They 
also proved to be more resilient in the recent 
downturn. External assets represent only 
10.2% of total assets and their share recorded 
a moderate increase in 2009 compared with 
2008. The share of claims on domestic MFIs 
has experienced some volatility over recent 
years, but remained low at 8.7% in 2009. Lastly, 
claims on the general government sector have 
declined in the last couple of years. 
According to the EBRD a score of “3” means that a country  24 
has achieved substantial progress in developing the capacity for 
effective prudential supervision, including procedures for the 
resolution of bank insolvencies, and in establishing hardened 
budget constraints on banks by eliminating preferential access to 
concessionary reﬁ  nancing from the central bank. 
Since 2009 banks have disclosed their ﬁ  nancial statements in  25 
accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS). This has prompted some changes to the composition and 
structure of the positions in this table.
Table 11 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: structure of the banking sector
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
EBRD index of banking sector reform 1) 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.0
Number of banks (foreign-owned) 20 (7) 21 (8) 21 (8) 20 (8) 19 (8) 19 (11) 18 (14) 18 (14)
Number of banks per 100,000 inhabitants 1.04 0.92 0.83 0.77 0.83 0.94 0.89 0.89
Assets of private banks Percentage of total assets 98.0 98.2 98.1 98.4 98.4 98.6 98.8 98.6
Assets of foreign banks Percentage of total assets 44.0 47.0 47.3 51.3 53.2 85.9 93.1 93.3
Assets of the three largest banks Percentage of total assets 64.0 66.9 66.8 66.1 66.1 67.1 66.1 67.5
Herﬁ  ndahl-Hirschmann index 2) 1,667 1,842 1,685 1,607 1,595 1,625 1,579 1,637
Sources: EBRD and NBRM.
1) Reform progress ranges from 1 (little progress beyond the establishment of a two-tier system) to 4+ (standards and performance norms 
of advanced industrial economies). 
2) Sum of the squared asset shares of individual banks. The index ranges between 0 and 10,000. Below 1,000 it suggests a non-concentrated 
sector; above 1,800 it is highly concentrated.31
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2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Commercial bank (net) assets Percentage of GDP 1) 38.2 41.7 44.5 49.4 56.4 63.1 62.9 66.0
Total domestic claims Percentage of total assets 56.4 57.1 59.1 63.2 67.5 73.7 80.8 72.6
Claims on domestic MFIs Percentage of total assets 6.3 9.0 7.6 11.1 10.7 13.9 10.0 8.7
Claims on domestic non-banks Percentage of total assets 50.1 48.1 51.4 52.1 56.8 59.9 70.8 63.9
of which: group impairment 
(general provisions for credit risk) Percentage of total assets … … … … … … … -0.3
of which:
Claims on general government Percentage of total assets 8.6 6.0 5.9 5.0 7.4 5.6 3.8 4.8
Claims on domestic households and enterprises Percentage of total assets 41.5 42.1 45.5 47.1 49.4 53.9 66.7 59.3
of which:
Claims on domestic enterprises Percentage of total assets 35.6 33.7 33.5 32.7 32.6 33.4 40.6 35.4
Claims on domestic households Percentage of total assets 5.9 8.4 12.0 14.4 16.8 20.5 26.0 23.9
Money market fund shares Percentage of total assets
External assets Percentage of total assets 31.4 28.2 28.1 24.2 20.6 15.5 8.8 10.2
Claims on domestic households
Percentage of total claims 
on households and enterprises 14.3 19.9 26.5 30.6 34.0 38.1 39.1 40.3
Loans-to-claims ratio for domestic nonbanks 79.8 81.8 86.1 86.8 85.1 88.2 92.6 91.6
of which:
Loans-to-claims ratio for general government 18.6 0.7 7.9 2.6 3.0 3.1 4.6 1.0
Loans-to-claims ratio for domestic households 
and enterprises 92.4 93.2 96.3 95.8 97.4 97.6 98.0 99.0
Sources: NBRM and State Statistical Ofﬁ  ce.
Note: Since 2009 banks have disclosed their ﬁ  nancial statements in accordance with IFRS, which has led to changes in the table’s 
composition and structure. 
1) For 2009, estimated GDP has been used.
Table 13 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: liability structure of the banking sector
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Deposits of MFIs Percentage of total liabilities 2.7 1.8 0.9 1.6 2.0 2.0 2.3 0.6
Deposits of domestic non-banks Percentage of total liabilities 57.8 64.0 67.1 66.8 68.2 70.0 70.4 71.5
of which:
Deposits of general government Percentage of total liabilities 2.8 2.1 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.6 0.9 0.5
Deposits of households and enterprises Percentage of total liabilities 55.1 61.8 65.6 65.5 67.2 69.4 69.5 71.1
Money market fund shares  Percentage of total liabilities 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Debt securities issued  Percentage of total liabilities 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.3
Capital and reserves Percentage of total liabilities 20.7 19.1 17.5 15.9 13.3 11.4 11.5 11.4
External liabilities Percentage of total liabilities 12.8 9.3 8.5 10.2 9.7 10.3 9.4 10.6
of which:
Parent entities non capital instruments 
(deposits, loans, subordinated and hybrid 
capital instruments) … … … … 39.5 40.5 51.6 60.1
Remaining liabilities (provisions for off-balance 
sheet liabilities, subordinated and hybrid capital 
instruments and other liabilities) Percentage of total liabilities 3.4 2.6 3.6 3.1 4.0 3.3 3.4 2.6
Remaining liabilities 
(short-term borowings up to one year) Percentage of total liabilities 1.0 1.8 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3
Remaining liabilities 
(long-term borrowings over one year) Percentage of total liabilities 1.6 1.4 2.2 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.3 2.7
Memorandum items:
Domestic non-banks’ claim-to-deposit ratio 89.8 81.8 83.4 84.1 88.6 90.3 102.7 89.3
General government’s claim-to-deposit ratio 322.0 303.6 450.3 433.0 777.5 914.9 430.7 1,010.1
Households’ & Enterprises’ claim-to-deposit ratio  78.1 74.2 75.4 77.5 78.2 82.1 98.0 83.5
Source: NBRM.32
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The banking sector has a solid funding structure. 
Domestic non-bank deposits represented 71.1% 
of total liabilities at the end of December 2009, 
and capital and reserves 11.4% (see Table 13). 
External liabilities stood at 10.6% of total 
liabilities, almost unchanged since 2007. Non-
equity instruments (e.g. deposits, subordinated 
and hybrid capital instruments, etc.) 
extended by parent banks represented 60% of 
external liabilities, up from 41% in 2007. Hence, 
the degree of dependence on external and, in 
particular, parent funding remains limited. 
BANKING SECTOR PROFITABILITY
The adverse macroeconomic environment in 
the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers episode 
impacted negatively on the proﬁ  tability  and 
efﬁ  ciency of the banking sector. Already in 2008 
a moderate decline in return on average assets 
and return on average equity was recorded, 
while in the course of 2009 proﬁ  tability 
indicators halved to 0.7% and 5.6% respectively 
(see Table 14). The main driver behind this 
deterioration was the increase in loan loss 
provisions, which represented 27% of total 
operating income in 2009. Revenue generation 
was also affected, as indicated by the moderate 
increase in the cost-to-income ratio in the last 
couple of years. Nevertheless the banking sector 
in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
has signiﬁ   cantly improved its performance 
compared with the period 2000-04. 
Net interest income has traditionally been the 
key driver of revenues, generating 65% of total 
operating income in 2009. The net interest 
margin (i.e. net interest income over average 
total assets) increased somewhat in 2009 to reach 
4.1%, providing a ﬁ  rst line of defence against 
potential loan losses. It is noteworthy that the 
interest rate spread (i.e. the spread between loans 
and deposits) has widened in foreign exchange 
and foreign exchange clause loans since 2006, 
the difference increasing substantially in 2009. 
Table 14 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: profitability of the banking sector
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Total operating income 1) Percentage of total income 75.6 72.2 82.7 83.5 93.3 93.5 94.6 99.5
of which:
Net interest income Percentage of operating income 47.0 48.7 52.0 56.3 59.6 59.7 61.9 65.5
Net non-interest income Percentage of operating income 53.0 51.3 48.0 43.7 40.4 40.3 38.1 34.5
General administrative expenses Percentage of operating income 90.9 87.0 74.5 66.6 62.0 58.4 62.1 62.8
Operating expenses 
(excluding loan loss provisions) Percentage of operating income
Loan loss provision expenses Percentage of operating income 30.9 39.8 34.7 28.6 15.5 17.3 16.9 27.0
Income tax Percentage of operating income 1.3 1.4 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.2 3.2 0.3
After-tax proﬁ  t/loss Percentage of operating income 6.4 7.6 8.1 17.9 26.7 28.8 23.2 10.3
Net interest income Percentage of average assets 2.8 2.9 3.5 3.9 4.0 3.8 3.8 4.1
Net non-interest income Percentage of average assets 3.2 3.0 3.2 3.0 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.2
Interest rate spread 
(total loans – total deposits) Percentage points
Denar spread 2) Percentage points ... ... ... 6.9 6.5 4.6 3.7 3.2
Foreign exchange spread 2) Percentage points ... ... ... 6.5 6.7 6.5 4.2 4.2
Denar with foreign exchange clause spread 2) Percentage points ... ... ... 6.8 7.0 5.6 4.0 5.7
Return on average assets 3) Percentage 0.4 0.5 0.6 1.2 1.8 1.8 1.4 0.7
Return on average equity 3) Percentage 2.0 2.3 3.1 7.5 12.3 15.2 12.5 5.6
Source: NBRM.
1) Data revised to include extraordinary income in total income. 
2) Figures for 1999-2004 are incompatible with data from 2005 onwards owing to a change in methodology for calculating banks’ 
weighted interest rates. 
3) 2009 data calculated using pre-tax proﬁ  ts.33
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The  ﬁ   nancial sector of the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia continues to be dominated 
by the banking sector, which accounted for 
89% of total ﬁ   nancial sector assets in 2008.26 
Nonetheless, the non-bank ﬁ  nancial  sector 
experienced far-reaching structural changes in 
2006-08. The share of insurance companies in 
total ﬁ  nancial sector assets shrank considerably 
to 4.2% (from 7.5% in 2006), mainly on account 
of the reduction in the sector’s assets in 2007. 
The share of leasing companies doubled (3.1% 
in 2008 against 1.4% in 2006), while pension 
funds, launched only in 2006, expanded to 1.8% 
of total assets. The share of savings banks (1.2%) 
remained ﬂ  at, while brokerage houses, pension 
fund management companies and investment 
funds together accounted for around 0.4% of 
ﬁ  nancial sector assets. 
Like the banking sector, the non-bank ﬁ  nancial 
system is highly concentrated and largely foreign-
owned (except for brokerage houses). However, 
concentration decreased in most segments in 
2006-08, a trend which is expected to continue 
in the near future (e.g. the number of leasing 
companies doubled in 2008). Certain activities 
remain underdeveloped (e.g. life insurance 
represents only 4% of gross insurance premiums; 
real estate leasing represents only 1.5% of 
the total value of active leasing agreements). 
Cross-sector ownership is at a relatively low 
level. The business ties between banks and non-
bank ﬁ  nancial institutions consist of the deposits 
of the non-bank ﬁ  nancial institutions placed with 
banks, which in turn constitute only 3.4% of the 
total deposits of the banking sector. 
2.3  RISKS AND SHOCK-ABSORBING CAPACITIES
CREDIT RISK
Credit risk is the key risk that banks in the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
are facing – as already mentioned, the loan 
book represents a very signiﬁ  cant part of their 
balance sheet. In addition, since 2004 the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has 
experienced a prolonged credit boom, with 
private sector credit recording a year-on-year 
growth of 24-39% (see Table 15). In 2009 a 
deceleration in credit growth was recorded, 
with private sector credit growth declining 
to 8.9% year on year (from 34.6% in 2008). 
This deceleration is not necessarily negative from 
a ﬁ  nancial stability perspective. Previous growth 
rates were not sustainable in the long term and 
might have raised concerns over asset quality. 
Moreover, there has been no credit crunch, 
considering that credit growth remains positive; 
more importantly, credit growth has only halved 
in real terms (since inﬂ   ation turned negative 
in 2009).
The deceleration in credit growth has been more 
pronounced for household loans. Their annual 
growth rate declined to 2.6%, while in the period 
2004-08 it was in the range of 37-64%. This 
development can be partly explained by the 
introduction of prudential measures. Firstly, in 
March 2008 the risk weights for calculating 
banks’ capital requirements on credit cards and 
current account overdraft exposures were 
increased to 125% (from 100%). The share of 
these types of claims in total household loans is 
important: credit card balances represent around 
one-third and overdrafts 11%. As a result of the 
aforementioned measure, a signiﬁ  cant slowdown 
in the growth of credit card balances has been 
recorded, while the impact on overdraft balances 
has been muted. Secondly, quantitative 
restrictions on household credit growth were 
applied – basically aiming at limiting the 
cumulative growth rate of household credit at 
18.1% between May and December 2008 
and at 11.3% for the whole of 2009.27 
This measure was abandoned in 2010, by which 
time household credit growth had already 
decelerated signiﬁ  cantly.
Overall indebtedness of households and 
non-ﬁ  nancial enterprises increased in 2008 but 
levelled off in 2009. Household debt (including 
Data on the overall ﬁ  nancial sector were available only up to  26 
2008 by the cut-off date.
In particular, if the household credit growth rate of a bank or  27 
savings house exceeded the monthly growth rate set by the 
NBRM at the end of a speciﬁ  ed month, the bank or savings house 
then had to place a compulsory deposit with the central bank.34
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Table 15 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: selected banking sector stability
indicators
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Credit risk
Credit growth Percentage, year on year 9.0 8.4 23.7 20.1 30.9 38.7 34.3 4.4
Credit growth to the private sector Percentage, year on year 10.4 15.6 26.8 23.4 31.0 39.0 34.6 8.1
Real credit growth to the private sector Percentage, year on year 8.4 14.2 27.3 22.8 26.9 35.9 24.3 8.9
Credit growth to households Percentage, year on year 47.5 59.5 63.2 40.8 42.9 56.2 37.4 2.6
Mortgage credit (housing loans) Percentage, year on year ... ... 60.4 37.0 52.2 63.8 45.0 7.6




Percentage of total household 
loans 10.7 7.2 6.8 6.5 5.1 4.2 5.3 8.2
Non-performing loans 
of corporates
Percentage of total corporate 
loans 25.9 26.0 20.4 18.8 14.3 9.3 7.5 9.6
Non-performing loans 
in domestic currency
Percentage of total domestic 
currency loans 23.8 24.0 19.8 17.7 13.4 8.6 7.6 8.5
Non-performing loans 
in foreign currency 1)
Percentage of total foreign 
currency loans 19.5 19.4 10.6 7.1 5.3 4.1 3.9 11.0
Foreign currency credit Percentage of total private 
sector credit 16.8 19.7 20.0 25.4 26.3 24.6 22.9 22.6
Foreign currency deposits Percentage of total deposits 52.3 52.7 54.4 55.7 52.6 44.5 48.1 56.2
Market risk
Forex risk
Open foreign exchange position 1) Percentage of total assets 11.5 10.4 8.5 7.7 6.0 4.5 3.3 1.6
Stock market risk
Ratio of shares and participations 
to total assets (equity holdings) 1.7 1.3 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.2
Liquidity risk
Ratio of liquid assets 2) to total assets 14.7 13.5 12.5 15.0 18.0 20.9 16.9 20.6
Ratio of total loans to total deposits 67.0 64.4 69.7 70.3 72.9 74.1 92.8 92.5
Ratio of liquid assets 2) to short-term 
liabilities 23.2 20.5 18.5 21.7 25.2 28.2 24.0 30.1
Shock-absorbing factors
Loan loss provisions
Percentage of non-performing 
loans 90.4 91.4 102.7 110.8 113.6 132.6 133.5 112.6
of which:
Loan loss provisions 
for household loans 3)
Percentage of non-performing 
loans to the household sector … … 102.7 100.4 116.3 125.6 104.9 91.7
Loan loss provisions 
for corporate loans 4)
Percentage of non-performing 
loans to the corporate sector … … 112.7 108.4 108.9 127.9 140.0 117.6
Non-performing loans net 
of provisions for the overall credit 
exposure of the banking sector 5) Percentage of capital 4.6 0.0 -4.5 -5.7 -6.0 -11.3 -11.3 -5.7
Capital adequacy ratio  28.1 25.8 23.0 21.3 18.3 17.0 16.2 16.4
Memorandum items:
Number of banks (foreign-owned) 20 (7) 21 (8) 21 (8) 20 (8) 19 (8) 19 (11) 18 (14) 18 (14)
Assets of foreign-owned banks Percentage of total assets 44.0 47.0 47.3 51.3 53.2 85.9 93.1 93.6
Source: NBRM.
1) The data series has been revised. Before the revision the open foreign exchange position was calculated as an average open foreign 
exchange position of the banking sector in the last month of each year. In this series the open foreign exchange position for each year 
represents the open foreign exchange position of the banking sector on 31 December. 
2) The data series has been revised. Liquid assets = cash in vaults + deposits with the NBRM + central bank bills + treasury bills 
(liquid assets exclude reserve requirements with the NBRM, deposits and correspondent accounts with domestic banks, but include 
correspondent accounts with foreign banks). Total assets exclude assets with domestic banks and short-term liabilities exclude short-term 
liabilities to domestic banks. 
3) Refers to “loan loss provisions for credit exposure to households” (the credit exposure includes: performing and non-performing loans, 
regular interest, off-balance sheet items and other claims). 
4) Refers to “loan loss provisions for credit exposure to corporates” (the credit exposure includes: performing and nonperforming loans, 
regular interest, off-balance sheet items and other claims). 
5) Refers to “own funds” according to the Decision on the methodology for determining capital adequacy (“Ofﬁ  cial Gazette of the Republic 
of Macedonia” 159/2007, 32/2008, 31/2009, 96/2009).35
ECB
Occasional Paper No 115
July 2010
2   THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC 
OF MACEDONIA
loans extended by leasing companies) reached 
17.7% of GDP and 30.7% of gross disposable 
income in 2008  28 (see Table 16). The bulk of 
this debt (around 80%) has been accrued for 
consumption purposes. Non-ﬁ  nancial enterprises 
debt reached 26.8% of GDP and 173% of 
corporate bank deposits. However, indebtedness 
levels remain low by international comparison. 
Indeed, debt servicing costs still appear to be 
manageable. Implicit interest payments for 
households stood at 2.9% of gross disposable 
income, while for non-ﬁ  nancial enterprises they 
represented 1.8% of GDP. Nonetheless, it should 
be borne in mind that many borrowers have no 
prior experience with ﬁ   nancial products and 
lack any credit history. This is particularly true 
for households and small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs).
Indirect credit risk through credit exposure 
with a foreign currency component is material. 
Foreign currency-denominated and indexed 
loans represented 58.5% of total private sector 
credit in 2009 (up from 54.7% in 2007). Many 
Indebtedness data for 2009 are incomplete. 28 
Table 16 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: selected macro-prudential indicators – 
domestic debt
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2)
Households
to banks and savings houses
Debt Percentage of GDP 2.7 4.1 6.2 8.0 10.6 13.5 16.7 16.6
Debt Percentage of gross disposable income 4.0 5.7 9.1 12.4 16.3 22.6 29.0 ...
Debt Percentage, year on year 44.6 58.1 59.8 39.3 43.5 44.4 39.1 1.6
Implicit interest payments Percentage of gross disposable income 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.5 1.7 2.2 2.9 ...
+ to leasing companies
Debt Percentage of GDP ... ... 6.7 8.7 11.5 14.5 17.7 ...
Debt Percentage of gross disposable income ... ... 9.7 13.4 17.5 24.3 30.7 ...
Debt Percentage, year on year ... ... ... 40.7 43.1 44.2 37.0 ...
Non-ﬁ  nancial enterprises
to banks and savings houses
Debt Percentage of GDP 13.2 14.3 15.7 16.5 19.0 21.5 25.3 26.6
Debt Percentage of corporate bank deposits 173.8 143.9 135.3 137.7 129.1 133.9 163.2 196.9
Debt Percentage, year on year -2.2 11.2 16.0 13.7 24.6 29.2 32.0 7.2
Implicit interest payments Percentage of GDP 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.8 2.1
+ to leasing companies
Debt Percentage of GDP ... ... 16.1 17.1 19.7 22.8 26.8 ...
Debt Percentage of corporate bank deposits ... ... 138.6 142.4 134.1 141.6 173.3 ...
Debt Percentage, year on year ... ... ... 14.9 25.2 31.6 32.5 ...
Total non-ﬁ  nancial private sector
to banks and savings houses
Debt Percentage of GDP 15.9 18.4 21.9 24.6 29.6 35.0 42.0 43.2
Debt Percentage, year on year 3.5 19.1 25.8 21.0 30.8 34.7 34.7 5.0
+ to leasing companies
Debt Percentage of GDP ... ... 22.7 25.8 31.2 37.3 44.5 ...
Debt Percentage, year on year ... ... ... 22.5 31.2 36.2 34.3 ...
Central government 1)
Debt Percentage of GDP 15.7 14.5 13.6 12.9 12.8 9.5 7.2 7.4
Debt Percentage, year on year -7.8 -5.0 -0.6 2.1 7.4 -14.7 -15.5 5.2
Interest paid Percentage of GDP 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2
Total non-ﬁ  nancial sector
Debt Percentage of GDP 31.6 32.9 35.6 37.5 42.4 44.6 49.1 50.6
Debt Percentage, year on year -2.5 7.2 14.2 13.8 22.8 19.8 24.0 5.0
Memorandum items:
Total external debt Percentage of GDP … … 48.1 54.0 49.3 49.1 50.9 57.8
Total private external debt Percentage of GDP … … 20.1 22.2 24.3 30.8 33.8 37.8
Sources: NBRM, Ministry of Finance and State Statistical Ofﬁ  ce.
1) Total domestic public debt of central government. 
2) For 2009, estimated GDP has been used.36
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factors have contributed to the large share of 
foreign currency-denominated and indexed 
loans, including the fact that foreign currency-
denominated and indexed deposits account for 
60.9% of the total. Moreover, the interest rate 
differential for loans in domestic and foreign 
currency is high, rendering the latter attractive 
to domestic borrowers. The dominant role of 
foreign-owned banks has further contributed to 
the proliferation of foreign currency-denominated 
and indexed loans. Last, but not least, prudential 
rules for management of the banks’ direct 
foreign exchange position provide an incentive 
for them to ofﬂ  oad their foreign currency to their 
customers, transforming the exchange rate risk 
into indirect credit risk. The share of foreign 
currency-denominated and indexed loans is 
higher for non-ﬁ   nancial enterprises (66.6% of 
total non-ﬁ   nancial enterprises loans) than for 
households (45.7% of total household loans). 
Hence, at ﬁ  rst sight it seems that some of the 
foreign currency loans have been extended 
to unhedged borrowers. There are, however, 
mitigating factors at work. Many households 
have signiﬁ  cant income from remittances, while 
many non-ﬁ  nancial enterprises have signiﬁ  cant 
export revenues. In addition, as already 
mentioned a signiﬁ  cant share of deposits is in 
foreign currency, so some of the foreign currency 
borrowers may also have deposits in foreign 
currency. More importantly, the exchange rate 
regime (a soft peg) protects borrowers in foreign 
exchange from extreme short-term ﬂ  uctuations 
in the exchange rate and, correspondingly, in 
their debt servicing cost. That said, safeguarding 
conﬁ  dence in the sustainability of the peg should 
be a key anchor of monetary and ﬁ  scal policy.
The feeble macroeconomic environment has 
taken its toll on the banks’ asset quality. 
The ratio of non-performing loans increased to 
9.0% in 2009 from 6.7% in 2008.29 This increase 
in the NPL ratio in the course of 2009 reversed a 
long-term downward trend that had started in 
2001. Both household and non-ﬁ  nancial 
corporate loans were affected, with the 
respective NPL ratios reaching 8.2% and 9.6% 
(see Table 2.6). Interestingly, the deterioration 
was more pronounced for foreign currency-
denominated and indexed loans, where the NPL 
ratio almost tripled in a year (11.0% in 2009 
against 3.9% in 2008), returning to levels last 
seen in 2004. This deterioration is concentrated 
in foreign exchange-denominated loans to non-
ﬁ   nancial enterprises and could be partly 
attributed to the signiﬁ   cant decline in export 
revenues (as a result of reduced metal prices and 
export demand).30 Concurrently, the increase in 
the NPL ratio for loans in domestic currency 
was moderate (8.5% in 2009 compared with 
7.6% in 2008). Overall, the deterioration in asset 
quality was widespread across the banking 
system, but tended more to affect banks with 
relatively low NPLs, as reﬂ  ected in the frequency 
distribution of the NPL ratio. Speciﬁ  cally, the 
inter-quartile range of the NPL ratio narrowed 
to 6.8-17.7% in 2009 from 3.9-21.7% in 2008.
MARKET AND LIQUIDITY RISKS
Market risk remains limited and its importance 
has decreased over time. Given that most 
bank loans are issued with de facto variable 
interest rates, interest rate risk is limited in the 
banks’ balance sheets. For example, only 11% 
of household loans have a ﬁ   xed interest rate. 
That said, as exposure to interest rate ﬂ  uctuations 
is largely passed on to the borrowers, this 
represents an additional source of indirect credit 
risk. The open foreign exchange position of 
banks declined signiﬁ  cantly to only 1.6% of total 
assets in 2009, compared with 4.5% in 2007 
(see Table 2.6). Nonetheless, the high degree of 
foreign currency usage in both deposits and loans 
renders the careful monitoring of foreign currency 
risk necessary. This is particularly true in times 
of turbulence in the global ﬁ  nancial  markets. 
For example, at the end of 2008 the NBRM adopted 
a decision which introduced the possibility for 
domestic banks to hold foreign currency deposits 
with the NBRM itself instead of placing them with 
foreign banks abroad. This measure was aimed 
at limiting the exposure of banks to counterparty 
Non-performing loans are classiﬁ  ed in the D and E risk category  29 
according to the NBRM’s classiﬁ  cation, and include loans not 
collected for more than 90 days after the maturity date.
The deterioration in the asset quality of foreign currency loans  30 
cannot be attributed to exchange rate volatility, since the 
exchange rate was stable.37
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risk when placing assets abroad. Banks’ exposure 
to equity price risk is very limited, as the ratio of 
shares and participations to total assets has been 
historically low and declined even further to only 
0.2% in 2009. 
Liquidity risk is also contained. Deposits 
represent the predominant funding source, with 
the loan-to-deposit ratio standing at 92% in 2009. 
Nonetheless, there is considerable dispersion 
among banks. Around one-quarter of banks have 
a loan-to-deposit ratio that exceeds 125%. 
Moreover, in the last quarter of 2008 banks 
experienced tightened liquidity conditions and 
recorded an increase in the maturity and currency 
mismatch of their assets and liabilities. Against 
this backdrop, the NBRM adopted a decision on 
liquidity risk management, which entered into 
force in the ﬁ  rst quarter of 2009. Inter alia, the 
new regulation introduced the requirement for 
banks to maintain a minimum liquid assets ratio.31 
As a result, the ratio of liquid assets 32 to total 
assets and to short-term liabilities improved 
somewhat in the course of 2009. 
SHOCK-ABSORBING FACTORS
The banking sector entered the crisis with 
a strong capital buffer. At the end of 2008 
the capital adequacy ratio stood at 16.2%, 
comfortably above the minimum required level 
(8%). In 2009 it strengthened further to reach 
16.4%, partly on account of the deceleration 
of credit growth (loans have a high risk weight 
relative to other assets). In addition, as exhibited 
by the frequency distribution of the capital 
adequacy ratio, most banks have a strong capital 
buffer. Speciﬁ  cally, three out of four banks have 
a capital adequacy ratio above 15% or so and 
none of the banks had a capital adequacy ratio 
below the minimum requirement. Moreover, 
the leverage ratio (i.e. total assets over total 
accounting equity) stood at 8.4 for the sector as a 
whole, a very satisfactory level by international 
standards. Retained earnings have been the most 
important source of capital generation, followed 
by subordinated instruments through parent 
entities. Financing through equity issuance is of 
very limited relevance.
The banking sector also had a signiﬁ  cant 
provisioning buffer. At the end of 2008 the 
coverage ratio stood at 133.5%, although in 
2009 it declined to 112.6%, still above 100% 
(see Table 15).  Nonetheless, the frequency 
distribution of the coverage ratio shows that 
some banks are relatively under-provisioned, 
with one out of four banks having a coverage 
ratio below 77%. Still, these deviations should 
be regarded with caution since the appropriate 
coverage ratio depends on the composition and 
risk proﬁ  le of the loan book of each individual 
bank. In any case, provisioning levels remain 
high by international standards, acting as a 
second layer of defence against losses. This is 
underpinned by the fact that the share of net 
(i.e. after provisions) non-performing loans 
as a percentage of prudential own funds is 
negative (-5.7%). 
Last but not least, proﬁ   t indicators reached 
record highs from a very low level in 2006-08 
(see Table 14). This is a positive development 
since proﬁ  ts are the ﬁ  rst line of defence against 
expected and unexpected losses. Banks followed 
conservative dividend policies over this period, 
with retained earnings representing more than 
two-thirds of after-tax proﬁ  ts,  contributing 
to the strengthening of the capital base. As 
mentioned earlier, however, the capital adequacy 
ratio declined owing to the rapid increase in 
risk-weighted assets. More importantly, returns 
on equity and on assets halved in 2009, mainly as 
a consequence of increased impairment charges. 
In addition, certain banks recorded losses. 
The minimum liquidity ratio equals 1, and is calculated as a ratio  31 
between (i) assets and liabilities that mature in the next 30 days 
(separately for assets and liabilities in domestic and in foreign 
currency) and (ii) assets and liabilities that mature in the next 
180 days (separately for assets and liabilities in domestic and in 
foreign currency). The concentration of deposits is an additional 
criterion for the calculation of relevant liabilities.
Liquid assets are deﬁ  ned as cash in vaults, deposits with the  32 
NBRM, central bank bills and treasury bills (liquid assets 
exclude reserve requirements with the NBRM, deposits and 
correspondent accounts with domestic banks, but include 
correspondent accounts with foreign banks). Total assets exclude 
assets with domestic banks, and short-term liabilities exclude 
short-term liabilities to domestic banks. 38
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According to the results of regular stress tests 
based on different shock scenarios, the banking 
system of the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia is relatively resilient. The various 
stress test simulations show that even in the case 
of simultaneous materialisation of credit, 
currency and interest rate risk of a severe nature, 
the capital adequacy of the banking sector would 
not fall below the minimum requirement of 8%. 
This simulation assumes a simultaneous increase 
of 50% in the credit exposure of the riskiest 
categories of loans (C, D and E risk categories 
according to the NBRM classiﬁ  cation), a 20% 
depreciation in the denar’s value against the 
euro and the US dollar, and an increase of 
5 percentage points in domestic interest rates.33 
2.4 CONCLUDING  ASSESSMENT 
AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The banking system in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia has so far weathered 
the global ﬁ  nancial and economic crisis quite 
successfully, limiting its impact on the domestic 
economy. In the case of the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia the transmission of the 
global crisis occurred through the real sector, 
since the banking sector was not exposed to 
“toxic” assets and was not materially affected by 
the disruption of the global money and capital 
markets, as it is not dependent on external 
ﬁ  nancing. The resilience of the banking sector 
has been underpinned by signiﬁ  cant capital and 
provisioning buffers, as well as by its strong 
deposit base. 
The macroeconomic outlook is favourable, with 
the ﬁ  rst signs of recovery already observed in 
late 2009. To the extent that advanced economies 
do not experience a double-dip recession, the 
anticipated return to positive real GDP growth 
will support bank revenue growth and mitigate 
credit risk. Lower than anticipated growth in 
the south-eastern European region remains a 
downside risk.
Fiscal consolidation would contribute to the 
maintenance of a signiﬁ   cant foreign currency 
reserves buffer, which in turn would underpin 
international investors’ conﬁ   dence in the 
long-term sustainability of the currency peg. 
Concurrently, the increased focus on sovereign 
risk and its interplay with ﬁ  nancial  sector 
risks has raised market sensitivity regarding 
ﬁ   scal vulnerabilities worldwide. Hence, the 
ﬁ  nancial stability implications of ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit 
and debt developments might merit a less 
expansionary ﬁ  scal policy than otherwise would 
be appropriate at this phase of the economic cycle. 
The aforementioned considerations also apply 
to the monetary policy stance. It should be 
highlighted that as economic recovery gains 
pace, policy-makers will enjoy higher degrees of 
freedom, since investors and domestic economic 
agents will feel increasingly reassured. 
Turning to the banking sector, the key 
challenge remains credit risk. A persistently 
high NPL ratio is a structural weakness that 
needs to be addressed in the medium term. 
To this end providing further incentives for loan 
restructuring or write-offs might be beneﬁ  cial. 
In any case the banking sector as a whole remains 
sound and resilient and seems to have avoided 
the excesses that have been observed in some 
other emerging European countries. Financial 
deepening in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia is expected to continue contributing 
to economic growth and social welfare.
For a macro stress-testing exercise, see section 4.2. 33 39
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3.1  THE MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
As a consequence of the global economic and 
ﬁ   nancial crisis, the Turkish economy slowed 
down considerably in 2008 and entered a 
recession in 2009 after a period of rapid 
growth during previous years. Real GDP 
growth decelerated to 0.9% in 2008 and fell 
to -4.7% in 2009 (see Table 17). Falls in private 
investment and consumption contributed 
strongly to this decline, whereas public 
consumption and investment increased and net 
exports also contributed positively, as Turkish 
exporters redirected part of their exports to 
higher-growth regions.34 The Turkish economy 
is expected to grow again at a rate of 4.7% 
in 2010 and 4.5% in 2011.35
The inﬂ   ation rate fell to 6.3%, down from 
10.4% in 2008, a very low rate in comparison 
with those observed during previous years. 
Currently the Central Bank of the Republic 
of Turkey (CBRT) sees no need for monetary 
policy tightening in the short term, especially in 
the context of the lacklustre growth of credit to 
the private sector, even if rate hikes are expected 
in the second half of the year. The CBRT has 
lowered the overnight borrowing rate on several 
occasions since October 2008 (when it stood at 
16.75%) to 6.5% (November 2009).
The current account deﬁ  cit, previously a notable 
vulnerability of the Turkish economy, has 
signiﬁ  cantly improved to -2.2% of GDP owing 
to reduced domestic consumption and 
investment, as well as falling energy prices. It is 
expected to widen again to -4.5% in 2010. Its 
ﬁ  nancing should beneﬁ  t from improved external 
ﬁ  nancing conditions and the expected recovery 
in foreign direct investment (FDI). Turkey, 
however, remains vulnerable to a deterioration 
in external ﬁ  nancing in view of its gross external 
debt position of 44.8% of GDP in 2009.36 The 
ﬁ  nancing structure of the current account deﬁ  cit 
has changed as a result of the crisis. Before the 
crisis, the deﬁ   cit was mainly ﬁ  nanced  by 
increasing long-term private sector external 
debt. In the meantime, although decreasing in 
absolute terms, FDI has become the most 
important ﬁ  nancing item. In addition, external 
public borrowing has increased.
As in many other countries, measures to sustain 
economic growth and falling tax revenues have 
caused the ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit to increase substantially. 
The Turkish general government deﬁ  cit  is 
As of end-January 2010, however, western Europe still accounted  34 
for around 44% of Turkish exports.
Based on AMECO projections, spring 2010. 35 
Nevertheless, the external debt ratio is relatively low compared  36 
with some other emerging market economies. Moreover, gross 
external debt decreased in nominal terms in 2009, although 
it worsened as a ratio to GDP due to the pronounced drop in 
nominal GDP.
Table 17 Turkey: main macroeconomic indicators
Description 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 1) 2011 1)
Real GDP growth Percentage, period average 5.3 9.4 8.4 6.9 4.7 0.9 -4.7 4.7 4.5
Inﬂ  ation
Percentage, period average, 
harmonised deﬁ  nition 25.3 10.1 8.1 9.3 8.8 10.4 6.3 9.0 7.8
Policy rate Percentage, end of period 26.0 18.0 13.5 17.5 15.8 15.0 6.5 … …
Nominal effective exchange rate  Index (2001 = 100), period average 66.1 64.6 67.8 63.3 65.0 62.5 55.6 … …
Current account balance Percentage of GDP -2.5 -3.7 -4.6 -6.1 -5.9 -5.7 -2.2 -4.5 -5.4
FDI Percentage of GDP 0.4 0.5 1.9 3.6 3.1 2.1 1.0 1.5 1.7
Gross external debt Percentage of GDP 47.5 41.0 35.2 39.2 38.4 38.1 44.8 40.2 41.1
General government balance  Percentage of GDP -10.4 -4.4 -0.6 -0.6 -2.1 -2.9 -6.2 -4.0 -3.5
General government gross debt  Percentage of GDP 67.4 59.2 52.3 46.1 39.4 39.5 45.5 44.5 44.3
Central government balance Percentage of GDP -10.0 -3.9 0.0 0.1 -1.7 -2.4 -5.6 -3.4 -3.0
Unemployment rate Percentage 10.5 10.8 10.6 10.2 10.3 11.0 14.0 13.9 13.4
Sources: Eurostat (AMECO), Haver Analytics, IMF, national sources and ECB calculations.
1) Forecasts.40
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estimated to have reached 6.2% of GDP in 2009, 
a level markedly higher than in previous years. 
The primary balance, which has continually 
decreased since 2005, fell to only 0.1% in 2009 
from 3.5% in 2008. The general government 
gross debt is estimated to have surged to 
45.5% in 2009, up from 39.5% in 2008. 
However, forecasts show only a stabilisation 
in the next two years. On 16 September 2009 
the Turkish government presented a 
medium-term programme aimed at gradually 
reducing the central government deﬁ  cit to 3.2% 
of GDP in 2012. The programme comprises 
a signiﬁ   cant number of policies, including 
the prioritisation of public investments and 
expenditures, an increase in the efﬁ  ciency  of 
health expenditures and social aid, and reduced 
tax loss and fraud. The programme is also aimed 
at improving education, enhancing the efﬁ  ciency 
of the Credit Guarantee Fund (see below) and 
fostering the efﬁ  ciency of the judicial system.
Rating agencies welcomed the medium-term 
programme and the relative resilience of the 
Turkish economy during the crisis. In fact, the 
Republic of Turkey’s issuer rating was recently 
upgraded (to one or two notches below investment 
grade) by the three major rating agencies. 
3.2  THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: STRUCTURE 
AND DEVELOPMENTS
THE STRUCTURE OF THE BANKING SYSTEM
The Turkish banking sector experienced two 
signiﬁ   cant crises at the beginning of the last 
decade. In 2000 volatility in international capital 
markets and deteriorating domestic economic 
conditions resulted in signiﬁ  cant losses in the 
banking system. This in turn triggered signiﬁ  cant 
capital outﬂ  ows and a sharp fall in international 
reserves. In December 2000 the IMF and the 
Turkish authorities agreed on a rescue package 
in order to avoid the unravelling of the existing 
disinﬂ  ation programme. However, as inﬂ  ation 
did not come down as quickly as predicted and, 
in addition, foreign investors withdrew from the 
Turkish market owing to the political uncertainty 
and fears that the stabilisation policies might 
be reversed, the authorities ﬂ  oated the Turkish 
lira on 22 February 2001 to avoid further 
reserve losses.
Following the 2000 and 2001 crises, the Turkish 
banking sector went through several structural 
transformations, including the restructuring 
of state-owned banks, the resolution of banks 
transferred to the Savings Deposit Insurance 
Fund (SDIF) and the strengthening of privately 
owned banks. Since then, concentration in 
the banking sector has increased as a result 
of liquidations or mergers and acquisitions, 
and foreign participation has risen markedly. 
This latter trend came to a halt in 2009, with 
the share of foreign banks in total assets falling 
for the ﬁ   rst time since 2003 (see Table 18). 
The share of (domestic) privately owned banks 
in total assets also decreased in 2009. Hence, 
the share of state-owned banks and, to a lesser 
extent, participation banks has increased, which 
could be explained by the relatively lower 
Table 18 Turkey: structure of the banking sector
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
EBRD index of banking sector reform 1) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.0 3.0
Number of banks (foreign-owned 2)) 54 (18) 50 (16) 48 (15) 51 (17) 50 (21) 50 (24) 50 (25) 49 (24)
Number of banks per 100,000 inhabitants 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Assets of private banks Percentage of total assets 56.2 57.0 57.4 58.3 53.2 50.5 50.5 49.6
Assets of foreign banks Percentage of total assets 3.3 3.0 3.5 6.3 13.1 16.1 17.0 15.8
Assets of the four largest banks Percentage of total assets 49.6 51.9 51.1 53.5 51.1 51.1 51.4 52.7
Herﬁ  ndahl-Hirschmann index 3) 883 942 949 935 911 879 886 913
Sources: CBRT, BRSA and EBRD.
1) Reform progress ranges from 1 (little progress beyond the establishment of a two-tier system) to 4+ (standards and performance norms 
of advanced industrial economies). 
2) Banks whose controlling shareholders are foreign (51% share or higher); participation banks have been included since 2005.
3) Sum of the squared asset shares of individual banks. The index ranges between 0 and 10,000. Below 1,000 it suggests a non-concentrated 
sector; above 1,800 it is highly concentrated.41
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propensity of private banks to expand their 
activities than in previous years. The Turkish 
banking sector counts three major state-owned 
banks whose privatisation remains on hold on 
account of unfavourable global conditions.
THE ASSET AND LIABILITY STRUCTURE 
OF THE BANKING SYSTEM
The total assets of the banking sector continued 
to grow in 2009, albeit at a slower pace than 
in previous years (by approximately 10%), 
reﬂ  ecting the impact of the economic slowdown. 
The crisis also triggered a reversal of the ongoing 
transformation of the asset structure of banks. 
Since the early 2000s banks had gradually 
shifted towards core activities and decreased 
their holdings of government securities. 
From mid-2008 onwards the share of loans in 
total assets started declining to the beneﬁ  t of 
growing exposures to sovereign securities, 
the rising share in total assets of claims 
on general government reﬂ   ecting a certain 
preference of the banking sector for assets with 
a lower regulatory risk weight (see Table 19). 
At the end of 2009 around one-third of total 
assets were securities holdings. Almost all of 
these are exposures on the Republic of Turkey, 
making these securities portfolios vulnerable to 
concentration risk and sovereign risk.
At the end of 2009, 49.8% of bank assets were 
loans to domestic non-banks. The loans to the 
domestic private sector grew at an annual rate of 
7%, sharply below the growth rates observed 
during recent years (which varied between 28% 
and 61%). Housing and other consumer loans 
increased in 2009  37 as a consequence of the 
ﬁ   scal stimulus package and the general 
improvement in expectations. The average 
maturity of assets has increased over the past 
few years owing to an increasing share of 
mortgage loans.
Car loans count as an exception, as their growth rate turned  37 
negative despite a lowering of the private consumption tax rates 
on the automotive sector.
Table 19 Turkey: asset structure of the banking sector
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Commercial bank assets 1) Percentage of GDP 60.7 54.9 54.8 62.7 65.9 69.0 77.1 87.4
Total domestic claims 2) Percentage of total assets 77.7 81.7 83.9 86.9 85.6 90.2 89.8 90.9
Claims on domestic MFIs 3) Percentage of total assets 11.7 10.8 9.4 11.3 9.0 9.4 9.9 8.3
Claims on domestic non-banks 2) Percentage of total assets 66.0 70.9 74.4 75.6 76.6 80.9 79.8 82.6
of which:
claims on general government 2) Percentage of total assets 39.0 42.0 41.5 36.4 32.3 31.0 29.2 34.0
claims on domestic households 
and enterprises Percentage of total assets 27.0 28.9 32.9 39.2 44.3 49.8 50.7 48.6
of which:
claims on domestic enterprises Percentage of total assets 23.8 23.4 24.0 27.3 29.9 32.9 33.9 31.9
claims on domestic households Percentage of total assets 3.3 5.5 8.9 11.9 14.3 16.9 16.7 16.7
Money market fund shares 4) Percentage of total assets 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
External assets Percentage of total assets 8.7 5.8 6.2 5.6 7.9 5.1 5.4 5.2
Claims on domestic households
Percentage of total claims 
on household and enterprises 12.0 19.2 27.1 30.4 32.4 33.9 33.0 34.3
Loans-to-claims ratio for domestic 
non-banks 2) 42.3 42.3 46.3 53.7 59.6 63.1 65.3 60.3
of which:
Loans-to-claims ratio 
for general government 2) 3.1 4.6 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.8 7.6 5.5
Loans-to-claims ratio 
for domestic households 
and enterprises 98.8 97.0 98.0 98.5 99.3 98.8 98.6 98.7
Sources: CBRT and Turkish Statistical Institute.
Note: Participation banks have been included since 2005. 
1) All banks (public, private, foreign, investment and development, and participation banks) are included in line with the other data provided.
2) Securities portfolio shown at balance sheet value. 
3) Deposits, loans, reverse repo and reserve requirement claims on the central bank and/or banks are included. 
4) Claims on securities mutual funds.42
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Turning to the liability structure of the banking 
sector, deposits of domestic non-banks made 
up 60% of total liabilities at the end of 2009, 
leaving some limited dependency on more 
volatile wholesale funds. The deposit share 
of the Turkish banking sector’s liabilities has 
shown a very stable proﬁ  le since 2001. External 
liabilities accounted for 13% of total liabilities 
and consisted primarily of loans from banks 
abroad, which decreased in 2009. However, 
funds from repo transactions denominated 
in Turkish liras have increased since 2007, 
especially for state-owned banks. Capital and 
reserves grew from 11.8% of total liabilities in 
2008 to 13.3% in 2009. Book equity rose as a 
result of capital increases and rising proﬁ  ts 
(see Table 20).
BANKING SECTOR PROFITABILITY
Despite the global ﬁ   nancial volatility, the 
Turkish banking sector remained proﬁ  table 
in 2008 and 2009. In 2009 net proﬁ  ts  even 
increased markedly compared with 2008. 
Returns on equity reached 24.9% at the end 
of 2009 from 20.4% in 2008. This increase in 
proﬁ  ts was made possible, inter alia, by the lack 
of direct exposure to sub-prime mortgages or 
other toxic assets. Moreover, operating income 
increased by around 35% in 2009 on account of 
rising net interest income and other operating 
income, particularly trading income. Turkish 
banks increased their net interest margin (from 
5.0% in 2008 to 5.8% in 2009), as policy rate 
cuts were not transmitted to rates on loans at 
the same pace as on deposits. The difference 
between the weighted average interest rates for 
loans and deposits rose to 7.6% for corporates 
in 2009, up from 7.3% in 2008, and to 9.8% for 
natural persons, up from 3.4% (see Table 21).
Operating expenses, including personnel 
expenses, remained broadly stable in 2009 in 
absolute amounts, but declined markedly as a 
share of operating income. By contrast, loan loss 
provision expenses rose in absolute terms, at an 
even faster pace than operating income. Hence, 
their share in operating income increased. 
As the increase in provisions was offset by 
improvements in interest and trading incomes, 
the net proﬁ  t of the banking sector reached 34% 
of total operating income, 4.4 percentage points 
higher than in 2008. As margins are expected 
to normalise as a consequence of the combined 
lagged effect of rate cuts on loan rates and rising 
Table 20 Turkey: liability structure of the banking sector
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Deposits of MFIs Percentage of total liabilities 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.4 1.3 0.9 0.9
Deposits of domestic non-banks Percentage of total liabilities 62.6 60.1 60.3 59.6 59.6 59.7 60.2 59.8
of which:
deposits of general government Percentage of total liabilities 2.2 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.5 2.9 3.0
deposits of households 
and enterprises Percentage of total liabilities 60.4 56.9 56.9 56.1 56.4 56.2 57.3 56.8
Money market fund shares 1) Percentage of total liabilities 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Debt securities issued  Percentage of total liabilities 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Capital and reserves Percentage of total liabilities 12.1 14.2 15.0 13.4 11.9 13.0 11.8 13.3
External liabilities Percentage of total liabilities 10.7 11.7 11.7 14.1 15.5 13.5 14.9 13.2
Remaining liabilities Percentage of total liabilities 12.9 12.3 11.4 11.2 11.6 12.5 12.2 12.9
Memorandum items:
Domestic non-banks’ 
claim-to-deposit ratio 2) 105.4 118.0 123.5 126.9 128.5 135.5 132.7 138.1
General government’s 
claim-to-deposit ratio 2) 1,755.5 1,290.5 1,230.6 1,057.9 1,019.4 893.3 1,011.7 1,125.8
Households’ and enterprises’
claim-to-deposit ratio  44.7 50.9 57.8 69.8 78.5 88.7 88.4 85.6
Source: CBRT.
Note: Participation banks have been included since 2005. 
1) Liabilities to securities mutual funds.
2) Securities portfolio shown at balance sheet value.43
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competition in credit granting, and loan loss 
provisions are expected to remain important, 
it is unlikely that the results observed in 2009 
will be achievable again in 2010.
NON-BANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
The ﬁ  nancial sector of the Republic of Turkey 
continues to be dominated by the banking sector, 
which accounted for 88.2% of total ﬁ  nancial 
sector assets in June 2009. This share remained 
stable in 2008 and 2009, slightly up from 87.1% 
in 2007. From a ﬁ  nancial stability perspective, 
non-bank ﬁ  nancial activities remained marginal. 
The share of insurance companies in the ﬁ  nancial 
sector remained stable at 3.3%. Securities 
mutual funds, which accounted for 3.9% of the 
ﬁ  nancial sector assets at the end of 2007, now 
represent 3.3%. Shares of leasing and factoring 
companies also slightly decreased, to 1.8% 
and 1% respectively. The remaining activities 
together account for 2.6% of the sector’s assets. 
Like the banking sector, the insurance market 
is underdeveloped and there is thus room for 
growth in the years ahead.
3.3  RISKS AND SHOCK-ABSORBING CAPACITIES
OVERALL RISK INDICATORS
Over the past two years, risk perceptions of the 
banking sector have largely followed the 
international risk perception of Turkish 
sovereign bonds. This is the case, in particular, 
for credit default swap (CDS) premia, which are 
plotted in Chart 3 for both the Republic of 
Turkey and a selected Turkish bank (Turkye IS 
Bankasi, the largest privately-owned bank).38 
Throughout the crisis, the risk proﬁ  les of the 
Turkish government and the selected bank have 
been considered as highly correlated. Since 
peaking at almost 900 basis points at the end of 
October 2008, CDS premia for Turkish 
sovereign bonds and bonds of the selected bank 
CDS data are not available for other Turkish banks. 38 
Table 21 Turkey: profitability of the banking sector
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Total operating income 1) Percentage of total income 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
of which:
Net interest income Percentage of operating income 64.5 47.5 67.0 63.2 64.1 65.1 68.9 70.2
Net non-interest income 2) Percentage of operating income -38.6 -7.3 -22.9 -33.1 -21.7 -22.8 -34.7 -29.2
General administrative expenses 3) Percentage of operating income 18.9 17.9 18.2 18.8 19.9 20.1 21.8 17.3
Operating expenses 
(excluding loan loss provisions) 4) Percentage of operating income 49.6 44.5 41.8 50.3 45.0 43.5 46.8 36.6
Loan loss provision expenses 5) Percentage of operating income 24.5 15.2 14.1 19.6 12.7 14.2 19.0 22.4
Income tax Percentage of operating income 5.8 10.4 10.0 11.5 9.6 8.4 7.1 8.4
After-tax proﬁ  t/loss Percentage of operating income 14.6 23.7 24.5 19.7 34.2 37.1 29.6 34.0
Net interest income Percentage of average assets 6.6 5.0 6.2 5.2 4.5 4.8 4.6 5.3
Net non-interest income Percentage of average assets -3.9 -0.8 -2.1 -2.7 -1.5 -1.7 -2.3 -2.2
Interest rate spread 
(total loans – total deposits) 6) Percentage points 12.4 12.3 11.0 6.9 5.9 5.9 7.3 7.6
Interest rate spread 
(total loans – total deposits) 7) Percentage points 9.2 15.2 13.2 6.4 4.8 5.0 3.4 9.8
Return on average assets – before tax Percentage 2.1 3.6 3.2 2.6 3.1 3.3 2.4 3.2
Return on average equity – before tax Percentage 20.1 25.5 22.7 18.5 25.5 26.0 20.4 24.9
Net interest margin 8) Percentage 8.2 6.0 7.2 5.8 5.0 5.2 5.0 5.8
Sources: CBRT and BRSA.
Note: Owing to changes in operating principles, calculations in this table do not include participation banks. 
1) Operating income = net interest income + net fees and commissions income + dividend income + net trading income (loss) + other 
operating income. 
2) Net non-interest income = net fees and commissions income + dividend income + net trading income (loss) + other operating income – 
provision for credits and other receivables - other operating expenses. 
3) Includes personnel expenses and provision for termination indemnities. 
4) Operating expenses = personnel expenses + provision for termination indemnities + depreciation + taxes, duties, charges and funds + 
other non-interest expenses. 
5) Includes special provision for non-performing loans, provision for general loan losses, provision for securities impairment, provision for 
afﬁ  liates, subsidiaries and joint ventures impairment and other provisions. 
6) The difference between the weighted average interest rate for corporate loans and deposits. 
7) The difference between the weighted average interest rate for consumer loans and deposits.
8) Net interest margin = net interest income / average interest-earning assets.44
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have decreased and almost reached their 
pre-crisis levels. 
This strong link between sovereign risk and 
banking sector risk also emerges from a review 
of recent rating decisions. Following the three 
major rating agencies’ recent upgrades of the 
Republic of Turkey’s issuer rating, the ratings 
of Turkish banks underwent a similar change. 
Standard & Poor’s reported that “Turkish banks’ 
ratings and fundamentals will remain closely 
correlated with sovereign creditworthiness 
through, among other things, their signiﬁ  cant 
holdings of government securities and exposure 
to the domestic economic and ﬁ  nancial 
environment”. Indeed, the majority of Turkish 
banks’ activities are directed at the domestic 
market and almost all debt securities held by 
Turkish banks are Turkish sovereign bonds. 
In the current context of uncertainty in the 
sovereign bond market, this highly concentrated 
exposure could make Turkish banks vulnerable 
to a contagion effect in the event of a lack of 
ﬁ  scal discipline by the Turkish government.
Another aggregate risk indicator for the ﬁ  nancial 
sector is the “Financial strength index” computed 
by the CBRT. This index is constructed on the 
basis of six sub-indices  39 covering all major 
risks facing the banking sector. It points to a 
consolidation of Turkish banks’ ﬁ  nancial 
strength since the index has increased and 
remains above its long-term average 
(see Chart 4).
CREDIT RISK
The growth of credit to the private sector fell 
markedly in 2009 after the rapid growth of 
previous years. Although credit to the private 
sector recovered in the second half of the year, 
its year-on-year real growth rate was only slightly 
positive at the end of 2009 (0.8%). This decrease 
in private sector credit growth can mainly be 
attributed to the corporate loan segment. Loans 
to households continued to increase, albeit at 
a slower pace than in previous years. Housing 
and personal ﬁ  nance loans contributed to credit 
growth, while consumer car loans decreased. 
Consumer credit card amounts also grew but at 
a slower pace than other consumer loans.
One-third of the Turkish banks’ private sector 
credit portfolio consists of loans to households 
Asset quality, liquidity, exchange rate risk, interest rate risk,  39 
proﬁ  tability and capital adequacy.
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(including mortgage loans and credit cards). 
Slightly less than half of the portfolio consists 
of corporate loans (excluding SMEs) and a little 
over one-ﬁ  fth is constituted by loans to SMEs.
Despite the slowdown in credit growth, credit 
risk continues to represent the largest risk factor 
for the banking sector. Non-performing loans 
(NPLs)  40 amounted to 5.3% of total loans, 
up from 3.7% at the end of December 2008. 
The non-performing loan ratio of corporates 
rose to 4.9% by the end of 2009, up from 3.7% 
at the end of the previous year. The NPL ratio 
for SME loans reached 7.6% at the end of 2009, 
from 4.8% at the end of 2008, underlining the 
larger impact of the crisis on SMEs. For loans to 
micro-enterprises only (slightly over one-third 
of SME loans), the NPL ratio amounted to 
10.5%. The increase in the NPL ratio for other 
corporate loans was more moderate. Although 
the level of NPLs for SME loans is a source of 
concern, it is expected to decrease as a result of 
the support of the Credit Guarantee Fund, which 
is being used to guarantee SME loans 
(see section 4.7).
The non-performing loan ratio of households 
stood at 6% at the end of 2009, up from 3.7% at 
the end of 2008. The NPL ratio for credit cards 
rose to 10.4% at the end of 2009, compared with 
6.5% one year earlier. Deterioration in the other 
consumer lending segment, with the NPL ratio 
increasing from 3% in 2008 to 5.5% in 2009, 
could become a source of concern because of 
the tight margins in this business segment. Since 
repayments on housing loans are prioritised 
owing to the fear of losing property, NPL ratios 
for this segment are lower than for credit cards 
or other loans, including car loans, where the 
NPL ratio reached 10.3% at the end of 2009 
from 6.0% at the end of 2008.
Looking ahead, NPLs may continue to weigh on 
the proﬁ  tability of the Turkish banking sector. 
Even though the latest ﬁ  gures show a decrease 
in the NPL ratio, asset quality is a lagging 
indicator and thus some renewed deterioration 
cannot be ruled out. However, the high number 
of non-performing credit card loans that are 
rescheduled, as stipulated in Law 5464 on bank 
cards and credit cards (see section 4.3) or on a 
voluntary basis, are expected to have a positive 
effect on NPL ratios.
Credit-risk stress tests performed by the CBRT 
have shown that the NPL ratio would need to 
rise by more than 15 percentage points before 
the solvency threshold (capital adequacy ratio) 
of 12% came under threat.
Household debt rose steadily in previous 
years to reach 14.6% of GDP by the end of 
2009. However, this level is still low when 
compared with that in many other countries. 
Hence, interest payments represent only 2.3% 
of gross disposable income. The percentage of 
foreign exchange-denominated or indexed loans 
and that of ﬂ  oating rate loans is low, making 
households less vulnerable to unfavourable 
developments in economic conditions. At the 
same time, the low proportion of ﬂ  oating rate 
loans (only 0.03% for housing loans at the end 
of October 2009) prevents existing debtors from 
reaping the beneﬁ  ts of the recent cuts in interest 
rates. As regards households, it is also worth 
noting that strong social links in Turkey bolster 
repayment capacities. The high unemployment 
rate remains a major source of concern, as it 
climbed to 14% in 2009 41 from 11% in 2008. 
Both domestic and foreign sales were adversely 
affected during the crisis, leading to a decrease 
in the net proﬁ  ts of the corporate sector. Firms 
in manufacturing suffered the most. Indeed, 
NPLs are highest in the textile as well as in the 
beverages, food and tobacco industries, and have 
increased strongly in machinery and equipment 
and also in the metal manufacturing industries. 
However, high levels or increases in NPL 
For Turkey, non-performing loans include loans and other  40 
receivables classiﬁ  ed as loss, doubtful loans and other receivables, 
and loans and other receivables with limited collectability. 
According to “The BRSA Regulation on the Procedures and 
Principles for Determination of Qualiﬁ   cations of Loans and 
Other Receivables by Banks and Provisions to be Set Aside”, 
published in Ofﬁ  cial Gazette 26333 of 1 November 2006, loans 
are recorded as non-performing receivables when they are more 
than 90 days past their due date.
Based on AMECO data, spring 2010. 41 46
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ratios have also been observed in other sectors 
such as wholesale and retail, construction and 
agriculture. These sectors, in which NPL ratios 
were highest or increasing the most, form an 
important part of the banking sector’s sectoral 
exposures.
As with households, debt among corporates as 
a percentage of GDP increased only moderately 
in 2009 and is still low in comparison with 
international levels. In contrast to households, 
around half of corporate loans are short-term 
loans. Hence, corporates were able to beneﬁ  t 
from the recent interest rate cuts, either for 
foreign exchange loans or loans denominated 
in Turkish liras. Nevertheless, this also 
makes them more vulnerable to an increase in 
interest rates.
MARKET AND LIQUIDITY RISK
Turkish banks face a limited direct exchange 
rate risk, as their overall foreign exchange 
position is almost balanced (an on-balance 
sheet short position offset by an off-balance 
sheet long position). By the end of 2009, the net 
open foreign exchange position of the Turkish 
banking sector represented -0.4% of Tier I 
capital (see Table 22).
Thus, exchange rate risk for Turkish banks 
mainly takes the form of indirect risk. 
Depreciation of the Turkish lira could result 
in an increase in corporate NPLs. While loans 
from Turkish banks to individuals are almost 
all denominated in Turkish liras, the share of 
foreign exchange-based lending to non-bank 
corporations is much higher (almost 50%).
Previously, Turkish banks were not allowed to 
lend directly in foreign exchange to unhedged 
borrowers, with the result that companies 
borrowed from off-shore branches of foreign 
banks or used foreign exchange-indexed 
loans. As regards individuals, only foreign 
exchange-indexed loans were allowed. The 
regulation was amended in June 2009 and now 
Table 22 Turkey: selected banking sector stability indicators
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Credit risk
Domestic credit growth Percentage, year-on-year 28.9 35.2 50.0 57.5 40.0 30.4 28.6 6.9
Real domestic credit growth 1) -0.6 14.2 37.2 42.5 27.7 20.3 16.9 0.3
Credit growth to the private sector Percentage, year-on-year 29.0 32.5 50.5 60.8 41.7 30.7 27.6 7.4
Real credit growth to the private sector 1) -0.6 11.9 37.7 45.4 29.2 20.6 16.0 0.8
Credit growth to households Percentage, year-on-year 27.4 113.2 96.2 76.7 47.9 37.5 23.3 10.9
Growth of consumer housing loans Percentage, year-on-year -4.2 80.2 224.9 395.5 79.3 38.8 19.9 15.4




Percentage of total 
household loans 4.6 1.8 2.7 3.2 3.0 2.9 3.7 6.0
Non-performing loans 
of corporates 2)
Percentage of total 
corporate loans 19.2 13.7 7.2 5.4 4.1 3.8 3.7 4.9
Non-performing loans 
in domestic currency
Percentage of total domestic 
currency loans ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Non-performing loans 
in foreign currency
Percentage of total foreign 
currency loans ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Foreign currency loans Percentage of total loans 58.9 45.4 35.2 27.4 25.5 24.0 28.7 26.6
Foreign currency deposits Percentage of total deposits 57.3 48.6 44.7 36.8 39.4 35.4 35.3 33.7
Growth of foreign liabilities 3), 10) Percentage, year on year … 37.1 58.2 55.0 53.8 -5.9 16.5 -23.5
Foreign liabilities 3), 10) Percentage of total 
liabilities
3.3 4.0 5.2 6.1 7.5 6.2 5.6 3.9
Market risk
Interest rate risk
Interest income Percentage of total assets 20.9 15.7 13.2 10.7 11.2 12.2 11.7 10.2
Net non-interest income 4) Percentage of total assets -3.6 -0.7 -2.0 -2.4 -1.4 -1.6 -2.1 -2.147
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allows lending in foreign exchange by local 
branches of Turkish banks to corporates of up to 
TRY 5 million. Hence, foreign exchange loans 
to non-bank corporations now tend to be granted 
by local branches instead of foreign branches of 
Turkish banks. The same amendment prohibits 
foreign exchange lending (including foreign 
exchange-indexed loans) to individuals.
As mentioned above, besides lending in 
foreign currencies from domestic and foreign 
branches of Turkish banks, corporates have 
received foreign exchange loans from foreign 
banks located abroad and non-banks. Hence, 
their total foreign exchange exposure is larger 
than stated above. The foreign exchange 
short position (net excess of liabilities) of 
corporates decreased from USD 79.5 billion 
at the end of 2008 to USD 73.9 billion at the 
end of September 2009, but remained above its 
end-2007 level (USD 63.2 billion) and end-2006 
level (USD 37.6 billion).
Banks also face some interest rate risk in 
comparison with international standards even 
though maturity mismatches are alleviated by the 
Table 22 Turkey: selected banking sector stability indicators (cont’d)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Forex risk
Foreign exchange assets Percentage of foreign 
exchange liabilities 85.7 87.8 90.1 87.1 87.6 84.4 86.9 84.5
Foreign exchange assets Percentage of total assets 43.2 38.0 36.2 31.3 33.1 28.3 30.3 26.7
Foreign exchange liabilities
Percentage of total 
liabilities
50.4 43.3 40.1 35.9 37.8 33.5 34.9 31.6
Net open foreign exchange position Percentage of Tier I capital -0.6 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Liquidity risk
Liquid assets 5) Percentage of total assets 40.8 40.6 39.2 37.6 34.2 29.7 28.9 31.6
Ratio of loans to deposits 6) 43.1 48.2 55.3 64.8 73.5 82.3 83.4 79.9
Liquid assets 7) Percentage of short-term 
liabilities 73.4 80.6 77.2 73.4 62.2 53.9 51.0 55.8
Shock-absorbing factors
Net interest margin between loans 
and deposits 8) Percentage points 3.2 2.0 6.9 6.5 4.6 4.8 4.4 6.7
Loan loss provisions 
(speciﬁ  c provisions)
Percentage of gross 
non-performing loans 64.2 88.5 88.1 88.7 89.7 86.8 79.8 83.6
of which:
Loan loss provisions 
for household loans
Percentage 
of non-performing loans 
to the household sector 69.0 94.3 83.7 82.5 85.1 80.9 76.7 86.3
Loan loss provisions 
for corporate loans
Percentage 
of non-performing loans 
to the corporate sector 64.0 88.4 88.6 90.2 91.2 89.0 81.2 81.9
Non-performing loans 
net of provisions Percentage of capital 14.5 2.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.8 3.3 3.2
Capital adequacy ratio 25.6 31.0 28.8 23.7 21.8 18.9 18.0 20.5
Number of banks 
(foreign-owned) 9) 54 (18)  50 (16)  48 (15)  51 (17)  50 (21)  50 (24)  50 (25)  49 (24) 
Assets of foreign-owned banks Percentage of total assets 3.3 3.0 3.5 6.3 13.1 16.1 17.0 15.8
Sources: CBRT, BRSA and Turkish Statistical Institute.
Note: Participation banks have been included since 2005. 
1) Deﬂ  ated using CPI (1994 = 100). 
2) Nonperforming loan ratio = gross non-performing loans/gross loans. 
3) Data for participation banks is not included. 
4) Net non-interest income = net fees and commissions income + dividend income + net trading income (loss) + other operating income – 
provision for credits and other receivables – other operating expenses. 
5) Liquid assets = cash + due from Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey + due from interbank + due from banks + securities that are not 
used as collateral or for repo transactions.
6) Loans exclude non-performing loans. 
7) Short-term liabilities are considered as 0 to 3-month deposits according to their remaining maturity. 
8) Calculated as the difference between interest income on loans/average loans and interest expenses on deposits/average deposits. 
9) Deposit-accepting foreign-owned banks. 
10) Foreign liabilities include syndicated loans and securitisation loans.48
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short-maturity proﬁ  le of loans. As the maturity 
mismatch allowed banks to increase their interest 
margin in 2009 following rate cuts by the CBRT, 
an increase in interest rates could adversely 
affect their proﬁ   tability. Moreover, as 44% 
of the securities held by the Turkish banking 
sector are classiﬁ   ed as “available for sale” 
assets, an increase in interest rates could lead to 
mark-to-market corrections (through equity).
Turning to liquidity and funding risks, it is 
apparent that the overall impact of the liquidity 
squeeze on Turkish banks has remained limited. 
No banks faced funding problems that required 
access to the central bank emergency liquidity 
facilities. To ensure sound liquidity management 
in the banking sector, the CBRT started using 
repo transactions with a maturity of up to 
three months in June 2009. In August 2009 it 
also resumed the foreign exchange buying 
auctions it had suspended in October 2008, 
and in October 2009 it reduced the required 
reserve ratio on liabilities denominated in 
domestic currency.
Non-bank deposits increased by 10% in 2009 
and remained stable as a percentage of total 
liabilities at 60%. At the same time, amounts due 
to (parent and other) banks decreased by 7.2%, 
but funds collected through repo transactions 
increased and more than offset this decrease. 
The loan-to-deposit ratio declined from 83.4% at 
the end of 2008 to 79.9% at end of 2009, mainly 
on account of the shift by banks from loans to 
Table 23 Turkey: selected macro-prudential indicators – domestic debt
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Households 1)
Debt Percentage of GDP 1.8 3.0 4.9 7.6 9.8 12.0 13.1 14.6
Debt Percentage of gross disposable income 1.8 3.1 4.9 7.7 9.9 12.1 13.2 14.8
Debt Percentage, year-on-year 27.4 119.4 97.1 81.5 50.5 35.6 22.9 11.7
Interest payments Percentage of gross disposable income 0.9 1.3 1.6 1.6 1.9 2.1 2.3
TL Consumer Loan Interest Rates 2), 3) 48.2 38.7 29.9 19.6 20.5 19.6 19.5 16.4
Non-ﬁ  nancial enterprises 4), 5), 6), 7)
Debt Percentage of GDP 12.2 11.6 13.0 16.9 19.8 22.6 26.3 27.5
Debt Percentage of corporate bank deposits 8) 160.6 161.3 166.4 167.1 188.6 209.8 200.4 178.4
Debt Percentage, year-on-year 29.2 23.6 38.2 50.5 36.6 27.2 31.3 5.0
Interest payments 9) Percentage of GDP 1.7 1.2 1.3 3.0 2.0 2.6 3.1 2.9
TL Corporate Loan Interest Rates 2) 51.7 35.8 28.3 20.6 21.7 20.8 24.2 15.3
Forex Corporate Loan Interest Rates 2) 6.9 6.0 6.1 6.6 7.3 7.4 7.6 6.0
Total non-ﬁ  nancial private sector
Debt Percentage of GDP 14.0 14.6 17.9 24.5 29.6 34.6 39.4 42.1
Debt Percentage, year-on-year 28.9 36.0 50.5 58.9 41.0 30.0 28.4 7.2
General government
Debt Percentage of GDP 43.1 43.2 40.6 38.1 33.4 30.4 29.2 34.9
Debt Percentage, year-on-year 22.8 30.1 15.5 9.1 2.4 1.3 8.0 20.2
Interest paid Percentage of GDP 12.4 11.6 9.0 6.1 5.1 4.9 4.7 4.9
Total non-ﬁ  nancial sector
Debt Percentage of GDP 57.1 57.8 58.5 62.7 63.0 65.0 68.6 77.0
Debt Percentage, year-on-year 24.3 31.5 24.3 24.4 17.5 14.8 18.9 12.7
Memorandum items:
Total external debt Percentage of GDP 56.2 47.3 41.2 35.2 39.4 38.4 37.5 43.9
Total private external debt Percentage of GDP 18.6 16.0 16.4 17.4 22.9 24.7 25.0 28.2
Sources: BRSA, CBRT, Turkish Statistical Institute, TOKİ and Treasury.
Note: Participation banks have been included since 2005. 
1) Household debt excludes non-performing loans and includes loans extended by banks, consumer ﬁ  nance companies and liabilities 
to TOKİ. Liabilities to TOKİ for 2009 are October 2009 values. 
2) Data for 2009 are provisional and based on stock values. 
3) Cash, housing and vehicle loans are included, other loans are excluded. 
4) Non-ﬁ  nancial enterprises loans = total domestic private sector loans – household loans. 
5) Data for non-ﬁ  nancial enterprises have been available since 2002. 
6) Data for non-ﬁ  nancial enterprises debt includes loans extended by the banking system. 
7) Loans extended to non-ﬁ  nancial enterprises include loans extended to government entities, however the latter loans are negligible. 
8) Corporate loans include nonperforming loans. 
9) Owing to differences in operating principles, participation banks are not included.49
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debt securities,42 but remained much higher than 
its level at the beginning of the last decade. 
For foreign-owned banks only, this ratio was 
greater than 110% at the end of 2009. 
Liquid assets increased both as a percentage of 
total assets and in terms of short-term liabilities, 
to 31.6% and 55.8% respectively, albeit to much 
lower levels than those reached in 2003 (40.6% 
and 80.6% respectively).
Stress tests were performed in October 2009 
for both interest rate and exchange rate risks 
(assuming a 30% depreciation of the lira and a 
5-6% increase in interest rates). They resulted, 
under the worst-case scenario, in a decrease in 
the capital adequacy ratio of 2 percentage points, 
which nevertheless would remain above the 
12% target rate.43 However, these stress tests do 
not measure the impact of interest and exchange 
rate developments on the repayment capacity of 
corporates and the resulting rise in NPLs.
SHOCK-ABSORBING FACTORS
The Turkish banking sector still follows the Basel 
I rules but the supervisory framework already 
features many aspects of Basel II, including in 
the area of operational risk, which was added 
in 2007. The evolution of the capital adequacy 
ratio, as shown in Table 22, is partly attributable 
to convergence towards Basel II. A fully-ﬂ  edged 
Basel II-compliant supervisory framework is 
set for adoption in Turkey by 2011, in line with 
the commitment of G20 countries. The move 
to Basel II is expected to weigh on the capital 
adequacy ratio, especially in a scenario where 
Turkish government securities denominated 
in foreign exchange are assigned a risk weight 
of 100% instead of 0% under Basel I.
Although the capital adequacy ratio decreased 
in 2008 owing to the rise in loans and convergence 
towards Basel II, it increased in 2009 to 20.5%, 
from 18.0% at the end of 2008.44 The average 
risk weight of Turkish banks’ assets decreased 
on account of their lower appetite for higher 
risk-weighted assets (a shift from loans to 
sovereign debt securities), and high proﬁ  tability 
contributed to the strengthening of own funds. 
Turkish banks have also been able to count on 
retained earnings with dividend pay-out ratios 
declining as a consequence of speciﬁ  c measures 
implemented to limit proﬁ  t  distribution 
(see section 4.7). Finally, the sector strengthened 
its regulatory own funds via the available-for-sale 
revaluation reserve due to the effect of lower 
interest rates on the value of debt securities. 
This latter effect would be reversed in the event 
of an increase in interest rates. 
The Turkish banks’ coverage ratio of NPLs 
(including only speciﬁ   c provisions) stood at 
84% in 2009. Although this rate increased in 
comparison with 2008, it was lower than the 
level reached in 2006 (90%).
3.4  CONCLUDING ASSESSMENT AND POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS
The previous report on ﬁ  nancial  stability 
challenges in candidate countries (ECB, 2008) 
identiﬁ   ed three main sources of risk for the 
banking sector, namely credit risk, interest rate 
risk and exchange rate risk. The international 
ﬁ   nancial crisis has highlighted the fact that 
credit risk remains a major potential risk factor, 
as the severe economic slowdown triggered 
some deterioration in asset quality. Overall, 
however, the banking sector has withstood 
the shockwaves of the crisis reasonably well, 
suggesting that the reform efforts in the banking 
sector over recent years have paid off.
Although Turkish real GDP contracted by 4.7% 
in 2009, it is expected to bounce back to an 
annual growth rate of 4.7% in 2010, underlining 
the relative strength of the Turkish economy in 
the face of the global ﬁ  nancial crisis. The current 
account deﬁ  cit was corrected to -2.2% of GDP. 
The government deﬁ  cit and gross debt expanded 
to 6.2% and 45.5% of GDP respectively as a 
result of support measures and the operation of 
The same shift results in an increase in free securities (neither  42 
held as collateral, nor used for repo transactions), which is the 
largest item in liquid assets.
For a macro stress-testing exercise, see section 4.2. 43 
While the regulatory minimum capital adequacy ratio is 8%,  44 
the target rate needed to continue opening new branches is 12%.50
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automatic stabilisers. The primary surplus fell 
to 0.1% of GDP, underlining the weakening 
ﬁ  scal performance. 
In the light of the strong correlation between 
the ratings of the Turkish government and those 
of Turkish banks, owing primarily to the high 
level of government securities holdings and 
their focus on domestic activities, weak ﬁ  scal 
performance in the future – namely a lack 
of commitment to the consolidation plans as 
announced in the medium-term programme – 
could lead to problems for the Turkish banking 
sector. However, the most recent indicators 
show some improvement in ﬁ  scal performance. 
This would reinforce the generally positive 
perception about ﬁ   scal policy credibility and 
ease the government’s ﬁ  nancing  requirement, 
which remains vulnerable to a deterioration 
in external conditions. Fiscal consolidation is 
also important for avoiding the crowding-out 
of credit to the private sector as the economy 
recovers. Following buoyant credit growth 
developments since the end of 2007, and in 
spite of a quasi-halt to credit growth in 2009, 
credit risks have become even more important 
as asset quality deteriorated markedly in 2009. 
Even though different measures have been taken 
to limit a further deterioration in NPL ratios, 
and despite some decline since November 2009, 
loan loss provisions are expected to remain 
above pre-crisis levels in 2010. In addition, 
as already identiﬁ   ed in the previous report 
(ECB, 2008), exchange rate and interest rate 
shocks could increase the vulnerability of the 
corporate sector. In 2009 banks were able to 
offset increasing loan loss provisions with 
increased interest and trading incomes, and 
even managed to improve their results. This 
supported the rise in the capital adequacy ratio to 
above 20%. However, the proﬁ  tability observed 
in 2009 is unlikely to persist in 2010, as interest 
margins are expected to normalise and loan loss 
provisions are expected to continue weighing 
on proﬁ   tability. A marked increase in CBRT 
interest rates could also expose banks to a larger 
negative impact on their proﬁ  tability.
Like credit risk (including risks induced 
by interest rate and potential exchange rate 
shocks), liquidity and funding risks also need to 
be monitored closely. However, compared with 
credit risk, they remain less important.
Despite these risks, the Turkish banking sector 
has shown a remarkable resilience to the crisis 
due, inter alia, to high capital adequacy levels. 
Not a single Turkish bank has had to request 
capital or liquidity support from the authorities. 
Nevertheless, Turkish banks remain vulnerable 
to the risks discussed above, and these risks 
would require particularly close monitoring if 
the international or domestic macroeconomic 
environment were to turn out less favourably 
than expected.51
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4.1  DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR BANKING 
STABILITY INDICATORS ACROSS INDIVIDUAL 
BANKS IN THE CANDIDATE COUNTRIES 
While the average values of prudential indicators 
allow a quick assessment of the stability of the 
ﬁ  nancial system as a whole, the distribution of 
values can provide important additional 
information on the resilience of individual 
institutions and the degree of systemic risk. 
This section presents a comparison of ﬁ  ve key 
banking indicators in Croatia, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey, 
using several distribution parameters: average, 
median, and ﬁ   rst and third quartiles.45 
The indicators considered are the capital 
adequacy ratio, the liquidity ratio (the ratio of 
liquid assets over total assets), the NPL ratio, 
the return on assets and the loan-to-deposit ratio 
(see Chart 5). In order to allow an assessment of 
recent trends, the values are presented at 
pre-crisis levels, i.e. as at December 2007 and 
December 2009.
In the two-year period under consideration, 
the median capital adequacy ratio decreased 
slightly in Croatia and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia and increased in Turkey. 
However, regulatory increases in risk weights in 
2008 in Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia led to a mechanical decline in 
capital adequacy ratios (in Croatia the estimated 
impact of this measure on the average is about 
0.9 percentage points, hence there is no decrease 
on average after allowing for this mechanical 
impact). The spread between the ﬁ  rst and third 
quartiles is quite narrow in Croatia and Turkey 
and has been squeezed further, driven on the one 
hand by the requirements for adequate capital in 
anticipation of credit quality deterioration and on 
the other by lower proﬁ  tability in the aftermath 
of the crisis. The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia stands out, with some banks having 
considerably larger capital buffers than in the 
other two countries possibly on account of the 
higher NPL ratios they are facing. However, 
in the three countries all banks remain relatively 
well-capitalised and the minimum capital 
adequacy ratio stands above 10%. 
Developments in the average liquidity ratio of 
banks were different across the three countries, 
as the ratio decreased in Croatia, remained 
roughly the same in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (although the median 
and quartiles declined) and increased in Turkey. 
The declines in Croatia and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia may be related to 
temporary deposit withdrawals stemming from 
depositors’ weakened conﬁ  dence and the high 
cost of holding large stocks of liquid assets 
during a period of decreased proﬁ  tability and 
competitive pressure. An additional factor for 
Croatia was the reduction in general reserve 
requirements and the abolition of the marginal 
reserve requirements in 2008, and for the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (where 
distribution as a whole shifted downwards) the 
outﬂ  ow of liquid funds owing to the repayment 
of external liabilities. In Turkey, although the 
weighted average value is quite high (31.6% 
in December 2009), it seems to be driven by 
several large banks with high liquidity, since 
three-quarters of all banks have below-average 
liquid assets.
Over the two-year period, the average 
non-performing loan ratio increased in all three 
countries, reﬂ  ecting the negative impact of the 
economic slowdown on loan collectability. 
The percentage change was higher in Croatia 
and Turkey, whereas in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia the average and 
median NPL level for 2009 was higher than 
in the other two countries (9.4%). Moreover, 
while NPL levels in the upper half of the 
distribution do not reach excessively high 
levels in Croatia and Turkey, the third quartile 
and the maximum values are high in the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (at 18% and 
38% respectively), indicating the presence of 
several institutions facing very high rates of 
borrower default.
Where relevant, the analysis also refers to minimum and  45 
maximum values (not shown in Chart 5).52
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Chart 5 Distribution of five financial stability indicators across the banking systems
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Note: Horizontal lines show the median, and ﬁ  rst and third quartiles of the distribution; dark blue squares indicate the weighted average.53
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FEATURES With regard to the return on assets, the three 
candidate countries are in very different 
positions. Although in Croatia the entire return 
distribution shifted downwards, the indicator 
remains positive for three-quarters of the banks. 
In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
the decrease is much more pronounced, with 
individual values for almost half of the banks in 
the negative range. This may be due to increased 
impairment charges related to the adverse 
developments in loan portfolio quality (see the 
respective country section). In stark contrast to 
these two countries, in Turkey the average return 
on assets remained high and all banks reported 
positive returns on account of improved interest 
and trading incomes (see the respective country 
section for more details). 
Turning to the loan-to-deposit ratio, its average 
has increased in Croatia and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, reaching a value very 
close to 100% in the former. This development 
can be traced back to the episodes of deposit 
withdrawals and the incomplete recovery of 
deposit levels in these two countries. The former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia stands out, 
with outliers on the upper side, a third quartile 
of 129% and a maximum value as high as 260%, 
suggesting a very high level of credit exposure 
for some banks.46
4.2  RESULTS OF MACRO STRESS TESTS 
IN THE CANDIDATE COUNTRIES 
The recent global downturn and the possible 
spillovers into the ﬁ  nancial sector have directed 
attention to macro-prudential analysis methods. 
This horizontal issue presents the results of a 
two-step macro stress-testing exercise for 
Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and Turkey. First, the major sources 
of risk were identiﬁ   ed and their potential 
impact on the credit quality of the banking 
system was assessed. In the second step, the 
identiﬁ  ed link between macroeconomic factors 
and credit quality was used to project the likely 
impact of different macroeconomic scenarios 
on individual banking institutions and on the 
system as a whole. This allowed an assessment 
of the propensity of the ﬁ   nancial system to 
withstand shocks and an evaluation of the 
degree of systemic risk. Interbank exposures 
and hence potential contagion were also taken 
into account.47 The main ﬁ  nding is that under 
extreme but not implausible scenarios, the 
banking systems of the three candidate 
countries appear well-capitalised and 
sufﬁ  ciently endowed with liquidity to withstand 
shocks, provided that such shocks do not occur 
simultaneously.
The main sources of risk in the candidate 
countries appear to be the unfavourable external 
environment lasting longer than currently 
expected and a further deterioration in the 
domestic business cycle, spilling over into the 
local banking systems through a deterioration 
in credit quality and constrained access to 
foreign funding. Moreover, the high share of 
foreign-denominated lending is an additional 
source of risk in the event of adverse exchange 
rate developments.48 
The link between economic activity and credit 
quality is addressed empirically through a 
simple econometric model using historical data. 
Changes in credit quality (measured by the ratio 
of non-performing loans to total credit) are 
regressed to allow for lags in real GDP growth 
and changes in the exchange rate. The estimated 
results for the individual country models are 
listed in the ﬁ  rst three columns of Table 24. 
There are two important caveats, namely the 
low number of observations and the simpliﬁ  ed 
model structure, disregarding potential feedback 
effects from credit quality to the macroeconomic 
variables of the model. Nevertheless, in line 
with intuition, a real GDP decline is related to 
worsening credit quality as a consequence of the 
increased difﬁ  culty on the part of borrowers to 
This high loan-to-deposit ratio for some banks in the former  46 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia mainly concerns banks that are 
not very active in attracting deposits.
The risk of possible interbank contagion is taken into account  47 
by estimating bilateral exposures using the maximum entropy 
principle. See, for example, Upper and Worms (2002).
For a detailed overview of recent trends in foreign exchange- 48 
denominated lending in the three countries, see section 4.6.54
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repay their loans. In the individual regressions, 
the differing lag structures and coefﬁ  cients 
suggest that the magnitude and speed of the 
impact will vary across the countries. For 
instance, the impact of a 1 percentage point 
decrease in real GDP appears to be much stronger 
in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
and Turkey than in Croatia (by considering the 
cumulative value, obtained by taking the sum 
of GDP lag coefﬁ  cients). The exchange rate is 
signiﬁ  cant for Croatia and Turkey, meaning that 
an increase in the exchange rate (depreciation 
of the domestic currency) might lead to an 
additional increase in NPLs. These individual 
results are broadly compatible with those of 
an extended panel model covering several 
additional eastern European countries (shown 
in the fourth column of Table 24). Although the 
individual regressions provide an insight into 
the country-speciﬁ  c credit quality patterns, the 
panel arrangement was preferred for compiling 
the NPL forecast owing to its larger number 
of observations and better out-of-sample 
forecasting properties.
In the second step of the process, the estimated 
coefﬁ  cients are used as an input for a macro 
stress test of the banking system using an 
approach similar to the IMF stress-testing 
method.49 It considers the impact of a one-off 
NPL increase on the bank’s capital adequacy 
ratio via additional provisions,50 and does not 
take proﬁ   ts into account as a buffer against 
potential shocks. This gives the method a static 
character, but it is a prudent way of assessing 
the shock impact (Cihak, 2007). For each 
country, the top ten banks in terms of total assets 
are considered.51
A baseline and a downside credit shock 
scenario are considered for all countries, as 
follows: country-speciﬁ   c GDP forecasts are 
used to obtain plausible forecasts for NPL 
ratios. At the same time, it is assumed in the 
baseline scenario that exchange rates remain 
stable. The downside scenario incorporates the 
idea of a double-dip recession and has identical 
assumptions across the countries: a real GDP 
decline in the ﬁ  rst three quarters and a return to 
the projected path from the baseline scenario 
thereafter, combined with a 5% domestic 
currency depreciation in two consecutive 
quarters. The magnitude and quarter-on-quarter 
proﬁ  le of the GDP decline is broadly in line 
with those observed in the three candidate 
countries in the period 2008Q3-2009Q2 during 
See Čihák (2007). 49 
A uniform provisioning rate of 50% of new NPLs was assumed  50 
for all banks.
An important caveat in these calculations is the timeliness of  51 
the bank data used as input: data are taken from BankScope and 
refer to the end of 2008 given the unavailability of more recent 
and sufﬁ  ciently detailed individual bank data.
Table 24 Econometric estimates: credit quality model
(Dependent variable: percentage change in the non-performing loan ratio)
FYR Macedonia Croatia Turkey Panel regression
Constant 0.77 2.27** -0.94 2.29**
ΔGDP
ΔGDP (-1) -1.72** -1.78***
ΔGDP (-2) -2.36** -2.17*** -1.32**
ΔGDP (-3) -2.86** -1.41**
ΔGDP (-4) -1.30**
ΔER
ΔER (-1) 1.98** 0.61** 0.58***
ΔER (-2)
ΔER (-3) 2.14** 0.35** 0.69***
Adj. R2 0.34 0.51 0.53 0.38
Sample 2003Q4-2009Q4 1999Q2-2009Q4 2002Q1-2009Q4 2000Q2-2009Q4
Source: ECB staff estimates using data from national sources.
Notes: *, ** and *** denote coefﬁ  cients signiﬁ  cant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. The exchange rate used is the nominal 
effective exchange rate, expressed as the domestic currency price of a trade-weighted basket of currencies. The unbalanced panel includes 
the three candidate countries, as well as Bulgaria, Romania, Russia and Ukraine. The panel regression uses a ﬁ  xed-effect estimate, 
and the length of the time series varies country by country.55
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the recent crisis. Moreover, the resulting NPL 
change is also in line with assumed NPL 
increases in stress tests conducted by the 
respective central banks.52 In addition to the 
two credit scenarios, a liquidity scenario is also 
considered, which assumes the withdrawal of 
deposits that have to be paid out of the 
liquid assets available to the bank. It is also 
designed in two versions: a moderate and a 
severe bank run, corresponding, respectively, 
to 4% and 8% deposit withdrawals on each of 
two consecutive days.53
The following panel of charts compares the 
results of the two credit shock scenarios for 
the three candidate countries, presenting the 
weighted average along with the ﬁ  rst and third 
quartile of the capital adequacy ratios for the top 
ten banks before and after each of the shocks. 
For Croatia and Turkey the impact of the 
baseline and even of the downside scenario is 
relatively modest, with the top ten banks staying 
well above the minimum capital adequacy 
ratio. Although the average decrease in the 
capital adequacy ratio is more substantial for 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
there are no bank failures  54 or contagion. 
However, the shock might also result in some 
institutions not meeting the minimum capital 
requirements or having insufﬁ   cient Tier 1 
capital,55  and thus requiring recapitalisation. 
The estimated recapitalisation needs of the 
top ten banks resulting from the two scenarios 
are modest when measured as a share of GDP 
(in Turkey, no recapitalisation is needed even 
under the downside scenario). 
As a result of the liquidity scenario (not shown 
in the charts), the banks appear to have sufﬁ  cient 
liquid assets to withstand the assumed deposit 
withdrawals: in the three countries, there is 
For instance, for Croatia the NPL increase in the downside  52 
scenario (55%) is comparable with the 48% increase in the 
stress-testing of the CNB, see CNB (2009b) as of August 2009.
The “moderate” rate of withdrawal roughly corresponds to  53 
the withdrawal rate during the run on the Kaupthing bank 
(Iceland, 2009).
A bank failure is deﬁ  ned as equity capital falling below zero. 54 
Tier 1 capital consists of equity capital and Tier 2 of hybrid  55 
capital and subordinated debt. The requirement that Tier 2 
capital makes up no more than 50% of total capital forms part of 
the Basel I accord.
Chart 6 Changes in the capital adequacy ratio 




























































Source: ECB staff estimates using data from national sources.
Notes: Horizontal lines show the ﬁ  rst and third quartiles of the 
distribution; dark blue squares indicate the weighted average. 
Since no bank failures are observed, the results with and without 
contagion are identical and therefore not shown separately.56
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no incidence of a bank becoming illiquid and 
requiring a liquidity injection. 
Overall, the results of the credit risk scenarios 
reveal that the banking systems of the candidate 
countries are considered relatively resilient under 
the assumed scenarios, with no bank failures 
being observed. The credit model suggests that 
NPLs in the candidate countries peaked in 2009 
and are likely to level off in 2010, provided 
that the economic recovery gathers pace and 
exchange rates remain stable. 
4.3  CREDIT QUALITY IN CANDIDATE 
COUNTRIES  56
Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and Turkey entered the last decade 
with high non-performing loan ratios. Turkey 
inherited a signiﬁ  cant stock of non-performing 
loans  57 from the 2000 and 2001 crises, while 
in Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia earlier economic and ﬁ  nancial 
shocks had left high levels of non-performing 
loans. From 2002 until the recent global ﬁ  nancial 
crisis, non-performing loan ratios kept on falling 
substantially in all three countries. 
Apart from the favourable macroeconomic 
environment, a major underlying factor in 
improving asset quality indicators was a lending 
boom in the candidate countries. Croatia and 
Turkey had already recorded rises in the stock 
of non-performing loans in the years preceding 
the global ﬁ  nancial  crisis.58 Nevertheless, 
high credit growth generally led to receding 
non-performing loan ratios. In Turkey, the stock 
of non-performing loans has risen since 2005. 
This development, however, has long been 
masked by high nominal credit growth rates 
to the private sector, which averaged 39% 
over the period from 2002 to 2008. In Croatia, 
non-performing loan ratios continued to fall 
until 2007 owing to rapid credit growth, while 
non-performing loans started to grow in 2006. 
In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
credit grew at double-digit rates, thus reducing 
the non-performing loan ratio in 2007 to roughly 
one-third of its value in 2002.
The fallout from the global ﬁ  nancial  crisis, 
however, led to a signiﬁ  cant surge in the ratio 
of non-performing loans in all three candidate 
countries. For the Turkish banking sector, the 
ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans 
rose by 160 basis points to 5.3% between 2008 
and 2009, as asset quality deteriorated in the 
private sector and credit growth abated. In Croatia, 
credit growth deceleration and a signiﬁ  cant 
deterioration in the macroeconomic environment 
caused a steep rise in the ratio of non-performing 
loans to total loans from 2008 onwards.59 
This ratio increased by 290 basis points to 7.8% 
between 2008 and 2009. Following a 230-basis 
point surge to 9.0%, the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia registered the highest 
non-performing loan ratio. Declining foreign 
and domestic demand and, hence, the contraction 
of economic activity in 2009, led to a rising 
non-performing loan ratio for the ﬁ  rst time in 
six years. A simultaneous slowdown of lending 
in the second half of 2008 and a gradually 
more pronounced deceleration in 2009 also 
contributed to the rise.
Analysing asset quality by sector, the 
deterioration has been particularly sharp for 
consumer loans. This is especially true in the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and 
Turkey, while in Croatia the deterioration in 
the corporate loan portfolio has been even more 
pronounced.
In Turkey, the non-performing loan ratio of 
corporate loans, which constitute 67%  60 of all 
loans, rose to 4.9% in 2009. Surging to 6%, 
the increase in the non-performing loan ratio 
Although considerable efforts were made to guarantee the  56 
consistency of data across the countries, the underlying 
deﬁ   nitions for national asset quality indicators may differ 
according to national classiﬁ  cations.
For the deﬁ   nitions of non-performing loans, see footnote 17  57 
for Croatia, footnote 29 for the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and footnote 40 for Turkey. 
According to NBRM data, the stock of non-performing loans  58 
decreased until 2007 and started to increase in 2008.
In Croatia, the loan classiﬁ  cation scheme changed in 2004. This  59 
has prompted a methodological change for non-performing loans 
and loan loss provisions.
Data for the sectoral composition of loans and indebtedness  60 
by sector in Turkey has been taken from the latest available 
Financial Stability Report. See CBRT (2009).57
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was even sharper for retail loans. Credit quality 
deteriorated most in the credit card and vehicle 
loans segment, while the deterioration in asset 
quality was less pronounced for housing loans. 
Even though retail loans account for no more 
than about one-third of total lending in Turkey, 
credit growth had been especially elevated 
in this segment prior to the crisis. High credit 
growth in credit card balances and consumer 
loans have led to a doubling of household 
indebtedness since 2005, outpacing household 
asset or disposable income growth. Thus, while 
household indebtedness, with a ratio of 14.1% 
of GDP, remains low by international standards, 
this newly generated credit could be particularly 
susceptible to higher default rates.
In Croatia, the non-performing loan ratio for 
both the household and the corporate sector 
recorded a steep increase. With the non-
performing loan ratio rising by 5.6 percentage 
points to 12.8%, the sharpest deterioration in 
asset quality came from the corporate loan 
segment. The corporate non-performing loan 
ratio is more than double that of the household 
loan segment. With regard to household loans,61 
asset quality declined most in the credit card and 
other loans segment, while defaults of housing 
loans grew at a lower pace.
In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
the initial signs of a deterioration in asset quality 
had already started to emerge in the household 
sector  62 in 2008, when the household 
non-performing loan ratio began to rise, whereas 
the deterioration in credit quality indicators for 
the corporate sector lagged behind this. Credit 
quality to the household sector registered the 
steepest deterioration, as the non-performing 
loan ratio surged by 290 basis points to 8.2% 
between 2008 and 2009. With a share of 
78.3%,63 household debt primarily consists of 
The share of household loans in the total bank loan portfolio fell  61 
below 50% by the end of 2008 owing primarily to the sharp rise 
in loans to the government.
Data for the household sector includes small businesses (sole  62 
proprietors). See NBRM (2009).
Data for the composition of debt and credit dynamics by sector  63 
has been taken from NBRM (2009).
Chart 7 Non-performing loan ratios


















Note: The non-performing loan ratio = gross non-performing 
loans/gross loans.
Chart 8 Non-performing loan ratios 
by sector
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loans for consumption purposes (consumer 
loans, automobile loans, current account 
overdrafts and credit cards). In 2008 credit card 
balances and current account overdrafts recorded 
the fastest growth. As this is unsecured lending, 
it may pose a particular risk for asset quality, 
especially when taking into account the high 
unemployment rate. That said, despite growing 
household indebtedness, the ratio of total 
household debt to GDP, which stood at 17.7% 
at the end of 2008, was still moderate, although 
this does not rule out high indebtedness in 
individual household segments. Loans 
denominated in or indexed to foreign currency 
recorded a particularly sharp drop in asset 
quality as the ratio of non-performing loans 
almost tripled for this segment, while the 
non-performing loan ratio for credit denominated 
in local currency rose by about 12% in the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.64 
While exchange rate and interest sensitivity 
constitute substantial risks for asset quality 
in Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, this is less true for Turkey.65 
The share of foreign exchange-indexed loans, 
which was low in the Turkish household 
sector (4.9% in 2008  66), continued to decline 
as consumers were discouraged from taking 
out foreign exchange loans in 2009 by new 
regulation.67 This has left asset quality in the 
consumer credit sector less sensitive to exchange 
rate movements than in eastern Europe. In the 
corporate sector, however, foreign exchange-
denominated debt accounted for 46.2% of 
total loans, making credit quality signiﬁ  cantly 
more vulnerable to potential ﬂ  uctuations 
in the exchange rate than in the household 
sector. In Croatia, the ﬁ  nancial crisis in 2007 
had the effect of reversing a trend, observed 
over several years, of declines in foreign 
exchange-denominated lending and the growing 
importance of local currency loans. While 
households moved part of their deposits into 
foreign currency in the face of rising uncertainty, 
Croatian banks stepped up the extension of 
foreign currency loans until the ﬁ  rst quarter of 
2009. To some extent this was also a response 
to the provision of foreign currency liquidity 
by the central bank. Consequently, the share in 
total loans of foreign currency loans increased 
to 72.7% in 2009.68 In the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, debt denominated in or 
indexed to foreign exchange amounted to about 
66.6% in the corporate sector, making corporate 
loans especially vulnerable to currency risk. For 
household credits this ratio amounted to more 
than 46%, meaning that sensitivity to adverse 
exchange rate movements remains a key 
vulnerability of the credit portfolio in the latter 
two countries, whereas in Turkey exchange rate 
sensitivity is primarily an issue in the corporate 
loan sector.
In Turkey, exposure among households to 
interest rate changes is lower than in central and 
eastern European peers, as variable rate loans 
are less common. In Croatia and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, however, 
the interest rate risk exposure of the household 
sector is signiﬁ  cant. Since late 2008 the interest 
rate exposure of Croatian households has 
increased. According to the CNB, at the end 
of March 2009 almost 97% of total household 
loans had been issued at interest rates adjustable 
within a year. In the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, adjustable interest rate loans 
accounted for 87.3% of total household loans 
(2008). As borrowing is mostly long-term, 
this has led to a considerable vulnerability of 
households to interest rate risk and therefore 
could impair asset quality. In the corporate 
sector, borrowing is also dominated by 
adjustable-rate credit.
In all three candidate countries, high credit 
growth has been a signiﬁ  cant driver of falling 
NPL ratios in the period since 2002. Hence, 
the quality of this newly generated credit is 
still unknown. However, it may have been 
compromised by the extension of credits to 
Separate NPL ratios for loans denominated in foreign exchange  64 
and local currency were not available for Croatia or Turkey.
See the country sections for a more detailed discussion of  65 
exchange rate regimes.
See CBRT (2009), p 40. 66 
See the country section for more details. 67 
This was also partly due to a substantial increase in foreign  68 
currency borrowing from the banking sector by the government.59
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new borrower segments and more lax lending 
standards. Since the quality of this credit 
portfolio is currently being tested in a harsh 
economic environment, asset quality is likely 
to deteriorate further in 2010 in Croatia and the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
At a level of 5.3%, the overall NPL ratio in 
Turkey does not seem alarming when compared 
with the level of peers and historical highs. 
Nevertheless, steep credit growth in recent 
years – from 2002 to 2008, total loans grew at 
an annual average rate of approximately 20% – 
as a by-product of strong growth and prospects 
for EU accession may have endangered credit 
quality. The latest data available from the 
Turkish Banking Regulation and Supervision 
Agency suggest a halt in the deterioration in 
asset quality, with overall non-performing loan 
ratios declining slightly and the stock of 
non-performing loans itself retreating 
marginally. Nevertheless, as asset quality is a 
lagging indicator and with credit growth 
subdued, Turkish banks in the short term could 
still see non-performing loan ratios above 
pre-crisis levels. The main cyclical risks to 
credit quality are deteriorating labour market 
conditions and a subdued economic recovery 
in western Europe, as Turkey’s real sector is 
largely dependent on exports to this region.69
In Croatia, the current recession will put 
additional pressure on asset quality in the near 
term. Unfavourable economic conditions and 
more expensive funding due to rising interest 
rates have reduced corporate liquidity to historic 
lows and considerably added to the corporate 
debt burden. As recovery is likely to be fragile 
on account of sluggish bank lending and tight 
ﬁ   scal policy, there could be a further rise in 
defaults in the corporate sector. Additionally, 
unfavourable employment and wage dynamics 
owing to persistent negative trends in the 
domestic labour market coupled with receding 
house prices could further erode asset quality in 
the consumer loan and mortgage segments. This 
can be expected to put a further strain on asset 
quality in 2010. 
In recent years growing indebtedness and 
decreasing liquidity in the corporate sector of 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
have intensiﬁ   ed vulnerabilities to adverse 
dynamics in the real sector. As the slow pace 
of recovery in main trading partners and tight 
external  ﬁ   nancing conditions will continue to 
put a strain on the economy, credit quality is 
expected to deteriorate further. With regard to 
the household sector, the labour market outlook 
will be crucial as the unemployment rate stood 
at 32.2% in 2009.
While asset quality is likely to come under 
further strain in the current year, potential rises 
in non-performing loan ratios are expected to 
be manageable, given the satisfactory level of 
capital adequacy. Moreover, loan loss provisions 
seem comfortable in Turkey, where the indicator 
exceeds 80% of non-performing loans for both 
the total and the sectoral loan portfolios. In the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, loan 
loss provisions (112.6% of non-performing 
Despite the growing importance of the Middle East as a  69 
destination for Turkish exports, western Europe still accounted 
for approximately 40% of all exports in 2009 according to 
national statistics.
Chart 9 Real credit growth to the private 
sector
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loans) are high despite a decline since 2006. 
In Croatia, loan loss provisions as a share of 
non-performing loans have declined to 42.5%.
4.4  FUNDING STRUCTURES OF BANKING 
SYSTEMS
The structure of bank ﬁ   nancing may have 
implications for the ﬁ   nancial stability of 
individual countries. Banks typically fund their 
balance sheets in layers, starting with a capital 
base comprising equity, subordinated debt and 
hybrid instruments, plus medium and long-term 
senior debt. The next layer consists of customer 
deposits: even though they can be withdrawn 
at short or no notice, they are assumed to be a 
stable source of ﬁ  nancing as long as the general 
banking system’s health and ﬁ  nancial  safety 
nets ensure continued investor conﬁ  dence. 
On the other hand, relying heavily on deposits 
tends to add pro-cyclicality to banks’ lending 
behaviour when local liquidity conditions 
tighten. However, other forms of domestic 
ﬁ  nancing, such as via wholesale or inter-bank 
markets, tend to be even more volatile during 
periods of market stress. 
The relevance of foreign ﬁ  nancing has been a 
distinctive feature of the funding structure of 
banking systems in emerging economies in 
recent years. In fact, before the crisis, the global 
economy was characterised by low interest rates 
and risk premia and abundant liquidity. Banks’ 
leverage expanded rapidly and the growth in 
loan stocks was only partly offset by the growth 
in deposits. Given the availability of ample 
liquidity, it was not difﬁ   cult for banks in 
emerging economies to raise funds from abroad. 
Until the onset of the crisis, the balance of 
evidence seemed to support the view that foreign 
ﬁ  nancing was a stabilising force for host markets 
in the presence of a deterioration in the business 
cycle and during periods of ﬁ  nancial  distress 
(Goldberg, 2009). Much of the analysis, 
however, had been in the context of shocks 
originating in emerging markets, and the 
literature did not rule out the possibility that a 
local banking system could be hit by shocks that 
Table 25 Shock-absorbing factors
(percentage)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Loan loss provisions
Croatia 67.9 60.9 62.5 60.0 57.0 54.7 49.5 42.5
FYR Macedonia 90.4 91.4 102.7 110.8 113.6 132.6 133.5 112.6
Turkey 64.2 88.5 88.1 88.7 89.7 86.8 79.8 83.6
of which:
Loan loss provisions for household loans
Croatia 61.4 53.0 69.9 66.2 62.6 67.0 63.8 60.6
FYR Macedonia n.a. n.a. 102.7 100.4 116.3 125.6 104.9 91.7
Turkey 69.0 94.3 83.7 82.5 85.1 80.9 76.7 86.6
Loan loss provisions for corporate loans
Croatia 68.4 62.0 57.4 56.4 52.2 45.3 38.1 33.0
FYR Macedonia n.a. n.a. 112.7 108.4 108.9 127.9 140.0 117.6
Turkey 64.0 88.4 88.6 90.2 91.2 89.0 81.2 81.9
Non-performing loans net of provisions
Croatia 19.6 22.6 19.0 16.7 14.0 11.3 12.8 22.2
FYR Macedonia 4.6 0.0 -4.7 -5.7 -6.0 -11.3 -11.3 -5.7
Turkey 14.5 2.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.8 3.3 3.2
Capital adequacy ratio
Croatia 16.6 15.7 14.1 13.5 13.2 15.4 14.2 15.8
FYR Macedonia 28.1 25.8 23.0 21.3 18.3 17.0 16.2 16.4
Turkey 25.6 31.0 28.8 23.7 21.8 18.9 18.0 20.5
Source: National sources.
Notes: Loan loss provisions as a percentage of non-performing loans. Non-performing loans net of provisions as a percentage of capital.61
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as demonstrated by the latest crisis.70 These 
shocks might be large and more difﬁ  cult for the 
local authorities to deal with by themselves. 
Lending ﬂ  uctuations in host market economies 
in response to external shocks may also reﬂ  ect 
the composition of banks’ exposure to various 
sources of foreign ﬁ  nancing. Local banks are 
likely to be affected differently by global 
liquidity conditions according to their relative 
exposure to funding in wholesale international 
interbank markets, as opposed to ﬁ  nancing 
directly from their own international banking 
groups’ headquarters or related afﬁ  liates 
(“internal capital market”). More generally, 
subsidiaries of large global groups may ﬁ  nd it 
easier to raise funds in international ﬁ  nancial 
markets, as information barriers are likely to be 
more limited for these entities and, even when 
wholesale international markets dry up, they 
may still have access to ﬁ  nancial support from 
their parent group, largely on account of the 
long-term nature of the investment and 
reputational considerations (Winkler, 2009).71 
A general look at banks’ funding structures in 
the countries under review at the onset of the 
global crisis highlights similarities but also 
signiﬁ   cant differences (see Chart 10). Such 
differences reﬂ   ect not only national and 
institutional factors, such as prudential 
regulations and the relevance of foreign 
ownership, but could also be explained by the 
level of sophistication of the banks’ business 
models and of domestic ﬁ  nancial  markets, 
as well as by differences in asset composition. 
For instance, less mature banking systems tend 
to be more reliant on retail deposits for their 
funding, and this is indeed the case in all 
countries under review. In the case of the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, customer 
deposits accounted for 70% of banks’ total 
liabilities in 2007; in comparison, their shares 
were substantially lower in Turkey (60%) and 
markedly so in Croatia (53%), where the relative 
importance of customer deposits as a funding 
source has signiﬁ  cantly decreased since 2001.72 
By contrast, the external liability position of 
banks in Croatia was relatively high, larger than 
The response of the Japanese banks to the capital and real estate  70 
market collapse in the early 1990s is indicative of how banks in 
advanced economies can transmit domestic ﬁ  nancial shocks to 
foreign markets (Peek and Rosengren, 1997).
By contrast, in the Asian crisis in the 1990s, as domestic banks  71 
had engaged in maturity transformation ﬁ  nanced by short-term 
loans from many western banks on the basis of an arm’s length 
relationship, international lenders did not have information about 
the long-term solvency of the borrowers in host markets. Nor had 
they particular incentives to acquire such information, given the 
short-term nature of their engagement.
By comparison, in 2007 deposits accounted, on average,  72 
for around 39% of total liabilities of European banks 
(ECB, 2009).
Chart 10 Bank liabilities structure
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in both Turkey and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia.73
Given the large market share held by local 
subsidiaries of international banking groups, 
ﬁ   nancing by foreign parent banks through 
non-capital instruments accounted for a sizable 
share of total external liabilities in Croatia and 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: in 
the former country it represented about 66% of 
total external liabilities in 2007, corresponding 
to 13% of GDP, while in the latter the share was 
lower (40.5%, corresponding to 2.8% of GDP). 
On the other hand, funding in international 
wholesale markets (syndicated lending and 
placement of bonds, notes and money market 
instruments) represented a relevant source of 
external ﬁ  nancing for Turkey and, to a much 
lesser extent, for Croatia, while it was practically 
non-existent for banks in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (see Chart 11). 
Financing through capital and reserves plays 
an important role, representing more than 10% 
of total liabilities in 2007, a high level when 
compared with the average in the European 
Union (around 4%). The stronger capital 
position in part reﬂ  ects the high capital adequacy 
requirements as well as the presumably 
higher risks faced by banks. It should also be 
seen in the light of the high level of foreign 
participation in some countries under review, as 
parent banks provide a portion of ﬁ  nancing to 
their subsidiaries in the form of equity capital 
(Walko, 2008). 
Financing through domestic debt securities was 
negligible in all countries, in sharp contrast 
with the trend prevailing in EU banking 
systems.74 This reﬂ  ected a generally low level of 
development in corporate debt markets and the 
limited scope for institutional investors, as well 
At an individual level, however, the dependence on external  73 
ﬁ  nancing in the banking system in the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia varies considerably. 
In 2007 capital market funding accounted for around 27% of  74 
the total liabilities of European banks (ECB, 2009). It should be 
noted that this ﬁ  gure comprises both funding in domestic and 
international capital markets, which are considered separately in 
the text. The limited reliance on this funding segment by banks 
in the countries under review may have represented a stabilising 
factor, considering that the issuance of banks’ debt instruments 
rapidly dried up during the recent crisis.
Chart 11 Funding in international wholesale markets



























Sources: BIS, CNB and CBRT.63
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issuance of covered bonds. 
Following the eruption of the ﬁ  nancial crisis in 
August 2007, liquidity became scarce and all 
funding sources were more or less affected, even 
though immediate spillovers into the banking 
systems of the countries under review seem to 
have been generally contained. 
Customer deposits were initially affected only 
to a limited extent, as central bank liquidity 
remained available throughout the turmoil and 
local authorities were quick to step up their 
efforts to support funding needs, for instance 
by raising deposit insurance limits where 
deemed necessary and preventing bank runs 
even in countries where public conﬁ  dence in the 
banking system was more fragile. As the global 
crisis unfolded, however, it spilled over into 
domestic funding markets, marking their more 
recent developments, when the liquidity position 
of banks was adversely affected by a marked 
slowdown in both corporate and household 
deposits that reﬂ  ected the severity of the shock. 
In 2009 the growth rates of household and 
enterprise deposits sharply decelerated in real 
terms in comparison with the pre-crisis level in 
Croatia and in the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, and were subdued in Turkey 
(see Chart 12). 
Looking at the foreign sources of ﬁ  nancing, there 
was a relatively larger impact in international 
wholesale markets. Indeed, funding in these 
markets had not kept pace with balance sheet 
growth since the end of 2007, and after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers these sources of 
ﬁ  nancing almost dried up. In Turkey, rollover 
ratios of long-term loans borrowed from abroad 
by the banking sector declined sharply at the 
end of 2008, stabilising at 90% in subsequent 
quarters, while net debt securities issuance 
was negative in 2008 and picked up again only 
modestly in 2009. 
In Croatia, the increasing constraints in 
international wholesale markets were offset by 
an increase in parent banks’ ﬁ  nancing of their 
own subsidiaries, as shown by the parent groups’ 
share of deposits and loans, which reached 
73% of total liabilities (15% of GDP) in 2008 
and increased further in the ﬁ  rst half of 2009. 
As a result, foreign liabilities grew on average 
by about 10% yearly. In the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia foreign bank support 
also increased during the crisis, accounting 
for 66% of total foreign ﬁ  nancing at the end 
of 2009.
Despite a drop in benchmark interest rates in 
major advanced economies, higher risk premia 
and slowing deposits have signiﬁ  cantly raised 
banks’ domestic and external funding costs 
in Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, where banks in particular have 
been forced to compete for resident deposits 
by offering higher rates, which in turn has 
increased pressure on their interest margins 
(see Chart 13). In Turkey the pressure on the 
liability side has been balanced by the marked 
decline in the central bank’s policy rates to date 
(10 percentage points since November 2008; 
see the country section). 
Chart 12 Real growth in households’ and 
enterprises’ deposits
(annual percentage change)
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The most recent developments may imply 
that, in the near term, funding could represent 
a key constraint for banking activity in all 
the countries under review. Should banks in 
advanced countries continue to deleverage and 
to rebalance globally, the reduced availability 
and higher cost of external ﬁ  nancing  would 
weigh on banks that rely on these sources of 
ﬁ   nance. On the other hand, greater reliance 
on domestic sources may offer limited scope 
for raising funds, as domestic savings in these 
countries will likely remain rather subdued 
in the foreseeable future and the increased 
competition for retail deposits may force banks 
to increase rates, thus raising funding costs and 
possibly eroding net interest margins.
4.5  THE ROLE OF PARENT BANKS IN CANDIDATE 
COUNTRIES
As a result of privatisation and ﬁ  nancial sector 
liberalisation, foreign-owned banks have 
established a dominant position in the banking 
sectors of Croatia and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, where, respectively, 
they held 90.9% and 93.3% of total banking 
assets at the end of 2009. Such high levels of 
foreign ownership are a common feature of 
many transition economies in central, eastern 
and south-eastern Europe, but are unprecedented 
in recent economic history. In contrast, the 
foreign bank presence is less substantial in 
Turkey, where 15.8% of banking assets were 
under foreign control in 2009. 
Foreign ownership of banks predominantly 
takes the form of subsidiaries (see Table 26), 
established mainly as a result of the acquisition 
of domestic banking institutions in the process 
of privatisation or restructuring. Branches of 
Chart 13 Interest expenses












































Table 26 Foreign bank presence in candidate countries
Croatia FYR Macedonia Turkey
Number of banks under foreign control 1) 15 14 24
of which:
Subsidiaries of foreign banks 15 8 18
Branches of foreign banks 0 0 6
Other forms of foreign ownership 0 6 0
Share of assets held by foreign banks 90.9 93.3 15.8
Source: National sources.
1) Banks with at least 50% of their capital under foreign control (banks, other ﬁ  nancial institutions, non-ﬁ  nancial legal entities or legal 
persons).65
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The preference for subsidiaries can be explained 
by restrictive host country regulation  75 of the 
opening of branches, the focus of foreign bank 
activities on retail services and the preferences 
and business models of parent banks. In the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia some 
foreign majority shareholders are non-banking 
corporations or natural persons in the case of 
some very small banks. It is also important to 
note that the subsidiaries of foreign banks in the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia barely 
depend on external funding from their parent 
banks (see section 4.4).
IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 
IN HOST COUNTRIES
On balance, the experience so far suggests 
that  ﬁ   nancial stability in the region has 
beneﬁ  ted from the presence of foreign banks. 
Recent empirical research  76 has argued that 
the reduction in cross-border bank ﬂ  ows  to 
emerging Europe during the current crisis was 
more limited than the reduction in the ﬂ  ows 
to emerging Asia and Latin America because 
of a high penetration of foreign banks and a 
relatively sound banking system in the region. 
The strength of the banking system is the result 
of a focus on mainstream banking activities in 
a growing market, low exposure to toxic assets 
and sound prudential management. 
Other empirical research  77 has found that 
foreign banks contributed to credit market 
stabilisation in transition economies, as their 
lending activities were more resilient to local 
shocks than those of domestic banks. In addition 
to having easier access to cross-border lending 
in general, foreign bank subsidiaries dependent 
on external funding were able, in particular, to 
draw on the deep pockets of their parent banks, 
which were willing to support them. Considering 
that parent banks entered the region with a long-
term perspective related to EU integration and 
convergence, expected future proﬁ   ts, as well 
as the potentially high costs of damage to their 
reputation in the event of a pull-out, underpin 
their decision to maintain activities. 
In addition, large-scale multilateral support 
packages and the private sector coordination 
orchestrated by multilateral institutions and 
foreign creditors (European Bank Coordination 
Initiative) were also very instrumental in 
encouraging the continued commitment of 
cross-border banks to the broader region.
At the same time, foreign banks have been the 
drivers of rapid credit growth and they may 
have underestimated the build-up of credit 
risk in a period of buoyant economic growth. 
They have also promoted foreign currency 
lending, effectively passing on the exchange 
rate risk to (mostly unhedged) borrowers. 
High domestic vulnerabilities to exchange rate 
shocks have constrained the ability of host 
country governments to use the exchange rate 
as an instrument during the economic downturn 
(except for Turkey).
Foreign bank subsidiaries could also become 
destabilising factors when they transmit shocks 
originating in the parent bank or elsewhere in 
the group. Indeed, research  78 has found that a 
deterioration in parent bank health is associated 
with a decline in growth of credit to emerging 
markets. 
An additional concern for Croatia and the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is 
that the ownership of their banking system is 
highly concentrated in a couple of countries 
(see Chart 14), namely Austria and Italy for 
the former and Greece and Slovenia for the 
latter. This ampliﬁ  es the risk of a transmission 
of shocks originating in the home country. 
Contagion can be prevented through rapid and 
decisive actions by the international community 
The regulation of foreign bank branches in Croatia is still very  75 
restrictive, while the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
did not allow the opening of foreign bank branches before its 
new banking law of 2007 came into force. 
See, for example, the EBRD Annual Report (2009) and  76 
Herrmann and Mihaljek (2010).
See, for example, De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010) and  77 
Hasselmann (2006).
See, for example, McGuire and Taraslev (2008), De Haas and  78 
Van Lelyveld (2006) and Popov and Udell (2010).66
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and home country governments, as the recent 
troubles with Hypo Group Alpe Adria and 
Volksbank, which were quickly rescued by the 
Austrian government, illustrate. In the case of 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
direct spillovers from the Greek crisis are very 
limited given that local subsidiaries depend little 
on external funding and are well-capitalised. 
Sound parent banks can also act as a buffer for 
the transmission of shocks originating at home 
(e.g. Greece). By contrast, foreign banks in 
Turkey come from various countries that are not 
all closely interrelated (some from the European 
Union and others from the Middle East), 
resulting in a better diversiﬁ  cation of risks.
SUPERVISION OF BANKING GROUPS
For host countries with a high participation of 
foreign banks, some of them being systemically 
important for the host country’s banking sector, 
negative spillovers from parent banks may be a 
source of concern in times of crisis. Especially in 
cases where home country authorities turn out to 
be unwilling or unable to conduct the rescue of 
an entire group (e.g. the collapse of the Icelandic 
banks), spillovers into the host countries can be 
very severe. In the case of branches, the scope 
for action by host authorities is limited because 
parent banks are fully responsible for the 
liabilities of their branches. In the case of 
subsidiaries, the scope for measures by host 
Chart 14 Geographic distribution of parent banks















Sources: BankScope and national sources.67
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can be ring-fenced from the group and can 
continue their operations in the host country 
as independent units, or be liquidated by the 
host country authorities that are responsible for 
insuring local depositors. However, the recently 
observed trend of centralisation at parent bank 
level of some key functions, such as risk and 
liquidity management, implies that the viability 
of the subsidiary as a stand-alone unit may not be 
taken for granted, hence the cost of a failure to 
host countries could be high. Moreover, the risk 
of unilateral actions and recourse to ﬁ  nancial 
protectionism by the home authorities is greater, 
as there is no legal requirement for the parent 
bank to support its subsidiaries. Conversely, 
unilateral actions on behalf of host governments 
to ring-fence a subsidiary of a troubled bank can 
also inﬂ  ict damage on the parent bank, its home 
government and the subsidiaries in other host 
countries.
These complexities have highlighted the need 
for information sharing and cooperation between 
different national bank supervisors in order to 
supervise more effectively banks with signiﬁ  cant 
cross-border operations and to coordinate actions 
during a crisis. One possibility is to establish 
supervisory colleges – a formal structure 
bringing together some of the host supervisors 
with the home supervisor, namely the banking 
supervisor of the country in which the banking 
group is headquartered. Supervisory colleges 
are designed to share prudential information 
about a particular ﬁ   nancial institution with 
cross-border operations. They operate within the 
frameworks developed by the Basel Committee 
of Banking Supervisors, the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB) and the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors (CEBS). Moreover, they 
have gained in importance since the eruption 
of the global ﬁ  nancial crisis. All systemically 
important international and European banking 
groups now have a supervisory college in full 
operation. At the same time, there has been a 
reinforcement of the mandates of the FSB and 
CEBS to promote the functioning of supervisory 
colleges through the drafting of more stringent 
principles and guidelines on home-host 
cooperation. Reﬂ   ecting the deep integration 
of EU ﬁ   nancial markets, the framework for 
supervisory cooperation at the European level 
is more ambitious, aiming for the convergence 
of supervisory practices and the development 
of common reporting formats for prudential 
information, as well as a centralised database. 
Recently, CEBS has been granted observer 
status on all supervisory colleges overseeing 
European banking groups and a mediator role in 
conﬂ  icts between national supervisors, although 
it lacks the power to impose its decisions directly 
on national supervisors or ﬁ  nancial institutions.
Another instrument to promote the exchange of 
information between banking supervisors in the 
context of the supervision of international banks 
is the conclusion of memoranda of understanding 
(MoU) between the supervisors and central 
banks of two or occasionally more countries. 
This tool is particularly attractive for smaller 
countries given that the participation of host 
supervisors in a supervisory college is often 
limited to those overseeing subsidiaries that are 
signiﬁ   cant or systemically relevant to the 
banking group, which tends to favour larger host 
countries. The candidate countries have 
concluded many bilateral MoU with their main 
partners in the European Union as well as with 
the other countries in the western Balkans. 
The Bank of Greece has also concluded a 
multilateral MoU on high-level principles of 
cooperation and exchange of information in the 
ﬁ  eld of banking supervision across south-eastern 
Europe.79 This MoU foresees regular meetings 
of Heads of Supervision Departments and 
Governors, annual information exchanges on 
macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial sector indicators, 
joint on-site inspections and the creation of task 
forces on speciﬁ   c issues to be tackled 
(e.g. stress-testing). 
The above developments are important for the 
promotion of information sharing between 
national bank regulators and will hopefully 
This multilateral MoU was signed in 2007 by the central banks  79 
of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, 
Romania and Serbia.68
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strengthen the resilience of the banking systems 
through better supervision of international and 
European  ﬁ   nancial institutions and the early 
identiﬁ  cation of problems in these institutions. 
In the meantime, the current global crisis provides 
a solid testing ground for the adequacy of the 
institutional framework to ensure cooperation 
between supervisors and governments in home 
and host countries. In particular, the following 
issues warrant closer examination:
Is the information shared during a crisis    •
mutually satisfactory? Information sharing 
under a MoU or in the context of a supervisory 
college should, in principle, be reciprocal, 
but may take the form of a predominantly 
one-way communication from the host to the 
home supervisor. It should be highlighted 
that trust is crucial in these arrangements. 
Are supervisory standards in host countries    •
on a par with international standards? Only 
Turkey, as a member of the G20, beneﬁ  ts 
from participation in the meetings of the 
Basel Committee of Banking Supervisors 
and the FSB. However, none of the three 
candidate countries participate in CEBS 
meetings even though they are expected 
to adopt its regulatory and supervisory 
standards upon EU accession. This lack of 
access to information is partly addressed 
by the Eurosystem’s technical assistance 
programme on strengthening macro 
and micro-prudential supervision in EU 
candidates and potential candidates, which 
is aimed at promoting supervisory standards 
in the target countries through the transfer 
of expertise and know-how via extensive 
training sessions. 
Can the current arrangements prevent    •
unilateral actions by home or host 
supervisors/governments to the detriment 
of the banking group? Neither instrument 
can guarantee a coordinated approach to 
crisis resolution in the event of a banking 
failure, as this requires a consensus between 
different banking supervisors and ﬁ  nancial 
sector regulators. The incentives of national 
supervisors to protect their national interests 
and residents may impede the emergence of 
a consensus, while there is no supranational 
institution that can impose binding decisions 
directly on an insolvent bank with signiﬁ  cant 
cross-border operations.
4.6  TRENDS IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE LOANS 
AND DEPOSITS
The use of foreign currencies is a potential 
vulnerability in each of the candidate countries. 
Particularly in Croatia and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia a majority of loans and 
deposits are denominated in or indexed to foreign 
currencies. Households especially tend to save in 
foreign exchange-denominated accounts, while 
both corporations and households have borrowed 
heavily via foreign currency-indexed loans. In 
Turkey, household lending in foreign currencies 
is low and – as a consequence of new regulations 
– declining, but there is widespread provision 
of corporate credit in foreign currencies. Owing 
to prudential rules that discourage currency 
mismatches at credit institutions, open foreign 
exchange positions in the ﬁ   nancial sector are 
small. However, foreign exchange lending does 
raise  ﬁ   nancial stability concerns insofar as it 
represents a (pro-cyclical) systemic credit risk. 
While authorities in candidate countries have 
used a range of measures to discourage such 
lending both before and during the crisis, the 
recent global ﬁ   nancial turbulence has brought 
about a decline in trust in local currencies in 
Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, which has led once again to an 
increasing use of foreign currencies in ﬁ  nancial 
transactions. Appropriate policy responses are 
needed to manage and reduce systemic risks 
arising from the use of foreign currency.
FINANCIAL STABILITY CONCERNS RELATED 
TO THE USE OF FOREIGN CURRENCY
The widespread use of foreign currency in the 
ﬁ  nancial system generates risks due to currency 
mismatches as a result of which the balance 
sheets of economic actors can be severely 
affected by changes in nominal exchange rates 
(see ECB, 2006 and 2008). There are especially 69
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economy-wide losses in a simultaneous, 
pro-cyclical manner, particularly during a crisis. 
In this perspective, currency mismatches at 
credit institutions are a well-known threat to the 
smooth functioning of the ﬁ  nancial  system. 
Yet, in the candidate countries, the use of 
prudential policies by the authorities has so far 
been relatively successful in discouraging such 
mismatches. In all countries, there are additional 
reserve or liquidity requirements for foreign 
exchange positions. In Turkey, the banks’ open 
foreign currency position may not exceed 20% 
of bank equity, but Croatia and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have similar 
measures too, according to which the banks’ 
open foreign exchange position is currently 
limited to 30% of banks’ own funds. As long as 
these measures remain effective, credit 
institutions should be well-insulated from direct 
exchange rate risk. On the other hand, 
the spillovers from the global ﬁ  nancial  crisis 
have entailed in some instances a relaxation of 
related legislation in order to leave banks more 
room for manoeuvre in times of heightened 
(foreign exchange) liquidity pressures.80
The more salient risk from a systemic stability 
perspective is constituted by currency 
mismatches on the balance sheet of borrowers, 
i.e. currency-induced credit risk. In the case of 
more pronounced exchange rate depreciations, 
as is common during crises, a short foreign 
currency position (net foreign currency 
borrowing) can cause the real debt level of 
households and corporations to rise, leading to 
a pro-cyclical decline in credit quality. Because 
loan values are linked to the value of a foreign 
currency, both foreign exchange-indexed and 
denominated loans behave similarly in this 
regard. Yet, even without depreciation, risks 
can materialise. In the case of an external shock, 
a country might need to increase interest rates 
(sharply) to mitigate downward pressures on 
the exchange rate. This may in turn affect 
clients borrowing in local currency at adjustable 
interest rates and also lead to a deterioration in 
(local currency) credit quality in the economy. 
Thus, the authorities of countries with rigid 
exchange rates may face a policy conﬂ  ict 
owing to the widespread use of foreign 
currency, which may complicate responses to 
ﬁ  nancial crises.
RECENT TRENDS AND FACTORS INFLUENCING 
THE USE OF FOREIGN CURRENCIES
Between 2004 and 2007 the candidate countries, 
in particular Croatia and Turkey, experienced 
rather substantial declines in the overall use 
of foreign currency in the ﬁ  nancial system on 
both the asset and liability sides. In the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, a declining 
use of foreign currencies on the liability side 
went hand in hand with an increasing use of 
foreign currencies on the asset side. At the 
same time, foreign exchange-denominated and 
indexed loans and deposits were still in the 
majority in Croatia and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, where the overall use 
of foreign currencies in the economy is higher. 
During the crisis years of 2008 and 2009, this 
downward trend reversed, and particularly 
in Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia the use of foreign currencies 
increased markedly. In Turkey, however, 
the degree of foreign currency use remained 
largely stable at levels comparable with 
those of 2007. 
As regards deposits, the share of foreign currency-
denominated deposits increased ﬁ  rst and foremost 
in the corporate sector but also (except for 
Turkey) in the household segment (see Chart 15). 
There is evidence that the increasing propensity 
of households to save in foreign currency – or 
to convert local currency-denominated deposits 
into foreign currency deposits – followed a 
general fall in conﬁ  dence in local currencies and 
the banking sector as a result of the ﬁ  nancial 
crisis (see Dvorsky, Scheiber and Stix, 2009).81 
For example, among other measures the Croatian National Bank  80 
(CNB) increased the maximum permitted open foreign exchange 
position for banks from 20% to 30% of equity in February 2009 
and decreased the required ratio of foreign currency liabilities 
to liquid foreign currency claims of banks in several steps, 
from 32% in May 2008 to 20% in February 2009.
This was accompanied by episodes of temporary deposit  81 
withdrawals, mainly in Croatia and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, in the ﬁ  nal quarter of 2008.70
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Market stabilisation and policy measures, 
such as the expansion of the deposit guarantee 
system in Croatia in the ﬁ  nal quarter of 2008, 
may have begun to underpin public conﬁ  dence 
(see section 4.7), but the effects on the use of 
local currencies are more difﬁ  cult to gauge and 
may be more persistent. 
Turning to foreign currency-denominated 
loans, the greater share of foreign exchange 
deposits and sizeable differentials between 
local and foreign currency interest rates were 
mirrored by a greater reliance among ﬁ  rms on 
foreign currency borrowing (see Chart 16). 
Throughout the review period, foreign 
currency lending (domestic foreign currency 
demand) was buttressed by the large savings 
position in (the domestic supply of) foreign 
currency. Foreign wholesale funding (Turkey) 
and funding by parent banks (Croatia and the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) 
provided a further supply of foreign exchange 
to the economy, though this was constrained 
at the height of the ﬁ   nancial crisis as cross-
border capital ﬂ  ows slowed (see section 4.4). 
At such times, candidate country central banks 
were on the spot to provide the economies 
with sufﬁ   cient foreign currency liquidity. 
Furthermore, as a consequence of the global 
ﬁ   nancial crisis, the currency composition of 
foreign currency loans has changed. In Croatia, 
for example, the share of Swiss franc loans in 
total foreign currency loans – which had grown 
rapidly in the period 2004-07 as a result of very 
low interest rates – decreased substantially 
in 2008 and 2009. Likely causes were the higher 
volatility of the kuna against the Swiss franc 
(in contrast to the euro), the more limited supply 
of CHF loans by banks (difﬁ  culties in obtaining 
CHF liquidity) and subsequent conversions of 
CHF-denominated loans into euro loans.
Factors inﬂ   uencing the growth in foreign 
currency borrowing are manifold. Survey 
evidence from the national central banks of 
the three candidate countries exhibits the 
different motives underpinning borrowing in 
foreign currency in the respective economies, 
with both demand-side and supply-side factors 
playing a key role (see Table 27 and Chart 17). 
In each country, foreign currency-denominated 
loans are attractive on account of economic 
Chart 15 Development of foreign currency 
deposits (2007-09)
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factors, particularly a lower interest rate for 
borrowers and the lack of availability of 
medium and long-term local currency ﬁ  nancing 
at a reasonable price. While local currency 
credit and money markets have continued to 
deepen in the candidate countries in recent 
years, interest rate and term factors remain less 
favourable than in foreign currency markets. The 
openness of domestic economies also explains 
the attractiveness of foreign exchange loans. 
For  ﬁ  rms with access to export earnings and 
households that receive remittances or income 
from tourism (e.g. Croatia), foreign currency 
borrowing may represent a means of reducing 
currency mismatches and smoothing the 
purchasing power of foreign currency income. 
However, for households and ﬁ  rms  without 
income in foreign exchange, such borrowing 
represents an unhedged foreign currency 
position that increases the credit risk for banks. 
Chart 16 Development of foreign currency 
loans (2007-09)
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Chart 17 Credit and deposit growth in 
candidate countries (2007-09)
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The stability of the exchange rate, especially in 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
and Croatia, also encourages borrowing in 
foreign currency, in the expectation that the 
loan’s value will remain stable. Expectations 
of future euro accession, while less salient than 
in new EU Member States, may also play a 
role. In Turkey, expectation among borrowers 
of lira appreciation was a further contributing 
factor. In Croatia, persistently low conﬁ  dence 
in the domestic currency given recurring 
hyperinﬂ  ationary episodes in the past is cited 
as an explanation for foreign currency lending. 
This is probably also valid for Turkey and the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
especially, the high presence of foreign-owned 
banks may also have contributed to fuelling 
foreign currency loans.
POLICY RESPONSES: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
Evidence from the central banks of Croatia and 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
shows that there are signiﬁ  cant  unhedged 
positions on household balance sheets, which 
means that currency-induced credit risk in 
the household sector is a key risk. In general, 
it is estimated that in Croatia 82% of all foreign 
currency loans were unhedged as of June 2009, 
while at the same time 96% of households’ 
net placements and contingent liabilities in 
foreign currency were not hedged. The fall 
in tourism and remittance income during 
the crisis, particularly in the western Balkan 
countries, may have also deprived borrowers of 
foreign currency income and thus contributed 
to declining credit quality (see section 4.3). 
On the other hand, the low interest rates on 
euro-denominated loans may actually have 
been a stabilising factor in credit quality, 
especially as local currency interest rates 
proved to be more volatile.
For ﬁ  rms, there is evidence that foreign currency 
lending is most common among borrowers with 
foreign exchange income (Brown, Ongena and 
Yesin, 2009), although unhedged currency positions 
could also represent a risk for corporations. 
Borrowing based on appreciation expectations – 
“carry trade behaviour” by ﬁ  rms – appears to be 
present in Turkey. This is a source of particular 
concern insofar as borrowers are purposefully 
taking on currency risk, speculating on a falling 
real debt level. If exchange rate expectations 
materialise – i.e. nominal appreciation occurs 
– foreign currency lending becomes attractive; 
in the case of unexpected adverse exchange 
rate movements, however – particularly during 
economic downturns or crises – such lending 
increases credit risk in a pro-cyclical manner.
Table 27 Factors influencing foreign currency borrowing
Croatia FYR Macedonia Turkey
Demand-side factors
Interest rate differential for loans in domestic and foreign currency Medium High Medium
High level of “euroisation” in the economy Medium High Low
High openness of the economy High Medium Medium
No or low historical exchange rate volatility Low n.a. n.a.
Fixed/pegged exchange rate to the euro Low High n.a.
Appreciation and/or expectation of appreciation of domestic currency  n.a. n.a. High
Persistently low conﬁ  dence in domestic currency owing to decades 
of recurring hyper-inﬂ  ationary episodes
High n.a. n.a.
Supply-side factors
Insufﬁ  cient domestic savings Medium Low Low
Low-developed local currency credit/money markets Low n.a. n.a.
Unavailability of longer-term debt in local currency High Medium Low
High presence of foreign-owned banks Low High n.a.
Prudential rules for direct foreign exchange risk management by banks Medium High n.a.
Source: National central banks.
Note: n.a. = not available.73
ECB
Occasional Paper No 115
July 2010
4   SPECIAL 
FEATURES The Turkish authorities’ decision in June 2009 
also to ban foreign currency-indexed borrowing 
by households may have been a reaction to 
these concerns. Thus, in Turkey, foreign 
currency-denominated and indexed loans are 
now available only for commercial purposes, 
but foreign exchange-denominated loans 
must have a maturity greater than one year 
and a volume greater than USD 5 million. 
Central banks in Croatia and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have 
also taken measures to discourage foreign 
exchange lending to households (see Table 28), 
in particular by tightening reserve requirements 
on banks’ foreign currency liabilities. The 
Croatian authorities also proactively increased 
these risk weights between 2005 and 2008, thus 
lowering capital adequacy ratios and spurring 
capital increases by banks. Such measures were 
likely to have been constructive, even if they 
could not fully dampen the provision of new 
unhedged foreign currency lending. 
In the aftermath of the crisis, it is a challenge 
for authorities to ﬁ   nd policies which can 
effectively reduce systemic risks and yet be 
implemented over an appropriate time period 
without hampering the recovery of the economy 
and the ﬁ   nancial system. There is a balance 
between loosening regulations in order to 
support recovery and reforming them so as 
to prevent the build-up of new systemic risks. 
While restrictions on foreign currency lending 
may be desirable from a ﬁ  nancial  stability 
point of view, their implementation – given 
the lack of long-term funding in local currency 
markets – may drastically restrict the supply 
of credit to the economy. As a result, both the 
design and the timing of policy are critical. 
Therefore, developing long-term local currency 
funding markets seems of key importance. 
In  ﬁ  nding effective policies, there is also the 
need to differentiate between the stock and 
ﬂ   ow problem, as recent or future regulations 
only target newly-generated foreign exchange 
lending and do not deal with the available 
stock of foreign exchange-denominated or 
indexed loans. Furthermore, there is a very 
clear link between the microeconomic choice 
of foreign currency lending and macroeconomic 
imbalances. Tackling persistent external deﬁ  cits, 
for example through ﬁ  scal restraint, therefore 
may also contribute to reducing foreign 
exchange risks.
As mentioned in previous reports on ﬁ  nancial 
stability challenges in the candidate countries 
(e.g. ECB 2006 and 2008), there is a clear role 
for ﬁ  nancial literacy and moral suasion to make 
sure that borrowers are aware of currency-related 
risks. In the interests of consumer protection, 
the transparency of lending products in foreign 
currencies can also be enhanced. For example, 
banks can illustrate the sensitivity of interest 
payments to potential depreciation scenarios 
and provide information on the past volatility of 
the exchange rate over a sufﬁ  ciently long time 
period. In addition, banks may sell insurance 
against excessive exchange rate volatility. 
Moreover, banks could apply stricter credit 
criteria (e.g. lower payment-to-income and/or 
loan-to-value ratios for mortgages) on foreign 
currency loans, again with the above-mentioned 
caveats in terms of the timing and scale of such 
restrictions.
Previous experience shows that discouraging 
the accumulation of such risks through policy is 
Table 28 Measures taken by authorities to discourage foreign currency lending
Croatia FYR Macedonia Turkey
Reserve requirements on bank liabilities in foreign currency  X X X
Quantitative restrictions on forex lending X
Special forex liquidity requirements X X
Increasing risk weights X
Guidelines/recommendations for banks or customers X X
Source: National central banks.74
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difﬁ  cult even in benign economic environments 
(Rosenberg and Tirpák, 2008). On the other 
hand, increased awareness of the topic at the 
international level is more and more evident. 
In this regard, there are ongoing discussions 
to broaden the scope of the European Bank 
Coordination (“Vienna”) Initiative, which was 
launched at the height of the global ﬁ  nancial 
crisis in January 2009 with the participation of 
the home and host authorities of large cross-
border banking groups operating in central, 
eastern and south-eastern Europe, international 
ﬁ   nancial institutions (e.g. IMF, EBRD, 
EIB, World Bank) and the banking groups 
themselves. Alongside maintaining parent bank 
exposures, the focus of the initiative should 
also be extended to the remaining challenges, 
such as the region’s strong reliance on external 
ﬁ  nancing and large foreign exchange exposures. 
In particular, it should tackle the vulnerabilities 
arising from weak domestic capital markets, the 
limited reliance on domestic ﬁ  nancing sources 
and foreign exchange lending to unhedged 
borrowers. 
As fundamentals improve, the emphasis should 
naturally shift towards enhanced implementation 
of risk-mitigating policies. Discussion with 
authorities within and outside the European 
Union will be necessary to come up with best 
practices for limiting systemic risk stemming 
from foreign currency lending.
4.7  MEASURES TAKEN TO TACKLE 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CRISIS
This section reviews monetary policy, 
regulatory and administrative measures that 
have been taken in the candidate countries to 
mitigate the impact of the crisis on the banking 
sector. The timeframe covers the period since 
the intensiﬁ  cation of the global ﬁ  nancial crisis 
following the fall of Lehman Brothers. Most 
measures entailed reversing or abolishing 
previous measures to slow down credit growth 
and avoid lending booms, which allowed a 
timely and countercyclical response to the 
crisis. Furthermore, it should be emphasised 
that monetary policy transmission operates 
to a large extent via exchange rate policy, 
especially in Croatia and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, given their tightly 
managed exchange rate regimes and the banking 
sector’s sizeable share of foreign exchange-
denominated assets and liabilities. Monetary 
policy transmission tends to be more effective 
in Turkey, operating under an inﬂ  ation-targeting 
and  ﬂ  oating exchange rate policy framework, 
but exchange rate management also played an 
important role as testiﬁ  ed by several measures 
taken to stabilise the currency at the end of 2008. 
In what follows, we only describe the measures 
that have been implemented in a given country, 
i.e. if a particular measure is not mentioned for a 
given country, then that type of measure has not 
been implemented there (see Table 29).
MONETARY POLICY MEASURES
Change in policy rates and reserve requirements
The paths of policy interest rates between 
October 2008 and early 2010 differed 
considerably across the candidate countries. 
In Croatia, the repo rate was reduced from 
7.75% to 6% in December 2008. The CNB also 
changed some of its operational instruments. 
Auctions were changed from multiple to 
ﬁ   xed-price. This contributed to stabilising 
the interest rates on the domestic money 
market, which had been highly volatile in 
the months following the fall of Lehman 
Brothers. Several changes in the reserve 
requirements for banks were introduced in 
order to free domestic and foreign exchange 
liquidity. Most of the measures entailed 
reversing or abolishing previous measures 
designed to slow down overall bank lending. 
The marginal reserve requirement, ﬁ  rst 
introduced in July 2004 to curb banks’ foreign 
indebtedness and then raised several times 
before the crisis, was abolished in October 2008. 
In addition, the special reserve requirement on 
banks’ liabilities arising from issued securities, 
introduced in February 2006, was abolished in 
February 2009. The general reserve requirement 
ratio was reduced from 17% to 14% in 
December 2008 and the foreign exchange 
component of the reserve requirement ratio cut 75
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in January 2009 to release foreign exchange 
liquidity for the banking sector. This reserve 
requirement was further reduced from 14% to 
13% in February 2010.
In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
the interest rate on central bank bills was ﬁ  rst 
increased in March 2009, from 7% to 9%, in the 
context of increased pressures on the domestic 
currency. In May the NBRM adopted additional 
restrictive monetary policy measures by 
increasing the reserve requirement for foreign 
exchange liabilities from 10% to 13%, and 
from 10% to 20% for foreign currency-indexed 
liabilities (where the change in the former was 
implemented in two steps). The alleviation of 
pressures on the foreign exchange market at the 
end of 2009 has allowed the NBRM to lower 
its main interest rate on several occasions since 
December 2009 – from 9% to 5% by the middle 
of June 2010. 
In Turkey, the central bank responded to 
the crisis by making sizeable cuts in policy 
rates in a context of rapidly falling inﬂ  ation 
triggered by contracting domestic and external 
demand. The CBRT has reduced its main policy 
rate – the overnight borrowing rate – by a 
cumulative amount of 1,025 basis points since 
October 2008 – from 16.75% to 6.5% by 
Table 29 Measures implemented to tackle the crisis in the candidate countries
Croatia FYR Macedonia Turkey
Monetary policy
Main interest rate 7.75% to 6% 7% to 9% (March 2009) 
9% to 5% (since December 2009)
16.75% to 6.5%
Reserve requirements 17% to 13%; abolition 
of marginal reserve 
requirement and special 
reserve requirement
10% to 13% (forex liabilities)
10% to 20% (forex-indexed 
liabilities)
6% to 5% (TRY liabilities); 
11% to 9% (forex liabilities)
Exchange rate  Net selling of €784 million 
(October 2008-February 2009); 
foreign currency swaps with 
banks; reduction of minimum 
forex claims ratio
Net selling of €230 million 
(ﬁ  rst half of 2009); allowing forex 
deposits at the central bank from 
banks
Intermediation window for 
banks FX deposits; forex selling 
auctions (USD 100 million); 
decreasing the lending rate 
on central bank forex loans
Collateral Broadening the eligible 
collateral to Ministry of 
Finance T-bills denominated 
in EUR
Regulatory measures
Quantitative limits on lending Annual credit growth limit 
of 12% removed
Annual credit growth limit 
of 11.3% removed 
Open FX position Open forex position 
from 20% to 30%
Deposit insurance HRK 100,000 to HRK 400,000 Council of Ministers authorised 
to raise the amount (not used)
Proﬁ  t distribution Obligation for banks to get 
permission for proﬁ  t distribution 
for 2008 and 2009
Loan restructuring Changes in the regulation on 
provisioning; loan restructuring 
of credit card loans
Other Introducing a minimum liquidity 
ratio
Administrative measures
Extension of the limit of export 
rediscount credit; guarantee 
scheme cash loans extended 
to the SMEs
Source: National central banks.
Notes: The table refers to measures taken since October 2008. Forex = foreign exchange.76
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November 2009 – and has kept it unchanged 
since then. In addition, the foreign exchange 
reserve requirement ratio was reduced from 
11% to 9% in December 2008. As a result, 
the Turkish banking sector was provided 
with foreign exchange liquidity equivalent to 
USD 2.5 billion. More recently, since June 2009, 
with the aim of enhancing the sound functioning 
of the banks’ liquidity management and 
strengthening the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism, the CBRT started to use more 
actively, when necessary, repo transactions with 
maturities of up to three months (in addition to the 
one-week maturity repo auctions that is the usual 
CBRT operating instrument). In October 2009, 
in order to reduce intermediation costs and inject 
permanent liquidity into the markets with the 
aim of supporting the upward trend in Turkish 
lira loans that became discernible in the last 
quarter of 2009, the domestic currency reserve 
requirement ratio was cut from 6% to 5%. 
With this reduction, an amount of liquidity 
equivalent to approximately TRY 3.3 billion 
was pumped into the Turkish banking system.
Exchange rate stabilisation measures
In all three candidate countries, some measures 
were taken to support the exchange rates at 
the height of the ﬁ  nancial crisis in late 2008 
and early 2009. The precise design and extent 
of the measures differed, however, in view 
of differences in prevailing exchange rate 
regimes, the degree of foreign exchange market 
pressures and the operational framework of 
central banks.
In Croatia, the CNB intervened directly on the 
foreign exchange market by selling €271 million 
in October 2008, €328 million in January 2009 
and €185 million in February 2009. Foreign 
currency swap contracts with the banks were 
introduced in January 2009 in order to support 
government borrowing from the banking 
sector: in exchange for €261 million of foreign 
currency pledged as collateral, banks obtained 
HRK 1.9 billion to lend to the central government. 
Subsequently, the amount of the swap contract 
was increased to €288 million and extended 
until June. In parallel, the ratio of minimum 
required liquid foreign currency claims 
over total foreign liabilities was reduced 
twice in February 2009 from 28.5% 
to 25.0%, and additionally to 20.0% 
(this followed a previous reduction in this 
ratio from 32.0% to 28.5% in May 2008). This 
measure resulted in freeing €2.1 billion in foreign 
exchange liquidity for the banks and provided 
them with the funds required for ﬁ  nancing the 
central government, thus minimising the risk of 
crowding out the private sector.
In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
the NBRM adopted a decision on foreign 
exchange deposits at the end of 2008, which 
introduced the possibility for domestic banks to 
hold foreign exchange deposits with the NBRM. 
The objective was to retain foreign exchange 
liquidity at home instead of banks placing their 
foreign exchange liquidity with foreign banks 
abroad. This measure also helped to limit the 
exposure of banks to credit risk when placing 
assets abroad in the context of the volatile global 
ﬁ   nancial environment. During the ﬁ  rst  half 
of 2009, shortages of external ﬁ  nancing resulted 
in a loss of foreign reserves for the NBRM 
related to interventions on the foreign exchange 
market worth a net sell of €230 million. During 
the second half of 2009, however, exchange rate 
pressures abated owing to a correction of external 
imbalances and the NBRM intervened by making 
net purchases of foreign currency. The NBRM’s 
action helped rebuild foreign reserves, which 
by the end of 2009 had risen by €102.6 million 
compared with levels at the end of 2008.
In Turkey, the intermediation window for 
foreign exchange deposits – a facility where 
the CBRT plays the role of intermediary in 
the interbank market – was reactivated during 
October 2008. The objective was to prevent 
a liquidity squeeze in the foreign exchange 
interbank market resulting from the conﬁ  dence 
shock that hit the world banking industry after 
the fall of Lehman Brothers. This facility was a 
last resort facility and was intended to cease once 
uncertainties arising from the global ﬁ  nancial 
crisis had disappeared. By 24 October 2008 the 
transaction limit for banks under this facility 77
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FEATURES had been doubled, reaching USD 10.8 billion 
in total. However, as Turkish banks did not 
encounter major foreign exchange liquidity 
problems, they had used only 4% of this limit 
by the end of October 2008. In addition, foreign 
exchange buying auctions were suspended and 
foreign exchange selling auctions initiated in 
mid-October 2008. The objective was to 
strengthen the foreign exchange liquidity 
position of the Turkish banking sector and 
to prevent negative pressures on the Turkish 
lira. The daily amount for foreign exchange 
selling auctions was set at USD 50 million. 
Two auctions were held and an amount of 
USD 100 million was sold in total. However, 
owing to positive developments in the global 
ﬁ   nancial markets, foreign exchange selling 
auctions were terminated at the end of 
October 2008. In November 2008, another direct 
measure to strengthen the foreign exchange 
liquidity position of the Turkish banking sector 
was introduced by increasing the maturity 
of foreign exchange loans extended to banks 
by the CBRT from one week to one month. 
The lending rate on these loans, denominated in 
euro and US dollars, was reduced from an initial 
level of 10% for both currencies to 9% for the 
euro and 7% for the US currency. However, 
none of the Turkish banks made use of this 
facility. More recently, in August 2009 foreign 
exchange buying auctions were initiated once 
more to absorb foreign exchange liquidity on 
account of the increasing capital inﬂ  ows related 
to improved market sentiment vis-à-vis the 
Turkish economy.
Eligible collateral
Amendments to the central bank’s collateral 
policy were made only in Croatia, where the 
CNB broadened the set of eligible collateral 
in March 2009. As collateral for the central 
bank’s short-term liquidity operations, banks 
have been allowed to use Ministry of Finance 
treasury bills denominated in euro with an 
original maturity of up to one year (initially only 
treasury bills in kuna were eligible). In addition, 
the CNB extended the set of eligible collateral 
further to other instruments in December 2009. 
Up to March 2010, however, banks had not 
shown any reliance on the new set of collateral 
instruments.
REGULATORY MEASURES
Contrary to many EU countries, neither 
recapitalisation schemes for banks nor state 
guarantees for bank liabilities were introduced 
in the countries under review.
Removing quantitative limits on lending
In Croatia, the CNB removed the quantitative 
restrictions on lending introduced in 
January 2007 (i.e. the obligation for banks to 
subscribe CNB bills in cases where annual 
growth in their credit portfolio exceeded 12%). 
Based on available indicators pointing to a 
considerable slowdown of bank lending and the 
fact that banks started to exercise greater caution 
regarding credit and associated risks, restrictions 
on credit growth were deemed to be no longer 
necessary as the CNB initiated measures to spur 
bank lending. 
In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
the measures implemented during 2008 to limit 
household lending were abandoned in 2010. 
At the end of 2009, the annual growth rate of 
household credits stood at 2.6%, signiﬁ  cantly 
lower than the 11.3% limit determined by the 
regulation (as in Croatia’s case, banks were 
obliged to subscribe to a compulsory deposit 
with the NBRM if the growth rate of household 
credits exceeded the limit set by the NBRM).
Open foreign currency position
In Croatia, the maximum permitted open foreign 
exchange position for banks was increased from 
20% to 30% in February 2009. This move was 
made in order to ensure consistency with the 
reduction in the minimum required foreign 
currency claims ratio (see above). These 
measures helped to maintain the stability of the 
kuna by allowing banks to substitute foreign 
exchange-denominated assets with domestic 
currency-denominated assets.
Change in the deposit insurance framework
In Croatia, the deposit insurance framework 
was strengthened in October 2008 by increasing 78
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the limit for the deposit guarantee on individual 
accounts from HRK 100,000 to HRK 400,000. 
This move came in an environment of negative 
perceptions among depositors concerning 
subsidiary banks, related to fears about the 
parent banks’ losses resulting from the failure 
of Lehman Brothers. This triggered an outﬂ  ow 
of deposits from the Croatian subsidiaries 
during October 2008, but the quick response 
of monetary and ﬁ  scal authorities proved to be 
effective as the outﬂ  ow of household deposits 
was halted.
In Turkey, the Council of Ministers was 
authorised to raise the amount of deposit 
insurance in November 2008. However, there 
appeared to be no need to change the amount of 
deposit insurance as banks were not subject to any 
deposit outﬂ  ows (the amount of deposit insurance 
has stood at TRY 50,000 since July 2004).
Limits on profit distribution
In Turkey, in order to strengthen banks’ own 
funds, the Banking Regulation and Supervision 
Agency required banks to obtain permission 
for the distribution of proﬁ   ts from the years 
2008 and 2009. As a result of this measure, the 
dividend payout ratio of deposit banks declined 
from 34.6% at the end of 2007 to 16.6% at the 
end of 2008.
Loan restructuring measures
In Turkey, an amendment to the Regulation on 
loans qualiﬁ  cation and provisioning introduced 
new facilities allowing the banks to classify their 
loans within a group level that would be more 
advantageous for them in terms of provisioning. 
Additionally, in order to restructure credit 
card receivables, a provisional clause was 
added to the “Law on Bank Cards and Credit 
Cards”, allowing customers whose credit card 
receivables are classiﬁ   ed as non-performing 
to apply within 60 days for a restructuring of 
their debt under certain conditions. Some banks 
voluntarily extended the application period of 
this clause, due to end on 4 September 2009, 
until the end of the year. The total amount of 
restructured credit card receivables as a result 
of this measure was TRY 1.3 billion, which 
represents 36.5% of total non-performing credit 
card loans as of May 2009.
Other measures
At the end of 2008 the NBRM adopted a 
Decision on the management of liquidity risk by 
banks. This imposed the requirement for banks 
to maintain a minimum level of liquidity equal 
to 1, deﬁ  ned as a ratio between the assets and 
liabilities with maturity up to 30 and 180 days 
for both domestic and foreign currencies. 
The implementation of this decision started in 
February 2009, when the banks were required 
to submit a ﬁ  rst report on initial liquidity ratios 
as of 28 February 2009 to the NBRM. From 
the end of March, a requirement for increasing 
the liquidity ratios on a monthly basis was 
introduced, with a monthly increment of 1/24 
of the gap between the minimum level and the 
initial level of the liquidity ratio for maturities 
up to 30 days, and 1/60 of the gap between 
the minimum level and the initial level of the 
liquidity ratio for maturities up to 180 days. 
The decision was amended in May 2009, 
allowing for the possibility of using NBRM 
instruments in fulﬁ  lling the liquidity ratios, either 
in domestic or in foreign currency. The effect of 
these measures became apparent as the liquidity 
of the banking system improved signiﬁ  cantly in 
the third quarter of 2009. The improvement was 
driven by the obligation for banks to comply 
with the above-mentioned requirement, but it 
was also a prudent response by the banking 
system to the enhanced liquidity risk associated 
with the global ﬁ  nancial crisis.
ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES
In Turkey, at the end of 2008 the limit for export 
rediscount credits was raised from 
USD 500 million to USD 1 billion and the 
utilisation of these credits facilitated with an 
amendment to the application guidelines and 
conditions for export rediscount credits. 
Moreover, the credit limit for individual 
companies was extended from USD 10 million 
to USD 20 million.82 These arrangements led to 
The limit was raised to USD 40 million for so-called “foreign  82 
trade capital companies”.79
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FEATURES a sharp increase in the volume of export 
rediscount credits extended via Turkey’s 
Eximbank: total export rediscount credit 
utilisation was USD 1.7 million for 2008, 
reaching USD 502.5 million in the period 
between 1 January and 16 April 2009. Having 
taken this development into account, in order to 
make the fullest possible contribution to meeting 
the  ﬁ   nancing needs of export companies, the 
export rediscount credit limit was raised further 
by USD 1.5 billion to USD 2.5 billion in 
April 2009.
In addition, a guarantee scheme in Turkey aimed 
at sustaining lending to SMEs was implemented. 
The Turkish government (Undersecretariat of 
Treasury) implicitly introduced guarantees on 
cash loans extended to SMEs by signing an 
agreement with the Credit Guarantee Fund in 
October 2009. The Credit Guarantee Fund was 
mandated to guarantee SME loans up to a total 
amount of TRY 10 billion (this amount is equal 
to almost one-eighth of cash loans extended 
to SMEs). The protocol between the Credit 
Guarantee Fund and the banks that provide loans 
was signed at the end of 2009 and ﬁ  rms started 
to apply for guarantees in January 2010.
FURTHER CHALLENGES
Although most of the measures listed above have 
proved to be effective in avoiding a liquidity 
squeeze in the banking sector and averting 
disruption in the exchange rate market, lending 
to the private sector remains at historically 
low levels. Therefore, the main challenge in 
the countries under review is to restart lending 
and avoid a prolonged period of credit crunch. 
The above review suggests that the bulk of 
measures implemented in Turkey to support 
lending to SMEs and export companies 
proved to be fairly effective as regards recent 
macroeconomic developments. No similar 
measures were implemented in the two 
other candidate countries and the Turkish 
example could provide a useful benchmark. 
Furthermore,  ﬁ   nancial stability could be 
strengthened via the pursuit of sound and 
stability-oriented macroeconomic policies and 
by creating robust domestic funding markets 
to encourage lending in domestic currency, 
although it should be noted that this might 
prove challenging for small countries in which 
foreign-owned banks represent a large share of 
the banking sector. Given the potential ﬁ  nancial 
stability risks associated with the very high 
shares of foreign currency-denominated loans 
in Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, macro-prudential measures to 
reduce the underlying vulnerabilities related to 
foreign currency lending are essential.80
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5 CONCLUSIONS
This paper has reviewed ﬁ  nancial  stability 
developments in the EU candidate countries. 
On the basis of the analysis, three main 
conclusions and recommendations emerge:
First, as of early 2010, the key challenge for 
the  ﬁ   nancial systems in the three candidate 
countries relates to the deterioration in credit 
quality. Given the lag in the transmission of the 
economic cycle to asset quality, and especially 
in the event of a renewed deterioration in 
economic conditions, a further deterioration in 
asset quality may occur, calling for continued 
close monitoring by the supervisory authorities 
of candidate countries. However, although 
uncertainties remain regarding credit quality, 
the shock-absorbing capacities of the banking 
systems are fairly high, as also evidenced by 
their relative resilience to date.
Second, as the economic recovery sets in, central 
banks should resume and possibly step up 
the implementation of measures to avoid a 
pro-cyclical build-up of credit (asset) boom-bust 
cycles. While at the moment the immediate 
challenge is more one of restarting credit growth, 
lending growth may resume strongly as the 
recovery gains ground, given the potential for 
further convergence in the economies of the 
EU candidate countries. Therefore, monetary 
authorities should design and communicate 
clearly their exit strategies from the loose 
monetary policy conditions applied via various 
channels at the present juncture.83
Third, given the relevance of foreign-owned 
banks in most of the countries, a continued 
strengthening of home-host cooperation in the 
supervisory area will be crucial to avoid any kind 
of regulatory arbitrage, to enhance the efﬁ  ciency 
of macro-prudential measures and to provide 
authorities with comprehensive information for 
planning their actions. Improving home-host 
cooperation is one of the key objectives of 
the Eurosystem’s crisis response package in 
EU candidates and potential candidates, which 
is aimed at promoting supervisory standards 
in the target countries through the transfer of 
expertise and know-how.
The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey had already made  83 
an announcement on 14 April 2010, stating that it would “gradually 
remove the liquidity measures implemented during the crisis”.81
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